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ABSTRACT	  James	  E.	  Covington	  III:	  Visionary	  Policy:	  Bill	  Clinton,	  the	  Bosnian	  War,	  and	  American	  Foreign	  Policy	  in	  the	  Post-­‐Cold	  War	  Era,	  1992-­‐1995	  (Under	  the	  direction	  of	  Michael	  C.	  Morgan)	  	   Bill	  Clinton	  assumed	  office	  during	  a	  particularly	  challenging	  period	  of	  American	  history.	  After	  the	  fall	  of	  the	  Soviet	  Union,	  the	  United	  States	  enjoyed	  a	  period	  of	  unprecedented	  power	  and	  authority.	  	  Clinton	  was	  elected	  to	  office	  largely	  for	  his	  domestic	  policies,	  however,	  his	  vision	  for	  America’s	  position	  in	  the	  post-­‐Cold	  War	  world	  steered	  his	  foreign	  policy,	  particularly	  with	  respect	  to	  Europe.	  	  	  Clinton’s	  vision	  was	  more	  inclusive	  and	  encompassing	  than	  that	  of	  his	  predecessor,	  George	  H.	  W.	  Bush.	  During	  the	  post-­‐Cold	  War	  years,	  Bush	  was	  more	  inclined	  to	  let	  Europe	  sort	  out	  their	  own	  problems,	  particularly	  in	  the	  case	  of	  Bosnia.	  	  Clinton,	  however,	  was	  more	  willing	  to	  see	  post-­‐Cold	  War	  European	  problems	  as	  American	  issues.	  	  The	  Bosnian	  War	  represents	  a	  point	  where	  these	  two	  ideals	  collided.	  	  Guided	  by	  this	  vision,	  Clinton	  overcame	  challenges	  from	  the	  European	  Community,	  political	  adversaries,	  and	  even	  his	  own	  public	  en	  route	  to	  intervening	  in	  Bosnia.	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Introduction	  In	  late	  December	  1995,	  the	  first	  American	  combat	  troops	  of	  NATO’s	  IFOR	  (Implementation	  Force)	  stepped	  out	  of	  their	  armored	  personnel	  carriers	  and	  set	  foot	  on	  frozen	  Bosnian	  soil	  to	  enforce	  the	  ceasefire	  set	  forth	  in	  the	  Dayton	  Peace	  Accords.	  	  These	  forces,	  the	  first	  American	  “boots	  on	  the	  ground”	  in	  the	  Former	  Republic	  of	  Yugoslavia	  (FRY,)	  represented	  the	  culmination	  of	  a	  long	  political	  and	  diplomatic	  process.	  	  For	  nearly	  three	  years	  President	  Bill	  Clinton	  had	  been	  seeking	  to	  halt	  the	  violence	  that	  had	  plagued	  the	  Balkans	  since	  the	  fall	  of	  the	  Soviet	  Union.	  	  Now,	  his	  efforts	  were	  finally	  paying	  off.	  Between	  1992	  and	  1995,	  the	  war	  in	  Bosnia-­‐Herzegovina	  (hereafter	  Bosnia)	  claimed	  the	  lives	  of	  more	  than	  100,000	  people	  and	  wounded	  at	  least	  twice	  that	  number.1	  	  The	  fighting	  raged	  in	  a	  confined	  territory	  with	  a	  population	  of	  fewer	  than	  four	  million	  people.	  	  The	  violence,	  which	  has	  been	  called	  the	  worst	  European	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  The	  total	  number	  of	  casualties	  is	  a	  highly	  debated	  topic.	  	  Getting	  an	  accurate	  total	  of	  casualties	  of	  the	  war	  has	  proven	  very	  difficult.	  	  Some	  organizations	  estimate	  the	  total	  as	  low	  as	  just	  over	  82,000	  and	  others	  estimate	  as	  high	  as	  more	  than	  350,000.	  	  For	  the	  purpose	  of	  this	  paper,	  I	  went	  with	  the	  	  most	  accurate	  study	  I	  could	  find,	  conducted	  by	  the	  United	  Nations	  International	  Criminal	  Tribunal	  for	  the	  former	  Yugoslavia	  (ICTY).	  	  Also	  considered	  were	  studies	  by	  the	  Households	  in	  Crisis	  Network	  (The	  Bosnian	  Book	  of	  the	  Dead)	  and	  the	  Research	  and	  Documentation	  Center	  in	  Sarajevo,	  but	  the	  ICTY	  was	  much	  more	  careful	  in	  compiling	  their	  figures.	  	  	  	  See	  Appendix	  1.	  Source:,	  Jan	  Zwierzchowski	  and,	  Ewa	  Tabeau,	  “The	  1992-­‐1995	  War	  in	  Bosnia	  and	  Herzegovina:	  Census-­‐Based	  Multiple	  System	  Estimation	  of	  Casualties’	  Undercount,”	  International	  Research	  
Workshop	  on	  The	  Global	  Costs	  of	  Conflict,	  (Berlin:	  February	  1,	  2010)	  Obtained	  from	  the	  United	  Nations	  
International	  Criminal	  Tribunal	  for	  the	  former	  Yugoslavia	  (ICTY)	  	  	  Online:	  http://www.icty.org/x/file/About/OTP/War_Demographics/en/bih_casualty_undercount_conf_paper_100201.pdf	  	  
	   2	  
atrocities	  since	  the	  Holocaust,2	  unfolded	  in	  plain	  sight	  while	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  world	  pretended	  not	  to	  notice.	  	  Until	  1995,	  the	  United	  States	  and	  its	  European	  allies	  seemed	  content	  to	  let	  the	  United	  Nations	  fumble	  the	  crisis	  –	  with	  disastrous	  results.	  	  Perhaps	  the	  most	  troubling	  facet	  of	  the	  Bosnian	  War	  was	  that	  it	  occurred	  as	  the	  world	  was	  looking	  to	  the	  U.S.	  and	  Western	  Europe	  for	  leadership.	  	  Richard	  Holbrooke,	  President	  Bill	  Clinton’s	  Assistant	  Secretary	  of	  State	  for	  European	  and	  Eurasian	  Affairs,	  called	  the	  failure	  of	  the	  U.	  S.	  and	  the	  EU	  to	  intervene	  “the	  greatest	  collective	  security	  failure	  of	  the	  West	  since	  the	  1930s.”	  	  In	  his	  1998	  memoir,	  Holbrooke	  wrote,	  “Yugoslavia	  undeniably	  represented	  a	  failure	  of	  historic	  dimensions.	  	  Why	  and	  how	  had	  it	  happened	  –	  and	  just	  at	  the	  moment	  of	  the	  West’s	  great	  triumph	  over	  communism.”3	  	  Clinton’s	  decision	  to	  intervene	  in	  Bosnia	  marked	  a	  reversal,	  or	  at	  least	  a	  significant	  shift	  in	  American	  foreign	  policy	  –	  not	  only	  toward	  the	  Balkans,	  but	  in	  the	  direction	  of	  U.S.	  international	  relations	  as	  a	  whole.	  	  As	  the	  Americans	  attempted	  to	  chart	  a	  new	  course	  for	  their	  foreign	  policy	  and	  determine	  their	  new	  role	  in	  a	  world	  without	  the	  Soviet	  Union,	  Bosnia	  provided	  a	  brutal	  initiation	  into	  the	  post-­‐Cold	  War	  era.	  	  	   The	  end	  of	  the	  Cold	  War	  presented	  an	  interesting	  challenge	  for	  American	  foreign	  policy	  makers;	  they	  no	  longer	  had	  to	  plan	  their	  moves	  with	  the	  end	  goal	  of	  defeating	  their	  Soviet	  adversaries.	  	  Having	  emerged	  victorious	  over	  the	  communist	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2	  Sabrina	  P	  Ramet.	  and	  Christine	  Ingebritsen,	  Coming	  in	  From	  the	  Cold	  War:	  Changes	  in	  U.	  S.	  –	  
Eurpoean	  Interactions	  since	  1980,	  (Oxford:	  Rowman	  &	  Littlefield	  Publishers,	  Inc.,	  2002)	  9.	  	  3	  Richard	  Holbrooke,	  To	  End	  a	  War,	  (New	  York:	  Random	  House,	  1998)	  21.	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giant	  the	  U.S.	  -­‐	  the	  world’s	  sole	  superpower	  -­‐	  faced	  uncharted	  territory.4	  	  For	  the	  first	  time	  in	  45	  years,	  the	  United	  States	  had	  to	  create	  a	  foreign	  policy.	  	  It	  was	  up	  to	  the	  Americans	  to	  decide	  their	  new	  role	  in	  the	  post-­‐Cold	  War	  world.	  	  Their	  victory	  over	  communism	  had	  not	  only	  increased	  American	  power	  and	  authority,	  but	  also	  their	  responsibilities,	  and	  U.S.	  policy	  makers	  had	  to	  determine	  when	  and	  how	  to	  best	  use	  their	  military	  power.	  Somalia	  presented	  the	  first	  opportunity	  for	  post-­‐Cold	  War,	  American	  military	  intervention.	  	  Not	  even	  a	  year	  into	  the	  post-­‐Cold	  War	  era,	  and	  with	  mere	  weeks	  remaining	  in	  his	  tenure,	  President	  George	  H.	  W.	  Bush	  ordered	  the	  deployment	  of	  American	  combat	  forces	  to	  Somalia	  to	  secure	  the	  Somali	  trade	  routes	  and	  facilitate	  the	  flow	  of	  food	  and	  medical	  supplies	  to	  the	  Somali	  people.	  	  Despite	  Bush’s	  assurance	  that	  this	  would	  not	  be	  an	  “open-­‐ended	  commitment,”5	  the	  timing	  of	  the	  deployment	  effectively	  left	  Bill	  Clinton’s	  administration	  in	  charge	  of	  the	  operation.	  	  	  Securing	  trade	  routes	  and	  enabling	  food	  and	  medical	  supplies	  to	  reach	  Somali	  civilians	  hardly	  seemed	  like	  a	  daunting	  challenge	  for	  American	  combat	  forces,	  who	  had	  obliterated	  Saddam	  Hussein’s	  Iraqi	  army	  about	  a	  year	  earlier.	  	  American	  forces	  met	  with	  success	  during	  the	  early	  days	  of	  the	  mission,	  officially	  titled	  Operation	  Restore	  Hope.	  	  The	  situation	  quickly	  turned	  ugly	  for	  the	  Americans,	  however.	  	  In	  October	  1993,	  during	  Clinton’s	  first	  year	  as	  president	  -­‐	  the	  “Black	  Hawk	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  4	  There	  is	  some	  debate	  as	  to	  whether	  or	  not	  the	  United	  States	  “won”	  the	  Cold	  War,	  and	  this	  can	  be	  argued	  at	  length.	  	  Regardless,	  of	  one’s	  stance,	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  certainly	  did	  not	  win,	  and	  the	  end	  result	  was	  that	  the	  U.S.	  had	  achieved	  unprecedented	  power	  and	  influence	  after	  the	  fall	  of	  communism.	  	  5	  Jonathan	  Stevenson,	  Losing	  Mogadishu:	  Testing	  U.S.	  Policy	  in	  Somalia,	  (Annapolis:	  Naval	  Institute	  Press,	  1995)	  53.	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Down”	  incident	  and	  subsequent	  Battle	  of	  Mogadishu	  created	  a	  media	  nightmare	  that	  would	  echo	  loudly	  during	  the	  following	  years.	  	  	  The	  administration	  responded	  by	  hastily	  pulling	  American	  combat	  forces	  out	  of	  the	  region.6	  	  	  	  Since	  the	  1960s,	  many	  historians	  have	  argued	  that	  the	  American	  government	  has	  long	  used	  military	  intervention	  to	  advance	  selfish	  foreign	  policy	  goals.	  	  Some	  even	  argue	  that	  the	  U.	  S.	  government	  deliberately	  deceived	  its	  citizens	  about	  its	  true	  intentions	  in	  order	  to	  garner	  their	  support.7	  	  I	  argue	  that	  American	  foreign	  policy	  in	  Bosnia	  represents	  a	  break	  from	  this	  trend.	  	  Bosnia	  offered	  the	  U.	  S.	  policymakers	  no	  promise	  for	  commercial	  capital	  gain,	  nor	  did	  they	  fabricate	  a	  reason	  to	  unilaterally	  intervene.	  	  I	  make	  the	  case	  that	  Clinton	  entered	  office	  with	  a	  more	  encompassing	  vision	  for	  U.S.	  foreign	  relations	  than	  that	  of	  his	  predecessor.	  	  Clinton’s	  vision	  included	  more	  cooperation	  with	  Russia	  and	  the	  European	  Community	  in	  the	  post-­‐Cold	  War	  world.	  	  In	  the	  case	  of	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  6	  Jonathan	  Stevenson,	  Losing	  Mogadishu:	  Testing	  U.S.	  Policy	  in	  Somalia	  (Annapolis:	  Naval	  Institute	  Press,	  1995)	  	  7	  Much	  has	  been	  written	  about	  United	  States	  foreign	  policy	  and	  military	  intervention	  abroad.	  	  William	  Appleman	  Williams’	  masterpiece,	  The	  Tragedy	  of	  American	  Diplomacy,	  argues	  that	  the	  aim	  U.S.	  foreign	  policy	  was	  to	  secure	  a	  commercial	  frontier	  that	  would	  be	  safe	  for	  American	  economic	  expansion.	  	  [William	  Appleman	  Williams,	  The	  Tragedy	  of	  American	  Diplomacy,	  (New	  York:	  W.	  W.	  Norton	  &	  Company	  1972.)]	  	  John	  Quigley	  offers	  a	  recent	  contribution	  to	  this	  foreign	  policy	  conversation	  with	  his	  work,	  The	  Ruses	  for	  War:	  American	  Interventionism	  since	  World	  War	  II.	  	  Quigley	  asserts	  that	  U.	  S.	  policy	  makers	  have	  repeatedly	  urged	  the	  American	  public	  to	  support	  wars	  for	  reasons	  that	  turned	  out	  later	  to	  be	  hardly	  credible.	  	  Quigley	  cites	  the	  George	  W.	  Bush	  administration’s	  use	  of	  weapons	  of	  mass	  destruction	  to	  justify	  the	  2003	  invasion	  of	  Iraq	  as	  recent	  evidence	  of	  a	  well-­‐established	  American	  foreign	  policy	  trend.	  	  Quigley	  makes	  this	  case	  for	  many	  military	  operations	  conducted	  during	  and	  after	  the	  Cold	  War.	  	  American	  intervention	  in	  the	  Bosnian	  War,	  however	  is	  not	  mentioned	  in	  his	  work.	  	  [John	  Quigley,	  The	  Ruses	  for	  War:	  American	  Interventionism	  since	  World	  War	  
II,	  (New	  York:	  Prometheus	  Books,	  2007.)]	  	  	  This	  is	  an	  argument	  that	  Walter	  LaFebre	  would	  agree	  with.	  	  In	  his	  work,	  America,	  Russia	  and	  the	  Cold	  War	  1945-­‐2006,	  LaFebre	  asserts	  that	  American	  domestic	  policies	  have	  long	  determined	  their	  foreign	  policy.	  	  LaFebre	  suggests	  that	  Harry	  S.	  Truman,	  and	  his	  secretary	  of	  state	  Dean	  Acheson,	  demonized	  communism	  and	  exaggerated	  the	  Soviet	  threat	  in	  order	  to	  get	  military	  bills	  passed	  in	  congress.	  [Walter	  LaFeber,	  America,	  Russia	  and	  the	  Cold	  War	  
1945-­‐2006	  (New	  York:	  McGraw	  Hill,	  Inc.,	  2008.)]	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Bosnia,	  Bill	  Clinton	  and	  his	  policy	  makers	  waited	  patiently	  (perhaps	  too	  patiently)	  to	  overcome	  the	  objections	  of	  his	  adversaries	  (both	  foreign	  and	  domestic)	  in	  order	  to	  provide	  an	  opening	  that	  would	  prove	  politically	  feasible	  for	  an	  American	  intervention	  rather	  than	  fabricating	  a	  false	  motive	  and	  deceiving	  the	  American	  public	  into	  supporting	  an	  intervention.	  	  The	  Srebrenica	  massacre	  acted	  as	  this	  tipping	  point	  for	  the	  Clinton	  administration’s	  foreign	  policy.	  	  It	  gave	  Clinton	  the	  opening	  that	  he	  needed	  to	  employ	  his	  agenda	  toward	  the	  former	  Yugoslavia.	  	  American	  intervention	  in	  the	  Bosnian	  War	  was	  not	  politically	  feasible	  until	  the	  Srebrenica	  massacre.	  Bill	  Clinton	  realized	  the	  opportunity	  that	  Srebrenica	  offered	  and	  took	  advantage.	  	  In	  several	  cases,	  however,	  the	  Clinton	  administration	  intervened	  in	  regions	  where	  the	  United	  States	  had	  no	  substantial	  interests	  at	  stake.	  	  It	  made	  no	  attempt	  to	  misinform	  the	  public	  and	  perhaps	  paid	  the	  price	  for	  its	  own	  candor.8	  	  	  Clinton’s	  vision	  was	  more-­‐inclusive	  and	  encompassing	  than	  that	  of	  his	  predecessor,	  George	  H.	  W.	  Bush.	  	  Bush’s	  less-­‐encompassing	  and	  more	  limited	  view	  of	  American	  policy	  (also	  shared	  by	  most	  of	  Clinton’s	  other	  political	  adversaries)	  had	  more	  utility	  during	  the	  Cold	  War,	  which	  was	  where	  his	  view	  was	  shaped.	  	  During	  the	  post-­‐Cold	  War	  years,	  Bush	  was	  more	  inclined	  to	  let	  Europe	  sort	  out	  their	  own	  problems,	  which	  explains	  why	  he	  chose	  to	  stay	  out	  of	  Bosnia.	  	  Clinton,	  being	  the	  first	  president	  elected	  after	  the	  Cold	  War,	  was	  more	  inclined	  to	  see	  post-­‐Cold	  War	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  8	  Bill	  Clinton	  acknowledged	  that	  the	  American	  public	  was	  not	  in	  favor	  of	  committing	  American	  combat	  forces	  in	  Bosnia	  and	  would	  remain	  opposed	  to	  such	  actions	  until	  he	  could	  assure	  them	  that	  he	  would	  only	  commit	  U.S.	  forces	  to	  a	  “clear,	  limited,	  achievable	  mission”	  and	  that	  they	  would	  be	  “well-­‐trained	  and	  heavily	  armed	  to	  minimize	  the	  risk	  of	  casualties.	  Bill	  Clinton,	  “Ending	  the	  Bosnian	  War:	  The	  Personal	  Story	  of	  the	  President	  of	  the	  United	  States”,	  Bosnia,	  Intelligence,	  and	  the	  Clinton	  
Presidency:	  The	  Role	  of	  Intelligence	  and	  Political	  Leadership	  in	  Ending	  the	  Bosnian	  War	  (Little	  Rock:	  William	  J.	  Clinton	  Presidential	  Library	  2013)	  7-­‐9.	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European	  problems	  as	  American	  issues.	  	  Bosnia	  represents	  a	  point	  in	  American	  history	  where	  these	  two	  visions	  collided.	  	  	  Writers	  continue	  to	  debate	  Clinton’s	  motivation	  for	  sending	  U.S.	  forces	  to	  the	  Balkans.	  	  Decision	  makers	  rarely	  have	  a	  single	  motivation	  for	  their	  actions,	  much	  less	  one	  as	  consequential	  as	  intervening	  in	  a	  long-­‐running	  and	  bloody	  foreign	  crisis.	  Clinton	  had	  many	  reasons	  for	  acting	  in	  Bosnia.	  	  To	  be	  sure,	  political	  gain,	  approval	  ratings,	  legacy,	  and	  the	  desire	  to	  do	  good	  factored	  into	  his	  decision.	  	  	  	  But	  more	  important	  than	  any	  of	  these	  factors	  was	  his	  vision	  for	  American	  foreign	  policy	  in	  the	  post-­‐Cold	  War	  world.	  	  As	  a	  candidate,	  Clinton	  centered	  his	  campaign	  on	  domestic	  issues.	  	  He	  had,	  however,	  been	  very	  critical	  of	  the	  Bush	  administration’s	  failure	  to	  address	  the	  human	  rights	  abuses	  in	  the	  Balkans.	  	  Soon	  after	  his	  November	  1992	  victory,	  Clinton	  pushed	  a	  greater	  U.	  S.	  role	  in	  ending	  the	  violence	  in	  the	  former	  Yugoslavia.	  	  He	  hinted	  that	  American	  military	  intervention	  in	  Bosnia	  was	  a	  genuine	  option	  and	  signaled	  a	  tough	  foreign	  policy	  toward	  the	  Balkans.	  	  Clinton	  recognized	  that	  the	  U.S.	  would	  have	  to	  assume	  a	  leadership	  role	  to	  force	  any	  real	  change,	  but	  he	  lacked	  the	  political	  power	  to	  act	  unilaterally.	  	  Still,	  guided	  by	  his	  vision	  for	  post-­‐Cold	  War	  Euro-­‐American	  stability,	  Clinton	  persisted.	  	  	  This	  thesis	  begins	  with	  a	  short	  historiography	  of	  the	  Clinton	  presidency	  followed	  by	  a	  brief	  history	  of	  the	  Balkan	  conflict,	  dispensing	  with	  the	  myth	  of	  “ancient	  hatreds,”	  and	  then	  presents	  a	  comprehensive	  description	  of	  Clinton’s	  vision	  for	  the	  U.S.	  in	  the	  post-­‐Cold	  War	  world.	  	  No	  thorough	  discussion	  can	  ignore	  the	  many	  obstacles	  that	  blocked	  Clinton	  from	  acting	  on	  these	  principles.	  	  Western	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European	  leaders,	  domestic	  American	  political	  rivals,	  and	  the	  American	  public	  all	  stymied	  his	  initial	  hopes	  of	  ending	  the	  crisis	  in	  Bosnia.	  	  Clinton	  finally	  acquired	  the	  political	  wherewithal	  to	  overcome	  each	  of	  these	  obstacles	  after	  the	  1995	  Srebrenica	  Massacre.	  	  The	  massacre	  provided	  new	  opportunities	  for	  action,	  and	  Clinton	  took	  full	  advantage.	  	  By	  the	  end	  of	  the	  year,	  the	  United	  States	  had	  used	  its	  military	  power	  to	  force	  the	  Serbian	  aggressors	  in	  Bosnia	  to	  come	  to	  the	  negotiating	  table	  and	  sign	  a	  lasting	  peace	  agreement.	  	  Throughout,	  Clinton	  remained	  devoted	  to	  his	  vision	  of	  America’s	  role	  in	  the	  post-­‐Cold	  War	  world,	  which	  Bosnia	  put	  to	  its	  severest	  test.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	   8	  
	  	  	  
Historiography	  Bill	  Clinton	  rose	  to	  power,	  seemingly	  out	  of	  nowhere,	  at	  a	  pivotal	  juncture	  in	  the	  history	  of	  the	  United	  States	  and	  the	  world.	  	  Not	  since	  the	  Great	  Depression	  had	  a	  president	  assumed	  office	  at	  a	  more	  challenging	  time	  –	  the	  collapse	  of	  communism	  and	  a	  time	  of	  when	  maps	  and	  globes	  rapidly	  became	  outdated.	  In	  his	  book	  The	  
Clinton	  Charisma:	  A	  Legacy	  of	  Leadership,	  Donald	  Phillips	  describes	  Clinton’s	  surprising	  rise	  to	  power	  in	  a	  chaotic	  post-­‐Cold	  War	  world	  where	  big	  countries	  are	  breaking	  up	  into	  smaller	  ones,	  neighbors	  are	  fighting	  one	  another,	  former	  enemies	  become	  friends	  and	  former	  friends	  become	  enemies.	  	  “The	  end	  of	  the	  Cold	  War	  left	  America	  with	  no	  perceptible	  enemy	  around	  which	  to	  rally	  the	  masses.”	  	  Amid	  the	  chaos,	  occurred	  the	  “startling	  and	  unlikely”	  rise	  of	  Bill	  Clinton,	  a	  relatively	  unknown	  governor	  from	  the	  small	  southern	  state	  of	  Arkansas.9	  	  	  In	  many	  respects,	  the	  Clinton	  presidency	  stands	  out	  in	  recent	  American	  history.	  	  Clinton	  was	  the	  first	  president	  elected	  in	  the	  post-­‐Cold	  War	  era,	  he	  was	  the	  first	  Democrat	  to	  be	  elected	  to	  a	  second	  term	  since	  Franklin	  D.	  Roosevelt,	  and	  he	  was	  the	  first	  president	  to	  balance	  the	  budget	  in	  three	  decades.	  	  Yet	  his	  time	  in	  the	  White	  House	  was	  accompanied	  by	  a	  national	  obsession	  with	  his	  personal	  life	  and	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  9	  Donald T. Phillips, The Clinton Charisma: A Legacy of Leadership. (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 
2007) 1-4. 	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character.10	  	  His	  effectiveness	  as	  a	  leader	  combined	  with	  morally	  questionable	  actions	  made	  for	  one	  of	  the	  most	  polarizing	  administrations	  in	  U.S.	  history.	  Phillips	  describes	  Clinton	  as	  “a	  lightning	  rod	  for	  hate,	  ridicule,	  and	  opposition,	  he	  was	  the	  target	  of	  an	  endless	  series	  of	  attacks	  perpetrated	  by	  a	  well-­‐organized	  and	  well-­‐funded	  group	  of	  political	  enemies.”	  	  Nearly	  every	  month	  of	  his	  eight-­‐year	  tenure,	  there	  was	  some	  sort	  of	  orchestrated	  attack	  on	  Clinton’s	  character,	  still	  he	  left	  office	  with	  a	  67	  percent	  approval	  rating	  –	  the	  highest	  for	  a	  departing	  president	  in	  the	  history	  of	  polling.	  	  Phillips	  asserts	  Clinton’s	  personal	  magnetism	  (The	  Clinton	  Charisma)	  was	  the	  reason	  Clinton	  was	  “loved	  and	  loathed”	  to	  extremes.	  	  Clinton	  possessed	  an	  uncanny	  ability	  to	  charm	  people,	  superb	  communication	  skills,	  and	  talent	  in	  connecting	  with	  others	  –	  physically,	  intellectually,	  and	  emotionally.11	  	  	  In	  her	  essay,	  "The	  Compromising	  Clinton:	  Images	  of	  Failure,	  a	  Record	  of	  Success,"	  Rita	  K.	  Whillock,	  details	  a	  few	  reasons	  why	  Clinton	  was	  so	  polarizing.	  	  She	  describes	  Clinton	  as	  an	  “enigma	  to	  the	  public,	  a	  mass	  of	  contradictions.”	  She	  offers	  several	  examples:	  Clinton	  is	  a	  country	  boy	  raised	  in	  Hope,	  Arkansas,	  yet	  a	  Rhodes	  scholar	  who	  graduated	  second	  in	  his	  law	  school	  class.	  	  He	  touts	  a	  strong	  belief	  in	  traditional	  values,	  yet	  (at	  the	  risk	  of	  alienating	  many	  Arkansas	  voters)	  he	  married	  a	  strong-­‐willed,	  modern,	  out-­‐spoken	  woman,	  who	  maintained	  her	  maiden	  name	  for	  years	  after	  their	  marriage.	  	  Clinton	  publicly	  questioned	  U.S.	  involvement	  in	  Vietnam	  In	  the	  1960s	  and	  70s,	  and	  rebelled	  against	  military	  service,	  yet	  he	  defeated	  a	  two	  war	  heroes	  known	  for	  their	  strong	  foreign	  policy	  leadership.	  	  He	  was	  a	  young	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  10	  Mark	  White,	  ed.,	  The	  Presidency	  of	  Bill	  Clinton:	  The	  Legacy	  of	  a	  New	  Domestic	  and	  Foreign	  Policy,	  (New	  York:	  I.	  B.	  Tauris	  &	  Co.,	  2012)	  1.	  	  11	  Phillips, The Clinton Charisma. 3-4.	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president	  who	  connected	  with	  the	  elderly	  (Arkansas	  had	  the	  2nd	  oldest	  population	  in	  the	  U.S.	  in	  1994.)	  Clinton	  was	  successful	  in	  breaking	  the	  perceptual	  link	  between	  youth	  and	  inexperience	  and	  allowed	  him	  to	  win	  their	  support.	  	  Finally,	  Clinton	  openly	  proclaimed	  his	  faith	  in	  God	  as	  a	  Southern	  Baptist,	  but	  held	  a	  pro-­‐choice	  stance	  and	  contended	  that	  homosexuals	  deserve	  to	  live	  their	  private	  lives	  free	  from	  judgment	  or	  state	  control.	  	  This	  stance	  angered	  the	  Southern	  Baptists	  in	  his	  home	  state	  –	  they	  argued	  that	  his	  home	  church	  should	  have	  expelled	  him	  for	  holding	  these	  views	  that	  contradicted	  church	  beliefs.12	  Joe	  Sobran,	  in	  his	  book	  Hustler:	  The	  Clinton	  Legacy,	  was	  more	  pointed	  in	  his	  criticism.	  	  “It’s	  not	  his	  lies	  alone	  that	  make	  Clinton	  so	  exasperating;	  it’s	  the	  posturing	  –	  the	  lip	  biting,	  the	  finger	  wagging,	  the	  Bible	  quoting	  –	  that	  accompanies	  them.	  	  No	  matter	  how	  often	  the	  lies	  are	  exposed,	  he	  is	  soon	  back	  at	  it,	  his	  voice	  cracking	  with	  sincerity…No	  matter	  how	  low	  your	  opinion	  of	  him,	  sooner	  or	  later,	  you	  find	  you’ve	  overestimate	  him.”13	  It	  is	  not	  surprising	  that	  such	  a	  divisive	  figure	  has	  been	  the	  subject	  of	  so	  many	  books	  and	  essays.	  	  Former	  cabinet	  members,	  political	  pundits,	  journalists	  and	  political	  scientists	  have	  all	  made	  contributions	  to	  the	  early	  Clinton	  historiography.	  	  Lately,	  historians	  have	  begun	  to	  examine	  the	  Clinton	  presidency.	  	  Some	  hope	  to	  deify	  the	  former	  president	  trumpeting	  his	  accomplishments	  or	  approval	  ratings,	  while	  others	  aim	  to	  demonize	  Clinton,	  highlighting	  his	  involvement	  in	  scandals	  and	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  12	  Rita K. Whillock, "The Compromising Clinton: Images of Failure, a Record of Success." In The Clinton 
Presidency: Images, Issues, and Communication Strategies, edited by Robert E. Denton, Jr., and Rachel L 
Holloway.  (Westport, Connecticut: Praeger Publishers, 1996) – (123 – 138) 	  13	  Joe Sobran, Hustler: The Clinton Legacy, (Vienna, VA: Griffin Communications 2000) xiv 	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usually	  highlighting	  his	  impeachment.	  	  The	  most	  effective	  authors,	  however,	  are	  those	  who	  aspire	  to	  remain	  neutral	  while	  describing	  and	  assessing	  the	  good	  and	  the	  bad	  of	  the	  Clinton	  administration.	  This	  tactic	  makes	  for	  a	  more	  rewarding	  read.	  	  This	  is	  particularly	  true	  regarding	  Clinton’s	  foreign	  policy,	  where	  most	  of	  the	  discussion	  of	  scandal	  can	  be	  marginalized.	  	  With	  few	  exceptions,	  authors	  accept	  that	  the	  Clinton	  administration	  represents	  a	  change	  in	  U.S.	  foreign	  policy.14	  	  The	  end	  of	  the	  Cold	  War,	  and	  the	  rapidly	  changing	  world,	  necessitated	  such	  a	  change.	  	  What	  is	  less	  universally	  accepted	  is	  how	  the	  president	  responded	  to	  the	  emerging	  world.	  	  More	  interesting	  than	  the	  obvious	  good	  job	  versus	  bad	  job	  argument,	  however,	  are	  the	  discussions	  in	  which	  these	  authors	  engage,	  often	  unintentionally,	  concerning	  motivations	  or	  driving	  forces	  behind	  Clinton’s	  foreign	  policy	  decisions.	  Like	  other	  aspects	  of	  the	  Clinton	  presidency,	  authors	  are	  divided	  with	  respect	  to	  the	  motivations	  that	  guided	  Clinton’s	  foreign	  policy	  decisions;	  most	  focus	  on	  one	  of	  three.	  	  Some	  try	  to	  convince	  their	  audience	  that	  Clinton	  was	  motivated	  by	  a	  genuine	  desire	  to	  do	  good	  and	  make	  the	  post-­‐Cold	  War	  world	  a	  more	  peaceful	  place.	  	  Others	  argue	  that	  Clinton’s	  desires	  were	  a	  selfish	  quest	  for	  personal	  or	  political	  gain.	  	  Most	  argue	  that	  Clinton	  was	  concerned	  with	  his	  legacy	  –	  how	  history	  would	  remember	  his	  years	  in	  office	  –	  and	  his	  foreign	  policy	  decisions	  reflected	  a	  desire	  to	  have	  history	  remember	  him	  kindly.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  14	  One	  notable	  exception	  is	  John	  Quigley’s	  The	  Ruses	  for	  War,	  Quigley	  argues	  that	  American	  foreign	  policy	  has	  remained	  unchanged	  since	  her	  rise	  to	  superpower	  status,	  and	  that	  Clinton continued the 
American tradition of involving US forces only for capital gain, often deceiving the public as to his self-
serving intentions.  In this respect, the Clinton administration offered little to no change from those of 
previous administrations since the U.S. became a world power.  Situations changed, but US approach did 
not.  Quigley offers several examples from Clinton’s foreign policy where this seems to be the case, but he 
conveniently leaves out Bosnia. 	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Clinton	  possessed	  an	  uncanny	  ability	  to	  captivate	  his	  audience.	  	  This	  often	  made	  people	  want	  to	  believe	  the	  best	  about	  him.	  	  Phillips	  notes	  this	  in	  The	  Clinton	  
Charisma.	  	  He	  claims	  Clinton’s	  personal	  magnetism	  (The	  Clinton	  Charisma)	  was	  the	  reason	  Clinton	  was	  both	  “loved	  and	  loathed”	  to	  extremes.	  	  Clinton	  had	  an	  uncanny	  ability	  to	  charm	  people,	  superb	  communication	  skills,	  and	  talent	  in	  connecting	  with	  others	  –	  physically,	  intellectually,	  and	  emotionally.	  This	  Charisma	  aided	  Clinton	  in	  adopting	  a	  unique	  and	  effective	  leadership	  and	  decision-­‐making	  style	  as	  well	  as	  his	  damage	  control	  strategies.	  Phillips	  argues	  that	  it	  allowed	  him	  to	  be	  an	  effective	  leader,	  who	  learned	  quickly	  from	  his	  mistakes.15	  	  Clinton’s	  charm	  is	  possibly	  the	  reason	  many	  authors	  assert	  that	  Clinton’s	  motivations	  were	  virtuous	  and	  that	  he	  truly	  wanted	  to	  make	  the	  world	  a	  better	  place.	  	  	  One	  example	  is	  Joe	  Klein,	  The	  Natural:	  The	  Misunderstood	  Presidency	  of	  Bill	  
Clinton.	  	  Klein’s	  work	  seeks	  to	  move	  beyond	  the	  scandals	  and	  media	  hype	  to	  reveal	  a	  “more	  accurate	  assessment	  of	  the	  policy,	  the	  politics,	  and	  of	  Bill	  Clinton	  himself,	  whom	  Klein	  believes	  is	  a	  good	  man,	  who	  wanted	  to	  use	  his	  presidency	  to	  make	  for	  a	  better	  world.	  	  His	  personal	  demons	  aside,	  Clinton	  lived	  to	  serve.	  	  Klein	  Provides	  a	  narrative	  of	  the	  inside	  functioning	  of	  the	  Clinton	  White	  House	  and	  how	  its	  administration	  enabled	  America	  to	  rise	  to	  unprecedented	  levels	  of	  prosperity	  and	  global	  influence.16	  	  Klein	  asserts	  Clinton	  conducted	  a	  serious,	  substantive	  presidency;	  his	  domestic	  policy	  achievements	  were	  impressive	  and	  his	  foreign	  policy	  was	  considerable	  and	  accomplished	  against	  great	  odds,	  “even	  in	  time	  of	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  15	  Phillips, The Clinton Charisma, 3-4. 	  16	  Joe Klein, The Natural: The Misunderstood Presidency of Bill Clinton (New York: Doubleday, 2002) 
21.	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national	  apathy	  and	  skepticism.”	  	  	  Furthermore,	  Klein	  states	  “Clinton	  performed	  the	  most	  important	  service	  a	  leader	  can	  provide:	  He	  saw	  the	  world	  clearly	  and	  reacted	  prudently	  to	  the	  challenges	  he	  faced.”	  	  Klein	  notes	  that	  Clinton	  was	  lucky	  to	  have	  served	  in	  relatively	  quiet	  times	  (compared	  to	  the	  tumultuous	  era	  of	  his	  predecessor	  and	  successors,)	  but	  he	  laments	  this	  was	  also	  unfortunate,	  as	  he	  was	  never	  challenged	  in	  a	  way	  that	  tested	  his	  “impressive	  strengths,”	  and	  the	  absence	  of	  such	  a	  challenge	  exacerbated	  his	  weaknesses.	  	   Another	  example	  is	  Sidney	  Blumenthal’s	  work,	  The	  Clinton	  Wars.	  	  Blumenthal’s	  book	  is	  a	  memoir	  of	  his	  time	  as	  Clinton’s	  aide	  and	  confidant,	  which	  reads	  like	  a	  personal	  quest	  to	  rectify	  Clinton’s	  damaged	  public	  image	  while	  simultaneously	  striking	  back	  at	  some	  in	  the	  media	  for	  having	  the	  audacity	  to	  besmirch	  their	  national	  leader.	  	  Like	  Klein,	  Blumenthal	  depicts	  Clinton	  as	  a	  successful	  leader	  who	  had	  righteous	  motivations.	  However,	  Blumenthal	  lacks	  Klein’s	  impartiality	  and	  his	  work	  often	  sound	  like	  political	  spin.	  	  Still,	  Blumenthal’s	  work,	  and	  others	  like	  it,	  represents	  a	  significant	  portion	  of	  the	  Clinton	  historiography.17	  	  	  	   While	  some	  may	  be	  convinced	  of	  Clinton’s	  benevolent	  motives,	  other	  authors	  believe	  Clinton	  had	  more	  self-­‐serving	  intentions.	  In	  his	  book,	  High	  Hopes:	  The	  
Clinton	  Presidency	  and	  the	  Politics	  of	  Ambition,	  Stanley	  Renshon	  describes	  Clinton	  as	  “a	  smart,	  educated,	  disarmingly	  sincere	  and	  decidedly	  charming	  suitor,	  but	  with	  a	  moral	  compass	  frozen	  at	  self	  interest.”	  	  Renshon	  claims	  Clinton	  was	  the	  most	  skillful	  politician	  to	  occupy	  the	  White	  House	  since	  Lyndon	  Johnson.	  	  He	  would	  often	  tell	  the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  17	  Sidney	  Blumenthal,	  The	  Clinton	  Wars.	  (New	  York:	  Farrar,	  Strauss,	  and	  Giroux,	  2003)	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public	  what	  they	  wanted	  to	  hear	  in	  order	  to	  benefit	  politically	  (through	  a	  boost	  in	  approval	  ratings	  and	  later	  reelection.)	  He	  cites	  Clinton’s	  promise	  to	  the	  American	  people	  that	  he	  would	  not	  send	  troops	  to	  Bosnia	  for	  no	  longer	  than	  one	  year	  as	  an	  example.	  	  Renshon	  notes	  that	  Clinton	  learned	  quickly	  from	  early	  foreign	  policy	  mistakes	  and	  that	  his	  skill	  at	  communicating	  with	  the	  American	  public	  ensured	  the	  political	  success	  he	  sought.18	  	   Rich	  Lowry’s	  work,	  Legacy:	  Paying	  the	  Price	  for	  the	  Clinton	  Years,	  Argues	  that	  Clinton’s	  success	  had	  little	  to	  do	  with	  his	  policies	  and	  that	  his	  character	  flaws	  brought	  on	  his	  scandals	  through	  lawlessness.	  Hell-­‐bent	  on	  political	  success,	  Lowry	  accuses	  Clinton	  of	  appeasing	  hostile	  regimes	  and	  ignoring	  threats	  to	  American	  security	  from	  abroad.	  Lowry	  asserts	  Clinton’s	  international	  relations	  record	  was	  “appalling,”	  specifically	  in	  the	  Middle	  East.	  	  He	  blames	  Clinton	  for	  the	  September	  11,	  2001	  terrorist	  attacks	  on	  New	  York	  and	  Washington,	  which	  Lowry	  claims	  prompted	  his	  book.19	  	  
 Of the various motivations mentioned throughout the Clinton historiography, 
Legacy is the most often cited.  Not surprisingly, many authors argue Clinton’s true 
desire is to be remembered fondly and written about kindly in history books.  Richard E. 
Cohen’s Changing Course in Washington: Clinton and the New Congress captures this 
sentiment.  Cohen depicts Clinton as a young, vibrant politician who was greatly 
motivated by his legacy.  Cohen states the early Clinton era was his opportunity to make 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  18	  Stanley Renshon High Hopes: The Clinton Presidency and the Politics of Ambition, (New York: 
Routledge, 1998) 	  19	  Rich Lowry, Legacy: Paying the Price for the Clinton Years, (Washington, D.C.: Regnery Publishing, 
Inc., 2003) 	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changes and cement his legacy. “Clinton’s fresh ideas and team of leading players 
brought both new substance and style to Washington.”20  Cohen Clinton’s early years 
were ones of great leadership and direction for the country led by a young leader with lots 
of ideas and intent on getting things done in a time of great international uncertainty.  
Cohen credits Clinton’s youth and vigor as much as his intelligence for his success.  He 
also claims that George H. W. Bush lacked the necessary energy and commitment to 
overhauling American foreign policy in the post-Cold War world.21   
 Nigel Hamilton’s Bill Clinton: Mastering the Presidency attempts to “penetrate 
the fog of political war” to describe Clinton’s presidency, which Hamilton claims was at 
first disastrous, but ultimately successful.  Hamilton see’s Clinton’s story as “one of the 
most extraordinary reversals of fortune in modern American biography.”  Hamilton 
portrays Clinton as a very cognizant of his legacy, and driven by this consciousness to 
recover after early adversity. Once Clinton learned how to be a president, Hamilton 
claims, he became unbeatable and “set American standing in the world higher than it has 
ever been since.”  Throughout his book, Hamilton references Clinton’s actions in Bosnia 
as examples of his growth as a president.22  Hamilton notes that Clinton was determined 
not to repeat mistakes in Bosnia that were made in Somalia.23 
These are only a few examples of the three most dominant motivations in the 
Clinton historiography (benevolence, personal gain, and legacy.)  There is another 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  20	  Richard E. Cohen, Changing Course in Washington: Clinton and the New Congress  (New York: 
Macmillan College Publishing Company, 1994) 3-4. 	  21	  Cohen, Changing Course in Washington 	  22	  Nigel Hamilton, Bill Clinton: Mastering the Presidency. (New York: Perseus Books, 2007) xiii-xv. 	  23	  Hamilton,	  Bill	  Clinton.	  490-­‐491.	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possibility: one that has yet to be discussed in the historiography of Bill Clinton’s 
presidency.  Clinton was driven by a new vision for American foreign policy in the post-
Cold War world.  Certainly	  benevolence,	  political	  gain,	  approval	  ratings,	  and	  legacy	  all	  factored	  into	  his	  decision.	  	  But	  more	  powerful	  a	  motivation	  than	  any	  of	  these	  factors	  was	  Clinton’s	  vision	  for	  American	  foreign	  policy	  in	  the	  post-­‐Cold	  War	  world.	  	  James	  D.	  Boys	  touches	  on	  this	  concept	  in	  his	  work	  Clinton’s	  Grand	  Strategy:	  U.S.	  
Foreign	  Policy	  in	  a	  Post-­‐Cold	  War	  World.	  	  “Clinton	  sought	  to	  find	  a	  role	  for	  an	  America	  that	  it	  could	  neither	  dominate	  nor	  retreat	  [from.]”24	  	  The	  advancement	  of	  American	  economic	  competitiveness,	  the	  spreading	  of	  democracy,	  and	  the	  maintenance	  of	  a	  strong	  national	  defense	  were	  all	  key	  components	  of	  American	  post-­‐Cold	  War	  foreign	  policy.	  	  “Clinton	  believed	  that	  this	  combination	  would	  ensure	  the	  United	  States	  stayed	  secure	  by	  remaining	  the	  strongest	  force	  for	  peace,	  freedom,	  and	  prosperity	  in	  the	  world.”25	  	  Still,	  Boys	  sees	  this	  as	  merely	  a	  goal	  for	  the	  Clinton	  administration,	  and	  not	  their	  motivation,	  which	  he	  still	  sees	  as	  political	  gain.26	  	  	  Similarly,	  David	  H.	  Bennett’s	  book	  Bill	  Clinton:	  Building	  a	  Bridge	  to	  a	  New	  
Millennium	  addresses	  Clinton’s	  reshaping	  the	  United	  States	  in	  the	  post-­‐Cold	  War	  era	  without	  mentioning	  Clinton’s	  motivation	  for	  doing	  so.	  	  Bennett	  briefly	  mentions	  that	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  24	  James	  D.	  Boys,	  Clinton’s	  Grand	  Strategy:	  U.S.	  Foreign	  Policy	  in	  a	  Post-­‐Cold	  War	  World.	  (New	  York:	  Bloomsbury	  Academic,	  2015)	  2.	  	  25	  Boys,	  Clinton’s	  Grand	  Strategy,	  17-­‐18.	  	  26	  Boys,	  Clinton’s	  Grand	  Strategy,	  252-­‐253.	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Clinton	  said	  he	  had	  wanted	  to	  do	  so	  in	  a	  campaign	  speech,	  then	  he	  describes	  how	  he	  went	  about	  making	  it	  happen.27	  
The most revealing look into Clinton’s motivation comes from the president 
himself.  In his book, Between Hope and History: Meeting America’s Challenges for the 
21st Century, Clinton aims to convince the American public of a “shared destiny as a 
nation, a duty to prepare for the new century, and our need for a shared vision of twenty-
first century America that will enable us to grasp the extraordinary opportunities of this 
age of possibility.”  He explains he ran for president because he believed that in 1992, 
Americans “lacked a unifying vision for our future and a strategy to achieve it,” and 
“were in danger of just drifting into the new era.  My vision for America at the dawn of a 
new century is of a nation in which the American dream is a reality for all who are 
willing to work for it.”28  Clinton was referring to the American people rising to meet the 
domestic challenges they faced at the dawn of the new millennium.  Still, his words offer 
a peek into his motivation meeting the foreign challenges as well.  If he possessed such a 
vision for America’s future within its borders, he must have been guided by a similar 
concept for challenges from abroad. 
Clinton recognized that the world was at a turning point and old solutions would 
not solve new problems.	  	  There	  would	  be	  challenges	  for	  sure	  –	  In	  1993,	  Clinton	  did	  not	  yet	  know	  how	  he	  would	  employ	  his	  vision,	  he	  did	  not	  yet	  know	  how	  to	  be	  an	  effective	  president,	  he	  would	  face	  a	  steep	  learning	  curve,	  and	  he	  would	  encounter	  stiff	  opposition.	  	  But	  it	  was	  his	  vision	  for	  America’s	  leadership	  in	  the	  post-­‐Cold	  War	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  27	  David	  H.	  Bennet,	  Bill	  Clinton:	  Building	  a	  Bridge	  to	  a	  New	  Millennium.	  (New	  York:	  Routledge,	  2014)	  2.	  	  28	  Bill Clinton, Between Hope and History: Meeting America’s Challenges for the 21st Century, (New 
York: Times Books, 1996) xi-xii.	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Background:	  The	  Red	  Herring	  of	  Ancient	  Hatreds	  It	  would	  be	  irresponsible	  to	  look	  at	  the	  Bosnian	  War	  in	  a	  vacuum.	  	  The	  most	  recent	  round	  of	  tensions	  in	  the	  Balkans	  is	  easily	  misunderstood	  without	  historical	  context.	  	  Many	  believe	  centuries-­‐old	  episodes	  of	  hatred	  and	  oppression	  had	  repercussions	  that	  have	  echoed	  throughout	  the	  history	  of	  the	  region,	  and	  that	  the	  Bosnian	  War	  represented	  the	  most	  recent	  chapter	  in	  an	  age-­‐old	  cycle	  of	  violence.	  	  Often	  overlooked	  are	  long	  periods	  (sometimes	  even	  centuries)	  of	  peaceful	  coexistence	  among	  the	  Balkan	  peoples,	  where	  they	  interacted,	  lived,	  and	  worked	  together	  in	  tranquility.	  	  Nevertheless,	  these	  periods	  of	  war	  and	  peace	  created	  a	  complicated	  religious,	  ethnic,	  and	  nationalist	  history,	  that	  would	  mean	  any	  intervention	  to	  stop	  the	  fighting	  could	  have	  had	  both	  geopolitical	  and	  historical	  consequences.29	  	  	  	  	  The	  roots	  of	  the	  religious	  divisions	  of	  the	  South	  Slav	  people	  date	  as	  far	  back	  as	  the	  Great	  Schism	  between	  the	  Eastern	  Orthodox	  and	  the	  Roman	  Catholic	  Churches	  in	  1054.	  Ecclesiastical	  and	  theological	  differences	  led	  to	  disputes	  and	  sometimes	  violence	  between	  the	  Serbs,	  who	  were	  Orthodox	  Christians	  and	  the	  Croats,	  who	  were	  Catholics.30	  	  Then,	  the	  first	  Ottoman	  soldiers	  complicated	  matters	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  29	  Noel	  Malcolm,	  Bosnia:	  A	  Short	  History	  (New	  York:	  New	  York	  University	  Press,	  1996)	  xix-­‐xxiv	  	  30	  Several	  historians	  argue	  that	  the	  differences	  among	  the	  South	  Slavs	  lie	  solely	  in	  their	  religion,	  and	  not	  in	  the	  racial	  or	  ethnic	  makeup	  of	  the	  people	  involved.	  	  	  Richard	  West	  states	  that	  there	  is	  “no	  ‘ethnic’	  difference	  between	  the	  warring	  factions	  in	  Bosnia-­‐Herzogovina,	  all	  of	  whom	  are	  alike	  in	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when	  they	  crossed	  the	  Hellespont	  into	  Europe	  in	  1358.	  	  Aided	  by	  an	  earthquake	  that	  destroyed	  the	  protective	  fortifications	  surrounding	  several	  cities	  ,	  the	  Ottomans	  occupied	  Gallipoli	  along	  the	  vital	  Dardanelles.31	  	  Around	  1361,	  the	  Ottoman	  sultan,	  Murad	  I,	  captured	  Adrianople	  in	  Thrace.	  	  In	  the	  ensuing	  decades,	  the	  Ottomans	  systematically	  captured	  the	  remaining	  provinces	  of	  the	  Byzantine	  Empire.32	  	  As	  the	  Ottomans	  moved	  into	  the	  Serbian	  heartland,	  tens	  of	  thousands	  of	  Christians	  fled	  north	  and	  west	  to	  the	  sanctuary	  of	  the	  realm	  of	  the	  Catholic	  Hungarian	  King	  Louis	  I	  (Lajos	  I.)	  	  Most	  of	  these	  refugees	  settled	  in	  modern-­‐day	  Croatia.	  	  Many	  of	  the	  southern	  Slavs	  converted	  to	  Islam,	  especially	  in	  southwest	  Serbia	  and	  in	  Montenegro.	  	  They	  assumed	  the	  farmlands	  left	  behind	  by	  the	  fleeing	  Serbs	  and	  built	  mosques	  on	  the	  sites	  of	  Serbian	  churches.	  	  The	  combination	  of	  religious	  disputes,	  Ottoman	  conquest,	  displacement	  of	  refugees,	  and	  widespread	  Islamic	  conversion	  helped	  to	  produce	  a	  tangled	  map	  of	  religious	  and	  ethnic	  diversity	  on	  the	  Balkan	  Peninsula.33	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  blood,	  appearance,	  language,	  and	  bellicose	  nature.	  	  All	  that	  divides	  them	  is	  their	  ancestral	  religion,	  so	  that	  the	  Greek	  orthodox	  call	  themselves	  Serbs,	  the	  Roman	  Catholics	  call	  themselves	  Croats,	  while	  the	  unhappy	  Muslims,	  who	  used	  to	  describe	  themselves	  as	  Yugoslavs	  or	  Bosnians,	  are	  now	  known	  by	  a	  faith	  in	  which	  many	  of	  them	  do	  not	  believe.”	  	  Richard	  West,	  Tito	  and	  the	  Rise	  and	  Fall	  of	  Yugoslavia,	  (New	  York:	  Carroll	  and	  Graf	  Publishers,	  Inc.	  1994)	  2.	  	  31	  Gabor	  Agoston	  and	  Bruce	  Masters,	  Encyclopedia	  of	  the	  Ottoman	  Empire	  (New	  York:	  Infobase	  Publishing,	  2009)	  442-­‐443.	  	  32	  The	  exact	  year	  of	  the	  Ottoman	  capture	  of	  Adrianople	  is	  somewhat	  in	  question.	  	  Historians	  estimate	  that	  it	  occurred	  between	  1361	  and	  1371.	  Donald	  Edgar	  Pitcher	  explains	  that	  early	  Ottoman	  history	  is	  “so	  intertwined	  with	  legend	  and	  so	  abounding	  that	  scarcely	  an	  event	  can	  be	  dated	  with	  any	  certainty	  before	  the	  Battle	  of	  Kosovo	  in	  1389.”	  Still,	  most	  sources	  contend	  Murad	  I’s	  capture	  of	  Adrianople	  occurred	  around	  1361.	  Donald	  Edgar	  Pitcher,	  An	  Historical	  Geography	  of	  the	  Ottoman	  Empire:	  From	  Earliest	  Times	  to	  the	  End	  
of	  the	  Sixteenth	  Century	  (Leiden,	  Netherlands:	  E.J.	  Brill,	  1972)	  35-­‐41.	  	  33	  West,	  Tito	  and	  the	  Rise	  and	  Fall	  of	  Yugoslavia,	  9-­‐11	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By	  the	  nineteenth	  century,	  revolts	  across	  the	  Balkans	  threatened	  Ottoman	  control	  over	  the	  region.	  	  It	  was	  evident	  that	  the	  Turks,	  having	  fallen	  behind	  the	  Russians	  and	  Europeans	  in	  military	  technology	  and	  battlefield	  tactics,	  remained	  in	  possession	  of	  an	  over-­‐stretched	  empire	  that	  had	  grown	  weak	  and	  complacent.	  	  Militarily,	  the	  late-­‐19th-­‐century	  Ottomans	  were	  a	  far	  cry	  from	  their	  14th	  century	  ancestors.34	  	  In	  1912,	  with	  Russian	  encouragement,	  Bulgaria,	  Greece,	  Montenegro,	  and	  Serbia	  established	  the	  “Balkan	  League”	  in	  defiance	  of	  their	  Ottoman	  rulers.	  	  Later	  that	  year,	  they	  initiated	  the	  first	  of	  two	  brief,	  but	  bloody,	  “Balkan	  Wars”	  that	  left	  more	  than	  150,000	  dead	  and	  the	  national	  boundaries	  within	  the	  Balkans	  redrawn.	  	  The	  wars	  ended	  the	  long	  period	  of	  Ottoman	  rule	  in	  the	  region.35	  	  	  The	  land	  grab	  that	  followed	  added	  nationalist	  complexities	  to	  longstanding	  religious	  and	  ethnic	  tensions.	  	  Following	  nationalist	  logic,	  each	  of	  the	  Balkan	  states	  sought	  to	  expand	  its	  territory	  at	  its	  neighbors’	  expense.36	  	  These	  identities,	  born	  in	  the	  Middle	  Ages	  and	  nurtured	  under	  Ottoman	  rule,	  yielded	  a	  tangled	  map,	  shot	  through	  with	  religious	  and	  ethnic	  tensions.	  Further	  violence	  and	  warfare	  plagued	  the	  Balkans	  throughout	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  20th	  century.	  	  Serbian	  nationalism	  famously	  contributed	  to	  the	  outbreak	  of	  the	  First	  World	  War.	  	  	  	  The	  other	  Balkan	  states	  entered	  the	  conflict	  in	  the	  hope	  of	  furthering	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  34	  Richard	  C.	  Hall,	  “Balkan	  Wars”,	  History	  Today,	  (November	  2012,	  Volume	  62,	  Issue	  11)	  36-­‐37.	  	  35	  M.	  Hakan	  Yavuz	  and	  Isa	  Blumi.	  eds,	  War	  and	  Nationalism:	  The	  Balkan	  Wars,	  1912-­‐1913,	  and	  Their	  
Sociopolitical	  Implications,	  The	  Utah	  Middle	  East	  Series,	  (Salt	  Lake	  City:	  The	  University	  of	  Utah	  Press	  2013)	  31.	  	  36	  Dennis	  P.	  Hupchick,	  The	  Balkans:	  From	  Constantinople	  to	  Communism,	  (New	  York:	  Palgrave	  2002)	  273.	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their	  own	  political	  goals.	  	  The	  Treaty	  of	  Versailles	  rewarded	  those	  who	  had	  allied	  themselves	  with	  the	  Great	  Powers	  with	  more	  territory,	  leading	  to	  the	  new	  kingdom	  of	  Yugoslavia	  and	  an	  enlarged	  Romania.	  	  	  Meanwhile,	  the	  treaty	  punished	  the	  Balkan	  allies	  of	  the	  defeated	  Central	  Powers.	  	  Further	  political	  and	  economic	  problems	  plagued	  the	  Balkan	  states	  during	  the	  interwar	  years.37	  	  The	  German	  invasion	  of	  Yugoslavia	  in	  March	  1941	  ushered	  in	  a	  four-­‐year	  period	  of	  occupation,	  resistance,	  fratricide,	  and	  genocide	  -­‐	  a	  particularly	  brutal	  chapter	  to	  Balkan	  history	  known	  as	  “Ustasha	  Terrors.”38	  	  	  The	  Croat	  and	  Catholic	  “Ustasha”	  quickly	  aligned	  themselves	  with	  the	  Nazis,	  further	  exacerbating	  both	  ethnic	  and	  religious	  friction	  during	  their	  pursuit	  of	  a	  “fifty-­‐year-­‐long	  policy	  of	  intolerance”	  as	  advised	  by	  Hitler.39	  	  The	  Croats	  adopted	  the	  slogan,	  “Convert	  a	  third,	  expel	  a	  third,	  and	  kill	  a	  third”	  when	  dealing	  with	  non-­‐Catholics	  within	  their	  grasp.	  	  Slaughtering	  combatants	  and	  civilians	  alike,	  the	  Ustasha	  executed	  their	  orders	  with	  such	  ferocity	  that	  they	  horrified	  some	  of	  the	  most	  hardened	  of	  Hitler’s	  SS.40	  	  	  	   After	  World	  War	  II,	  a	  charismatic	  communist	  leader	  and	  resistance	  leader,	  Josip	  “Tito”	  Broz	  assumed	  power	  in	  Yugoslavia.	  	  As	  president,	  and	  virtual	  dictator,	  Tito	  was	  able	  to	  subdue	  the	  ethnic,	  religious,	  and	  nationalist	  tensions	  in	  his	  country.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  37	  Hupchick,	  The	  Balkans,	  273-­‐274.	  	  38	  Misha	  Glenny,	  TheBalkans:	  Nationalism,	  War,	  and	  the	  Great	  Powers,	  1804-­‐1999	  (New	  York:	  Penguin	  Books,	  2001)	  495-­‐506.	  	  39	  West,	  Tito	  and	  the	  Rise	  and	  Fall	  of	  Yugoslavia,	  77-­‐87	  	  40	  West,	  Tito	  and	  the	  Rise	  and	  Fall	  of	  Yugoslavia,	  97.	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His	  answer	  to	  these	  rivalries	  was	  simple:	  Loyalty	  to	  Tito	  and	  Yugoslavia	  was	  all	  that	  mattered.	  	  He	  adopted	  the	  slogan,	  “Brotherhood	  and	  Unity”	  as	  he	  suppressed	  nationalism	  with	  an	  iron	  fist;	  loyalty	  to	  any	  other	  cause,	  was	  punishable	  with	  prison,	  exile,	  or	  even	  execution.41	  	  	  Tito’s	  death	  in1980	  marked	  the	  beginning	  of	  Yugoslavia’s	  collapse.	  	  Spurred	  along	  by	  the	  collapse	  of	  the	  Iron	  Curtain,	  from	  1989	  to	  1991,	  the	  regime	  crumbled	  and	  the	  central	  government	  lost	  power	  and	  influence,	  giving	  the	  republics	  ample	  reason	  to	  break	  away	  to	  form	  their	  own	  nations.	  	  By	  this	  time	  Serbian	  leader	  Slobodan	  Milosevic	  exploited	  and	  fanned	  the	  growing	  upsurge	  of	  Serbian	  nationalism	  en	  route	  to	  becoming	  the	  most	  powerful	  political	  figure	  in	  Yugoslavia.42	  	  The	  Serbs,	  who	  had	  controlled	  much	  of	  the	  arsenal	  of	  the	  former	  Yugoslav	  army,	  began	  a	  campaign	  of	  systematic	  murder,	  rape,	  and	  torture	  against	  their	  former	  Croat	  and	  Muslim	  neighbors	  in	  an	  attempt	  to	  form	  “ethnically	  pure”	  Serb	  governments	  in	  Croatia	  and	  Bosnia.43	  	  	  On	  March	  3,	  1992,	  Bosnia	  declared	  its	  independence	  from	  Yugoslavia.	  	  Most	  Bosnian	  Serbs	  boycotted	  the	  new	  Bosnian	  government,	  choosing	  instead	  to	  take	  up	  arms.	  	  Violence	  erupted	  immediately,	  and	  by	  late	  March	  1992,	  the	  streets	  of	  many	  Bosnian	  cities	  were	  afflicted	  with	  open	  warfare.	  	  Bosnian	  Serbs	  initiated	  the	  fighting,	  but	  it	  quickly	  grew	  into	  a	  complicated	  three-­‐way	  territorial	  war	  among	  the	  Bosnian	  Serbs,	  Bosnian	  Croats,	  and	  Bosniaks	  (Bosnian	  Muslims).	  	  	  Though	  the	  fighting	  was	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  41	  John	  G.	  Stoessenger,	  Why	  Nations	  Go	  to	  War,	  	  (Belmont,	  CA:	  Clark	  Baxter,	  2005.)	  120.	  	  42	  Stoessinger,	  Why	  Nations	  Go	  to	  War,	  122.	  	  43	  Misha	  Glenny,	  The	  Fall	  of	  Yugoslavia:	  The	  Third	  Balkan	  War,	  (New	  York,	  Penguin	  Books,	  1996)	  	  
	   24	  
mostly	  contained	  within	  the	  Bosnian	  borders,	  the	  Bosnian	  Serbs	  and	  Bosnian	  Croats	  received	  varying	  amounts	  of	  support	  from	  Serbia	  and	  Croatia	  respectively.	  At	  the	  outbreak	  of	  the	  fighting,	  many	  analysts	  turned	  to	  the	  region’s	  deep	  past	  and	  argued	  that	  its	  future	  was	  doomed	  to	  founder	  on	  the	  rocks	  of	  centuries	  of	  ethnic	  and	  religious	  hatred.	  	  They	  argued	  that	  the	  Serbs,	  Croats,	  and	  Bosniaks	  have	  been	  fighting	  for	  so	  long,	  and	  that	  hate	  is	  so	  ingrained	  into	  their	  culture,	  that	  they	  will	  continue	  to	  propagate	  violence	  toward	  one	  another.44	  	  In	  reality,	  it	  is	  easy	  to	  pick	  a	  few	  bloody	  chapters	  of	  Balkan	  history	  and	  assume	  that	  violence	  has	  always,	  and	  will	  always	  plague	  the	  region,	  but	  this	  practice	  distorts	  reality.	  	  One	  could	  reach	  similar	  conclusions	  about	  many	  Western	  nations.45	  	  	  The	  Balkans	  have	  witnessed	  much	  bloodshed,	  but	  they	  have	  also	  enjoyed	  long	  periods	  of	  peace	  and	  tranquility.	  	  In	  many	  cities,	  multi-­‐ethnic	  neighborhoods	  prospered,	  and	  families	  lived	  and	  worked	  with	  neighbors	  of	  different	  faiths	  and	  backgrounds.	  	  The	  rate	  of	  intermarriage	  was	  so	  significant	  that	  no	  Balkan	  province	  could	  claim	  to	  be	  ethnically	  homogenous.46	  	  These	  periods	  of	  peace	  did	  as	  much	  as	  any	  of	  the	  violence	  to	  create	  Balkan	  diversity.	  	  Yet	  many	  Western	  commentators	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  44	  The	  most	  influential	  of	  these	  authors	  during	  the	  early	  1990s	  was	  Robert	  Kaplan,	  whose	  book	  
Balkan	  Ghosts:	  A	  Journey	  Through	  History	  suggested	  that	  nothing	  could	  be	  done	  by	  outsiders	  to	  bring	  peace	  to	  a	  region	  so	  steeped	  in	  violence.	  	  Kaplan’s	  work	  had	  a	  profound	  effect	  on	  many	  policymakers,	  including	  some	  key	  members	  of	  the	  Clinton	  administration.	  	  Robert	  Kaplan,	  Balkan	  Ghosots:	  A	  Journey	  Through	  History	  (New	  York:	  St.	  Martin’s	  Press,	  1993)	  	  45	  Historian	  and	  current	  chairman	  of	  the	  Bosnian	  Institute	  in	  London,	  Noel	  Malcolm	  uses	  bloody	  chapters	  of	  the	  history	  of	  France	  to	  illustrate	  that	  a	  country’s	  bloody	  past	  does	  not	  determine	  its	  direction.	  	  Noel	  Malcolm,	  Bosnia:	  A	  Short	  History	  	  (New	  York:	  New	  York	  University	  Press),	  xxi	  –	  xxii.	  	  46	  Both	  Holbrooke	  and	  Malcolm	  repeatedly	  mention	  the	  significance	  of	  these	  periods	  of	  tranquility	  to	  Balkan	  history.	  	  Holbrooke	  in	  particular	  notes	  that	  the	  ethnic	  groups	  in	  Bosnia	  had	  lived	  and	  worked	  together	  in	  “every	  walk	  of	  life.”	  He	  notes	  the	  “considerable”	  intermarriage	  and	  friendships	  despite	  their	  neighbors’	  ethnicities.	  	  Holbrooke,	  To	  End	  a	  War	  23.	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emphasized	  the	  stories	  of	  conflict	  and	  downplayed	  the	  periods	  of	  peace,	  perhaps	  because	  bloodshed	  sells	  more	  books.	  	  Whatever	  the	  “truth”	  of	  Balkan	  history,	  this	  supposed	  and	  complicated	  past	  of	  occasional	  explosions	  of	  hatred	  resulting	  in	  the	  wholesale	  slaughter	  of	  belligerents	  and	  civilians	  formed	  a	  key	  part	  of	  American	  policymakers’	  perceptions.	  	  Other	  perceptions	  weighed	  in	  as	  well.	  	  The	  wave	  of	  civilian	  massacres	  occurred	  in	  the	  shadow	  of	  the	  “Hour	  of	  Europe,”	  at	  a	  time	  when	  the	  great	  powers	  believed	  (or	  hoped)	  such	  atrocities	  were	  a	  thing	  of	  the	  past.	  	  While	  the	  Americans	  and	  Europeans	  agreed	  that	  the	  violence	  needed	  to	  stop,	  a	  military	  intervention	  would	  have	  to	  be	  handled	  carefully,	  and	  had	  several	  potential	  consequences.	  	  The	  war	  posed	  a	  threat	  to	  the	  stability	  of	  Europe,	  while	  too	  great	  a	  degree	  of	  American	  involvement	  threatened	  to	  undermine	  the	  authority	  of	  the	  European	  Community.	  	  Additionally,	  intervention	  had	  the	  potential	  to	  damage	  the	  fragile	  friendship	  between	  the	  U.S.	  and	  Russia	  as	  the	  Russians	  (historically	  allied	  with	  the	  Serbians)	  were	  turning	  toward	  democracy.	  Perhaps	  the	  most	  important	  concern	  for	  U.S.	  policymakers	  was	  the	  potential	  for	  American	  bloodshed.	  	  During	  the	  1990s,	  the	  Balkan	  combatants	  had	  displayed	  a	  thirst	  for	  violence	  that	  troubled	  the	  American	  public.	  	  Potential	  centuries	  of	  peace	  notwithstanding,	  the	  Balkan	  states	  had	  recently	  displayed	  some	  of	  the	  most	  extreme	  and	  violent	  examples	  of	  hatred	  that	  the	  world	  has	  been	  forced	  to	  witness.	  	  The	  U.S.	  had	  recently	  enjoyed	  a	  quick,	  decisive	  victory	  in	  Iraq	  that	  saw	  the	  Iraqis	  fleeing	  from	  the	  battlefield	  in	  the	  face	  of	  American	  technology.	  	  	  The	  Serbs	  seemed	  to	  be	  displaying	  a	  tenacity	  that	  the	  Iraqis	  had	  not.	  	  This	  had	  convinced	  many	  in	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  Colin	  L.	  Powell	  with	  Joseph	  E.	  Persico,	  My	  American	  Journey	  (New	  York:	  Random	  House	  1995)	  291-­‐292.	  	  




The	  Bosnian	  War	  As	  noted	  before,	  Tito’s	  death	  in1980	  marked	  the	  beginning	  of	  Yugoslavia’s	  collapse.	  	  From	  1989	  to	  1991,	  communism	  crumbled	  and	  the	  central	  government	  lost	  power	  and	  influence,	  giving	  the	  republics	  ample	  reason	  to	  break	  away	  to	  form	  their	  own	  nations.	  	  In	  June	  1991,	  the	  republics	  of	  Slovenia	  and	  Croatia	  declared	  their	  independence	  from	  Yugoslavia.	  	  The	  Yugoslav	  federal	  army	  promptly	  invaded	  Slovenia	  to	  prevent	  their	  secession.	  	  After	  10	  days	  of	  fighting,	  however,	  the	  European	  Community	  brokered	  a	  ceasefire	  guaranteeing	  the	  Slovenes	  their	  independence.	  	  The	  Yugoslavians	  agreed	  to	  withdraw	  all	  troops	  and	  equipment	  from	  the	  region	  in	  three	  months.48	  Croatian	  Independence	  was	  not	  secured	  so	  quickly	  or	  decisively.	  	  Ethnic	  Serbs	  with	  support	  from	  Yugoslav	  forces	  declared	  war	  on	  the	  newly	  independent	  nation	  of	  Croatia.	  They	  seized	  about	  a	  third	  of	  the	  country	  –	  mostly	  areas	  where	  ethnic	  Serbs	  made	  up	  the	  majority	  of	  the	  population.	  	  Yugoslav	  aircraft	  bombed	  the	  Croatian	  government	  headquarters	  in	  Zagreb	  as	  ground	  forces	  moved	  to	  within	  10	  miles	  of	  the	  Croatian	  capital.	  	  Croatia	  responded	  by	  severing	  all	  ties	  with	  Yugoslavia	  and	  a	  brutal	  war	  ensued.49	  	  In	  September	  1991,	  The	  U.N.	  Security	  Council	  decided	  to	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  "War	  for	  Slovenia	  1991,"	  Government	  of	  the	  Republic	  of	  Slovenia,	  Public	  Relations	  and	  Media	  Office.	  July	  4,	  2001.	  Accessed	  June	  12,	  2015.	  http://www.slovenija2001.gov.si/10years/path/war/.	  	  49	  Ina	  Vukic,	  "Croatia:	  Hard-­‐Won	  Independence,"	  Croatia	  the	  War	  and	  the	  Future,	  October	  8,	  2014,	  Accessed	  June	  13,	  2015.	  http://inavukic.com/2014/10/08/croatia-­‐hard-­‐won-­‐independence/	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prohibit	  the	  export	  of	  all	  weapons	  to	  the	  territories	  of	  the	  former	  Yugoslavia.	  	  The	  embargo’s	  aim	  was	  to	  halt	  the	  violence	  by	  restricting	  the	  supply	  of	  weapons	  going	  into	  the	  region.50	  	  In	  December	  1991,	  Germany	  officially	  recognized	  Croatia’s	  independence,	  and	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  European	  Community	  followed	  shortly	  after.	  	  In	  January	  1992,	  U.N.	  envoy	  Cyrus	  Vance	  negotiated	  a	  ceasefire	  in	  Croatia,	  and	  14,000	  U.N.	  Peacekeepers	  deployed	  to	  enforce	  the	  shaky	  peace	  agreement.	  The	  presence	  of	  the	  peacekeepers	  reduced	  the	  violence,	  but	  sporadic	  fighting	  and	  occasional	  ceasefire	  violations	  would	  continue	  until	  August	  1995,	  when	  two	  major	  Croatian	  offensives	  would	  expel	  the	  ethnic	  Serb	  forces	  from	  the	  country.51	  Encouraged	  by	  the	  actions	  of	  their	  neighbors,	  Bosnia	  declared	  its	  independence	  from	  Yugoslavia	  in	  March	  1992.	  	  In	  response,	  most	  Bosnian	  Serbs	  chose	  to	  take	  up	  arms	  rather	  than	  participate	  in	  the	  political	  process.	  	  By	  late	  March,	  the	  streets	  of	  many	  Bosnian	  cities	  were	  afflicted	  with	  open	  warfare.	  	  The	  U.S.	  and	  European	  Community	  officially	  recognized	  Bosnia’s	  independence	  in	  April	  1992.52	  	  Serbia	  and	  Montenegro	  moved	  quickly	  to	  preserve	  the	  remainder	  of	  Yugoslavia.	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They	  established	  the	  new	  Federal	  Republic	  of	  Yugoslavia,	  though	  the	  new	  state	  received	  little	  international	  recognition.53	  Backed	  by	  Yugoslav	  forces,	  the	  ethnic	  Serbs	  not	  only	  took	  their	  fight	  to	  the	  Bosnian	  government	  army,	  but	  also	  turned	  on	  the	  non-­‐Serb	  citizens	  of	  Bosnia.	  	  They	  quickly	  seized	  large	  portions	  of	  the	  country	  (eventually,	  the	  Serbs	  would	  almost	  two-­‐thirds	  of	  the	  Bosnian	  geography)	  and	  began	  a	  campaign	  of	  ethnic	  cleansing	  in	  an	  effort	  to	  create	  a	  “pure”	  Bosnian	  Serb	  state.	  	  Bosnian	  President	  Izetbegovic	  asked	  the	  U.N.	  Security	  council	  to	  intervene,	  but	  they	  declined	  to	  send	  peacekeepers.	  	  	  In	  early	  May,	  Yugoslavian	  and	  Bosnian	  Serb	  forces	  attacked	  Sarajevo,	  but	  Bosnian	  Special	  Forces	  soldiers	  and	  local	  gang	  members	  thwarted	  the	  Serb	  assault.	  	  Still,	  the	  Yugoslavian	  forces	  managed	  to	  kidnap	  President	  Izetbegovic	  at	  the	  airport	  after	  he	  had	  returned	  from	  negotiations	  in	  Lisbon.	  	  The	  Yugoslavians	  used	  Izetbegovic	  as	  leverage	  to	  guarantee	  their	  safe	  exit	  from	  Sarajevo.	  	  On	  May	  18,	  the	  Bosnian	  and	  Yugoslavian	  governments	  reached	  a	  shaky	  peace	  agreement	  and	  Yugoslavia	  withdrew	  their	  forces	  from	  Bosnia,	  but	  left	  their	  heavy	  weapons	  in	  the	  hands	  of	  the	  Bosnian	  Serbs.54	  	  	  	  	   With	  the	  Yugoslavian	  forces	  gone,	  the	  Bosnian	  Serbs	  escalated	  their	  campaign	  of	  violence	  all	  across	  the	  country.	  	  By	  the	  end	  of	  May,	  they	  had	  shelled	  Red	  Cross	  and	  UN	  relief	  convoys,	  overran	  and	  massacred	  the	  inhabitants	  of	  the	  village	  of	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Kozarac,	  and	  began	  an	  artillery	  barrage	  of	  Sarajevo.55	  	  The	  U.N.	  Security	  Council	  responded	  to	  these	  actions	  by	  passing	  Resolution	  757,	  which	  imposed	  economic	  sanctions	  on	  Serbia,	  on	  May	  30,	  1992.56	  	  The	  Bosnian	  Serb	  shelling	  of	  Sarajevo	  intensified.	  The	  escalation	  of	  violence	  had	  captured	  the	  world’s	  attention,	  and	  the	  international	  community	  initiated	  efforts	  to	  reopen	  the	  airport	  in	  Sarajevo	  for	  humanitarian	  relief	  flights.	  	  The	  U.N.	  Security	  Council	  agreed	  to	  send	  1,500	  peacekeepers	  from	  their	  Protection	  Force	  (UNPROFOR)	  to	  secure	  the	  Sarajevo	  airport.57	  	  The	  U.N.	  authorized	  its	  member	  states	  to	  take	  “all	  measures	  necessary”	  to	  assist	  in	  the	  delivery	  of	  humanitarian	  aid	  to	  Bosnia,	  and	  by	  August,	  had	  authorized	  the	  use	  of	  force	  to	  protect	  aid	  convoys.58	  	   In	  October	  1992,	  the	  U.N.	  Security	  Council	  established	  a	  War	  Crimes	  Commission	  to	  investigate	  widespread	  reports	  of	  atrocities	  including	  mass	  rape,	  torture,	  starvation,	  and	  executions	  committed	  by	  all	  sides,	  particularly	  the	  Bosnian	  Serbs.	  	  NATO	  forces	  deployed	  to	  Bosnia	  under	  U.N.	  authorization	  and	  the	  Security	  Council	  instituted	  a	  “no-­‐fly	  zone”	  over	  Bosnia.	  	  President	  Bush	  threatened	  to	  use	  U.S.	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airstrikes	  to	  enforce	  the	  U.N.	  no-­‐fly	  zone.	  	  In	  November,	  the	  U.N.	  authorized	  its	  member	  states	  to	  enforce	  the	  Serbian	  embargo	  on	  the	  high	  seas.59	  	  	   January	  1993	  offered	  some	  hope	  for	  peace	  as	  U.N.	  Envoy	  Cyrus	  Vance	  and	  E.C.	  envoy	  Lord	  David	  Owen	  presented	  their	  peace	  plan,	  which	  would	  divide	  Bosnia	  into	  10	  autonomous	  provinces	  under	  a	  decentralized	  federal	  government.	  	  Bosnian	  Croat	  forces	  immediately	  accepted	  the	  Vance-­‐Owen	  plan,	  eventually	  the	  Bosnian	  government	  and	  even	  Serbian	  President	  Slobodan	  Milosevic	  (after	  being	  threatened	  with	  further	  U.N.	  sanctions)	  would	  accept	  a	  modified	  version	  of	  the	  plan,	  the	  but	  it	  fell	  through	  when	  the	  Bosnian	  Serbs	  rejected	  it.	  	  Following	  the	  failure	  of	  the	  Vance-­‐Owen	  peace	  plan,	  the	  U.N.	  established	  a	  War	  Crimes	  Tribunal	  to	  investigate	  and	  prosecute	  barbarities	  committed	  in	  all	  former	  Yugoslav	  republics	  since	  January	  1,	  1991.60	  	  	  Determined	  to	  step	  up	  American	  efforts	  toward	  peace	  in	  Bosnia,61	  President	  Clinton	  authorized	  the	  aerial	  delivery	  of	  relief	  supplies	  to	  Bosnian	  Muslims	  in	  February	  1993,	  after	  Bosnian	  Serb	  forces	  denied	  passage	  of	  aid	  convoys	  to	  besieged	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  cease	  interference	  with	  relief	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  relief	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  and	  their	  UNPROFOR	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  be	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  in	  getting	  the	  convoys	  through.”	  Memorandum	  -­‐	  Anthony	  Lake	  to	  President	  William	  J.	  Clinton,	  “Presidential	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  on	  Humanitarian	  Air	  Drops	  for	  Bosnia,”	  February	  19,	  1993.	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  June	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areas.62	  	  The	  Clinton	  administration	  encouraged	  the	  U.N.	  to	  tighten	  the	  sanctions	  on	  Serbia	  and	  proposed	  a	  “lift	  and	  strike”	  policy	  toward	  the	  Bosnian	  Serbs.	  	  Clinton	  had	  campaigned	  on	  this	  policy	  during	  the	  1992	  election,	  and	  now	  he	  was	  proposing	  “lift	  and	  strike”	  as	  a	  workable	  policy	  in	  Bosnia.	  	  For	  the	  most	  part,	  the	  European	  Community	  disagreed	  that	  “lift	  and	  strike”	  would	  have	  a	  beneficial	  impact	  on	  the	  situation	  on	  the	  ground.	  They	  felt	  the	  most	  likely	  consequence	  of	  lifting	  the	  arms	  embargo	  would	  be	  a	  flood	  of	  weapons	  to	  all	  sides,	  resulting	  in	  the	  fighting	  and	  killing	  rising	  to	  new	  levels.	  They	  also	  feared	  the	  Bosnian	  Serbs	  would	  launch	  preemptive	  assaults	  the	  ethnic	  Croats	  and	  Muslims	  in	  Bosnia.63	  	  In	  April	  1993,	  the	  U.N.	  passed	  Security	  Council	  Resolution	  819,	  which	  designated	  the	  Muslim	  enclave	  of	  Srebrenica	  as	  a	  safe	  area.	  	  Furthermore,	  the	  Security	  Council	  demanded	  the	  “unimpeded	  delivery	  of	  humanitarian	  assistance	  to	  all	  parts	  of	  the	  Republic	  of	  Bosnia	  and	  Herzegovina”	  and	  that	  “the	  Federal	  Republic	  of	  Yugoslavia	  (Serbia	  and	  Montenegro)	  immediately	  cease	  the	  supply	  of	  military	  arms,	  equipment	  and	  services	  to	  the	  Bosnian	  Serb	  paramilitary	  units	  in	  the	  Republic	  of	  Bosnia	  and	  Herzegovina.”64	  	  NATO	  initiated	  “Operation	  Deny	  Flight”	  to	  enforce	  the	  U.N.	  no	  fly	  zone	  over	  Bosnia.	  	  Eventually,	  NATO	  would	  expand	  the	  operation	  to	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include	  close	  air	  support	  for	  U.N.	  troops	  and	  coercive	  airstrikes.65	  	  The	  first	  American	  combatants	  would	  see	  combat	  in	  support	  of	  Operation	  Deny	  Flight.	  	  In	  May,	  the	  passed	  U.N.	  passed	  Security	  Council	  Resolution	  824,	  extended	  their	  safe	  areas	  to	  include	  the	  cities	  of	  Sarajevo,	  Bihac,	  Zepa,	  Gorozade,	  and	  Tuzla.	  	  	  Regardless	  of	  U.N.	  resolutions,	  Bosnian	  Serbs	  continued	  to	  carry	  out	  military	  operations	  in	  the	  designated	  safe	  areas.66	  Thorvald	  Stoltenberg	  of	  Norway,	  who	  replaced	  Vance	  Cyrus	  as	  U.N.	  mediator	  and	  Lord	  David	  Owen	  proposed	  a	  new	  peace	  plan	  in	  June	  1993.	  	  The	  Owen-­‐Stoltenbrg	  plan	  called	  for	  dividing	  Bosnia	  into	  3	  ethnic	  regions.	  	  Bosnian	  Serb	  and	  Bosnian	  Croat	  forces	  intensified	  offensive	  operations	  against	  the	  Bosnian	  government	  in	  order	  to	  increase	  their	  holdings	  in	  the	  event	  of	  partition.	  	  The	  Owen-­‐Stoltenberg	  plan	  was	  accepted	  by	  Croatia	  and	  Yugoslavia,	  but	  the	  Bosnian	  government	  rejected	  the	  plan	  due	  to	  territorial	  disputes	  with	  the	  Bosnian	  Serbs.67	  	  	  The	  second	  half	  of	  1993	  saw	  an	  increase	  of	  violence	  by	  Bosnian	  Croats.	  	  In	  August,	  they	  besieged	  the	  town	  of	  Mostar	  and	  refused	  to	  allow	  humanitarian	  convoys	  access	  to	  the	  Muslim	  town.	  	  President	  Clinton	  ordered	  additional	  aerial	  deliveries	  of	  food	  and	  medical	  supplies	  to	  the	  besieged	  Bosnian	  Muslims	  there.	  	  In	  October,	  the	  U.N.	  military	  command	  in	  Bosnia	  reported	  the	  rape,	  torture,	  and	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  65	  Operation	  Deny	  Flight	  Fact	  Sheet,	  ”Global	  Security,	  Military	  Operations	  in	  the	  Former	  Yugoslavia	  -­‐	  Operation	  Deny	  Flight,”	  Global	  Security,	  accessed	  June	  13,	  2015,	  online:	  	  http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/deny_flight.htm	  	  66	  "Security Council Resolution 824 (1993)," United Nations Security Council. May 6, 1993. Accessed 
June 14, 2015. http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/824(1993).  	  67	  Mirko	  Pejanovic,	  Through	  Bosnian	  Eyes:	  The	  Political	  Memoirs	  of	  a	  Bosnian	  Serb	  (West	  Lafayette:	  Purdue	  University	  Press,	  2004)	  177-­‐186.	  	  
	   34	  
massacre	  of	  Bosnian	  Muslims	  in	  the	  town	  of	  Stupni	  Do.	  	  U.N.	  officials	  believed	  that	  Bosnian	  Croats	  were	  responsible	  for	  the	  atrocities.	  	  In	  addition,	  Bosnian	  Croats	  fired	  upon	  U.N.	  forces	  before	  allowing	  them	  to	  enter	  Stupni	  Do.68	  In	  early	  1994,	  the	  violence	  in	  Bosnia	  increased.	  	  In	  February,	  Bosnian	  Serbs	  began	  shelling	  U.N.	  safe	  areas.	  	  They	  launched	  a	  mortar	  strike	  into	  bread	  lines	  in	  a	  marketplace,	  killing	  68	  civilians.	  	  In	  response,	  the	  U.S.	  and	  France	  threatened	  the	  Bosnian	  Serbs	  with	  airstrikes	  if	  the	  Serbs	  did	  not	  remove	  their	  heavy	  weapons	  from	  the	  vicinity	  of	  Sarajevo.	  	  Russia	  intervened	  to	  ensure	  the	  Bosnian	  Serbs	  complied.	  	  Later	  that	  month,	  NATO	  shot	  down	  4	  Bosnian	  Serb	  aircraft	  for	  violating	  the	  U.N.	  no-­‐fly	  zone.69	  	  Bosnian	  Serbs	  renewed	  their	  shelling	  of	  U.N.	  safe	  areas	  in	  April.	  	  The	  town	  of	  Gorozade	  fell	  under	  Bosnian	  Serb	  control.	  	  Russia	  criticized	  the	  Bosnian	  Serb	  aggression	  and	  NATO	  responded	  with	  more	  airstrikes,	  forcing	  Bosnian	  Serb	  forces	  to	  withdraw	  from	  Gorozade.70	  	  In	  mid	  1994,	  the	  U.S.	  Senate	  and	  House	  of	  Representatives	  voted	  to	  unilaterally	  lift	  the	  U.N.	  arms	  embargo	  against	  the	  Bosnian	  government,	  increasing	  tensions	  between	  the	  U.S.	  and	  its	  NATO	  allies.	  	  France	  threatened	  to	  withdraw	  their	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peacekeepers	  from	  UNPROFOR	  if	  the	  embargo	  was	  lifted.71	  President	  Clinton	  vetoed	  the	  measure	  and	  the	  move	  to	  unilaterally	  lift	  the	  embargo	  failed.	  72	  	  	   In	  June	  1994,	  U.N.	  mediator	  Yashui	  Akashi	  secured	  a	  one-­‐month	  ceasefire,	  but	  fighting	  erupted	  again	  before	  the	  end	  of	  the	  month.	  	  The	  U.S.,	  Britain,	  Germany,	  France,	  and	  Russia	  formed	  a	  “contact	  group”	  and	  proposed	  a	  new	  peace	  plan	  in	  July.	  	  The	  Five	  Powers	  Peace	  Plan	  was	  based	  on	  a	  territorial	  division	  of	  Bosnia	  where	  the	  Bosnian	  Croats	  and	  Muslims	  would	  control	  51%	  of	  the	  country,	  while	  Bosnian	  Serbs	  would	  control	  the	  remaining	  49%.	  	  Furthermore,	  the	  contact	  group	  threatened	  to	  multilaterally	  lift	  the	  arms	  embargo	  against	  the	  Bosnian	  government	  if	  the	  Bosnian	  Serbs	  rejected	  the	  plan.	  	  The	  Bosnian	  Serbs	  called	  the	  contact	  group’s	  bluff	  and	  rejected	  the	  peace	  plan,	  and	  the	  U.N.	  failed	  to	  lift	  the	  arms	  embargo.	  	  Later	  that	  month,	  NATO	  recommenced	  airstrikes	  against	  Bosnian	  Serb	  targets	  in	  response	  to	  a	  Bosnian	  Serb	  attack	  on	  U.N.	  personnel.	  73	  	  	  	  	   In	  September,	  Bosnian	  government	  forces	  launched	  offensive	  operations	  against	  Bosnian	  Serbs	  in	  and	  around	  Sarajevo.	  	  The	  U.N.	  threatened	  to	  withdraw	  peacekeepers	  and	  to	  recommend	  airstrikes	  against	  the	  Bosnian	  government	  if	  the	  Bosnian	  government	  were	  to	  continue	  offensive	  operations.	  	  In	  October	  however,	  Bosnian	  government	  forces	  attempted	  to	  move	  through	  a	  U.N.	  demilitarized	  area	  in	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order	  to	  attack	  Bosnian	  Serb	  forces.	  	  The	  U.N.	  forces	  repelled	  the	  Bosnian	  attack.74	  	  	   By	  November	  1994,	  the	  Bosnian	  Government,	  Bosnian	  Croat,	  and	  Bosnian	  Serb	  forces	  were	  again	  locked	  in	  combat.	  	  Bosnian	  Serbs	  again	  violated	  the	  U.N.	  no-­‐fly	  zone	  and	  again	  attacked	  a	  U.N.	  safe	  area;	  this	  time	  in	  Bihac.	  	  NATO	  aircraft	  attacked	  the	  airfield	  from	  which	  the	  Serb	  planes	  launched,	  damaging	  the	  runways.	  	  Bosnian	  Serb	  leader	  Radovan	  Karadzic	  refused	  to	  meet	  with	  U.N.	  Secretary	  General	  Boutros	  Boutros	  Ghali	  in	  Sarajevo	  to	  discuss	  the	  Bosnian	  Serb	  attack	  on	  Bihac.75	  Despite	  previous	  failed	  attempts	  at	  peace	  in	  Bosnia,	  mid-­‐December	  1994	  offered	  an	  unexpected	  and	  hopeful	  turn	  of	  events.	  	  Karadzic	  extended	  an	  invitation	  to	  former	  President	  Carter	  to	  visit	  Bosnia	  in	  the	  hopes	  that	  the	  two	  could	  broker	  some	  sort	  of	  peace	  agreement.	  	  President	  Carter	  insisted	  he	  had	  no	  intentions	  of	  being	  becoming	  a	  permanent	  negotiator,	  but	  he	  hoped	  his	  trip	  might	  provide	  an	  opening	  to	  move	  toward	  a	  cessation	  of	  hostilities.	  	  Carter	  arranged	  a	  4-­‐month	  cease-­‐fire,	  which	  proved	  to	  be	  the	  most	  successful	  bid	  for	  peace	  in	  Bosnia	  to	  that	  point.	  	  The	  Peace	  Carter	  brokered	  gave	  all	  sides	  hope	  for	  a	  permanent	  solution,	  but	  only	  proved	  to	  be	  the	  calm	  before	  the	  storm.76	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Clinton’s	  Policy	  Ambitions:	  A	  New	  Vision	  for	  the	  Post	  Cold	  War	  World	  Upon	  entering	  the	  White	  House,	  Bill	  Clinton	  enjoyed	  a	  brief	  “honeymoon”	  period	  with	  his	  public.	  	  The	  American	  people,	  for	  the	  most	  part,	  were	  optimistic	  about	  the	  future	  and	  direction	  of	  the	  country.	  	  During	  the	  election	  campaign,	  Clinton	  had	  focused	  primarily	  on	  domestic	  issues,	  but	  he	  saw	  a	  weakness	  in	  George	  H.	  W.	  Bush’s	  Balkan	  policy.77	  	  Though	  they	  were	  hardly	  surprised	  by	  its	  breakup,	  the	  Bush	  Administration	  viewed	  the	  crumbling	  of	  Yugoslavia	  with	  a	  “wait	  and	  see”	  attitude,	  and	  understandably	  so.78	  	  Yugoslavia’s	  collapse	  and	  the	  subsequent	  violence	  occurred	  during	  the	  last	  year	  of	  Bush’s	  single	  term	  in	  office.	  	  With	  the	  multitude	  of	  other	  issues	  populating	  American	  headlines	  (German	  reunification,	  the	  breakup	  of	  the	  Soviet	  Union,	  and	  missions	  in	  Iraq	  in	  support	  of	  Operation	  Desert	  Shield/Desert	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  Several	  in	  the	  administration	  warned	  of	  Yugoslavia’s	  break	  up	  years	  before	  it	  occurred.	  	  The	  Director	  of	  Central	  Intelligence	  officially	  reported	  that	  the	  fragmentation	  of	  Yugoslavia	  in	  October	  1990.	  The	  National	  Intelligence	  Estimate	  report	  titled	  “Yugoslavia	  Transformed”	  that	  Yugoslavia	  would	  “cease	  to	  function	  as	  a	  federal	  state	  within	  one	  year”	  and	  would	  “probably	  dissolve	  within	  two.”	  	  Furthermore,	  the	  report	  asserted	  that	  “Economic	  reform	  will	  not	  stave	  off	  the	  breakup”	  and	  that	  there	  was	  “little	  the	  United	  States	  and	  its	  European	  Allies	  can	  do	  to	  preserve	  Yugoslav	  unity,”	  and	  that	  Yugoslavs	  would	  see	  such	  efforts	  as	  “contradictory	  to	  advocacy	  of	  democracy	  and	  self-­‐determination.”	  Director	  of	  Central	  Intelligence,	  “Yugoslavia	  Transformed,”	  October	  10,	  1990,	  National	  Intelligence	  Estimate.	  	  William	  J.	  Clinton	  Presidential	  Library,	  (Hereafter	  CPL,)	  accessed	  June	  14,	  2015,	  Online:	  http://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/show/12289	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Storm	  to	  name	  a	  few,)	  the	  breakup	  of	  Yugoslavia	  was	  an	  attractive	  issue	  to	  place	  on	  the	  back	  burner.79	  	  	  During	  his	  presidential	  campaign,	  Clinton	  chose	  Bosnia	  on	  which	  to	  make	  his	  foreign	  policy	  stand,	  and	  within	  his	  first	  three	  months	  as	  president,	  Clinton	  had	  kept	  his	  promise	  to	  take	  a	  more	  aggressive	  position	  than	  the	  U.S.	  had	  previously	  taken.80	  	  As	  the	  first	  president	  elected	  after	  the	  Cold	  War,	  He	  took	  office	  with	  a	  new,	  expanded	  vision	  for	  America’s	  position	  in	  the	  world.	  	  Clinton	  believed	  that	  the	  United	  States	  was	  a	  European	  power,	  whose	  presence	  was	  “essential	  to	  maintaining	  stability	  and	  peace	  throughout	  the	  Euro-­‐Atlantic	  region.”	  	  He	  claimed	  “the	  critical	  lesson	  of	  this	  century	  is	  that	  our	  security	  is	  inextricably	  linked	  with	  Europe.”81	  	  He	  said	  European	  peace	  and	  stability	  were	  central	  to	  American	  prosperity.	  	  The	  “first	  task”	  of	  the	  U.S.,	  therefore,	  was	  to	  “help	  build,	  for	  the	  first	  time,	  an	  undivided	  Europe.	  	  When	  Europe	  is	  stable,	  prosperous,	  and	  at	  peace,	  America	  is	  more	  secure.”	  	  The	  central	  objective	  of	  Clinton’s	  broader	  vision	  was	  to	  “build	  a	  peaceful,	  integrated	  Europe	  within	  a	  New	  Atlantic	  Community	  that	  can	  effectively	  manage	  the	  security	  challenges	  of	  the	  21st	  century.”82	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  79	  Richard	  Holbrooke,	  To	  End	  a	  War,	  (New	  York:	  Random	  House,	  1998)	  26-­‐27	  
80	  William	  J.	  Clinton,	  “Remarks	  at	  a	  Town	  Meeting	  in	  Detroit,”	  February	  10,	  1993.	  Online	  by	  Gerhard	  Peters	  and	  John	  T.	  Woolley,	  The	  American	  Presidency	  Project.	  http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=46999	  	  81	  Joint	  DOD,	  DOS,	  NSC,	  and	  USIA	  Cable	  	  “European	  Security,”	  February	  12,	  1993.	  File:	  European	  	  Affairs	  –	  Feeley,	  Folder:	  France	  and	  NATO,	  2006-­‐0215-­‐F,	  OA/ID	  910,	  William	  J.	  Clinton	  Presidential	  
Library	  	  82	  Joint	  DOD,	  DOS,	  NSC,	  and	  USIA	  Cable	  	  “European	  Security,”	  	  February	  12,	  1993.	  File:	  European	  	  Affairs	  –	  Feeley,	  Folder:	  France	  and	  NATO,	  2006-­‐0215-­‐F,	  OA/ID	  910,	  William	  J.	  Clinton	  Presidential	  
Library	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Ensuring	  stability	  and	  spreading	  democracy	  were	  central	  to	  Clinton’s	  vision.	  	  He	  sought	  to	  enhance	  the	  security	  of	  all	  European	  states,	  to	  strengthen	  democratic	  and	  market	  reforms	  in	  Central	  and	  Eastern	  Europe,	  and	  to	  prevent	  the	  establishment	  of	  “dividing	  lines”	  in	  Europe	  that	  would	  recreate	  the	  European	  disunion	  of	  the	  Cold	  War.	  	  Clinton	  believed	  that	  “in	  a	  Europe	  without	  dividing	  lines,	  all	  states	  would	  share	  greater	  commonality	  of	  interests	  and	  objectives,	  former	  adversaries	  will	  continue	  to	  work	  together	  to	  tackle	  new	  challenges	  that	  threaten	  shared	  interests.”83	  Clinton’s	  vision	  for	  the	  U.S.	  role	  in	  the	  post-­‐Cold	  War	  world	  differed	  markedly	  from	  that	  of	  his	  predecessor.	  	  George	  H.	  W.	  Bush	  understood	  American	  interests	  in	  a	  narrower	  terms.	  	  He	  felt	  that	  the	  U.S.	  should	  resist	  the	  urge	  to	  	  “tackle	  every	  international	  problem	  as	  its	  own.”	  	  Where	  Clinton	  was	  willing	  to	  accept	  that	  European	  issues	  could	  constitute	  American	  problems,	  Bush	  felt	  that	  the	  U.S.	  should	  not	  “postpone	  addressing	  our	  own	  domestic	  imperatives	  while	  we	  devote	  attention	  and	  resources	  to	  international	  demands.”84	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  83	  Joint	  DOD,	  DOS,	  NSC,	  and	  USIA	  Cable	  	  “European	  Security,”	  	  February	  12,	  1993.	  File:	  European	  	  Affairs	  –	  Feeley,	  Folder:	  France	  and	  NATO,	  OA/ID	  910,	  William	  J.	  Clinton	  Presidential	  Library	  	  84	  National	  Security	  Strategy	  of	  the	  United	  States,	  January	  1,	  1993.	  White	  House,	  1600	  Pennsylvania	  Ave.,	  NW,	  Washington,	  DC.	  	  National	  Security	  Strategy	  Archive,	  	  Online:	  	  http://nssarchive.us/NSSR/1993.pdf	  	  The	  publication	  of	  George	  H.	  W.	  Bush’s	  final	  National	  Security	  Strategy	  was	  delayed	  until	  January	  1,	  1993,	  just	  before	  Clinton’s	  inauguration.	  	  As	  may	  be	  expected	  for	  any	  White	  House	  document	  produced	  in	  an	  election	  year,	  the	  1993	  NSS	  focused	  on	  past	  accomplishments	  of	  the	  administration	  more	  than	  the	  future	  of	  national	  security.	  By	  the	  time	  the	  document	  was	  nearing	  publication,	  it	  was	  clear	  that	  President	  Bush	  would	  lose	  the	  election.	  The	  NSS	  was	  an	  attempt	  to	  shape	  the	  legacy	  of	  the	  12-­‐year	  Republican	  reign	  and	  prepare	  the	  field	  for	  the	  Clinton	  administration	  by	  setting	  the	  standards	  by	  which	  his	  foreign	  policy	  would	  be	  judged.	  	  When	  Clinton’s	  NSS	  was	  published	  in	  July	  1994,	  it	  clearly	  represented	  a	  change	  in	  ideas	  for	  post-­‐Cold	  War	  foreign	  policy.	  	  Clinton’s	  vision	  of	  national	  security	  is	  remarkably	  different	  and	  much	  broader	  than	  that	  of	  his	  predecessor.	  	  
	   40	  
Bosnia	  not	  only	  presented	  a	  glaring	  roadblock	  to	  Clinton’s	  vision	  for	  Euro-­‐American	  stability,	  the	  issue	  also	  represented	  a	  clash	  between	  Bush’s	  narrow,	  Cold-­‐War	  vision	  and	  Clinton’s	  more	  encompassing	  view	  of	  U.S.	  foreign	  policies.	  	  	  The	  Bush	  administration’s	  aversion	  to	  a	  real	  commitment	  in	  the	  Balkans	  had	  drawn	  criticism	  by	  many	  on	  both	  sides	  of	  the	  political	  spectrum.	  	  During	  the	  1992	  presidential	  campaign,	  Clinton	  saw	  this	  as	  an	  opportunity	  to	  gain	  some	  ground	  on	  the	  foreign	  policy	  front.	  	  During	  the	  campaign,	  he	  was	  critical	  of	  the	  Bush	  administration’s	  failure	  to	  address	  the	  human	  rights	  abuses	  in	  the	  Balkans.	  	  In	  response,	  Bush	  insisted	  that	  he	  was	  not	  willing	  to	  commit	  American	  combat	  forces	  into	  a	  potential	  Bosnian	  quagmire.	  	  	  Clinton	  sought	  a	  greater	  U.S.	  role	  in	  Bosnia,	  but	  he	  assured	  a	  skeptical	  American	  population	  that	  he	  was	  not	  prepared	  immediately	  to	  send	  American	  combat	  troops	  into	  Bosnia.	  	  He	  was,	  however,	  committed	  to	  doing	  more	  than	  the	  previous	  administration	  to	  solve	  the	  Bosnian	  problem.85	  	  Clinton	  advocated	  a	  “lift	  and	  strike”	  policy;	  a	  policy	  of	  lifting	  the	  arms	  embargo,	  which	  was	  hindering	  the	  war	  efforts	  of	  the	  Bosnian	  Muslims	  and	  Croats,	  and	  conducting	  airstrikes	  against	  Bosnian	  Serb	  forces.86	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  National	  Security	  Strategy	  of	  the	  United	  States,	  July	  1,	  1994.	  White	  House,	  1600	  Pennsylvania	  Ave.,	  NW,	  Washington,	  DC.,	  National	  Security	  Strategy	  Archive.	  	  	  Online:	  	  http://nssarchive.us/NSSR/1994.pdf.	  Section	  1.01 85	  Debate	  Transcript,	  “Presidential	  Debate	  in	  St.	  Louis,”	  October	  11,	  1992,	  The	  
American	  Presidency	  Project,	  accessed	  June	  14,	  2015,	  	  Online:	  http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=21605	  	  86	  U.S.	  Department	  of	  State,	  Office	  of	  the	  Historian,	  “Milestones	  1993	  –	  2000:	  The	  War	  in	  Bosnia,	  1992	  –	  1995,”	  Foreign	  Relations	  of	  the	  United	  States,	  accessed	  June	  14,	  2015,	  Online:	  	  https://history.state.gov/milestones/1993-­‐2000/bosnia	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After	  the	  election,	  Clinton	  continued	  his	  emphasis	  on	  a	  stronger	  U.S.	  role	  in	  the	  Balkans.	  	  In	  Dec	  1992,	  he	  publicly	  stated,	  “Anything	  we	  can	  do	  to	  try	  to	  turn	  up	  the	  heat	  (in	  Bosnia)	  to	  try	  to	  reduce	  the	  carnage	  is	  worth	  trying.”87	  	  The	  Bush	  administration’s	  “hands-­‐off”	  approach	  to	  Bosnia	  combined	  with	  their	  recent	  decision	  to	  kick	  the	  proverbial	  hornet’s	  nest	  in	  Somalia	  created	  a	  foreign	  policy	  predicament	  that	  was	  certain	  to	  test	  the	  new	  president	  right	  away.	  	  Somalia	  was	  the	  most	  immediate	  issue,	  but	  because	  of	  Clinton’s	  strong	  stance	  on	  the	  Balkans,	  Bosnia	  loomed	  ominous	  –	  like	  the	  600	  lb.	  gorilla	  in	  the	  Oval	  Office.	  Clinton	  has	  been	  accused	  of	  hesitating	  on	  making	  many	  foreign	  policy	  decisions.88	  	  However,	  evidence	  suggests	  this	  was	  not	  the	  case	  for	  Bosnia.	  Clinton’s	  mind	  was	  made	  up	  in	  this	  regard	  as	  it	  made	  for	  European	  security.	  	  He	  entered	  office	  with	  a	  very	  clear	  goal	  of	  a	  greater	  U.S.	  involvement	  in	  the	  Bosnian	  peace	  process.	  	  Bosnia	  constituted	  the	  most	  glaring	  issue	  preventing	  the	  implementation	  of	  Clinton’s	  vision	  for	  success	  within	  the	  “New	  Atlantic	  Community.”89	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  Elaine	  Sciolino,	  “Clinton	  Urges	  a	  Stronger	  Stand	  on	  Enforcing	  Bosnia	  Flight	  Ban,”	  New	  York	  Times,	  December	  12,	  1992.	  Page	  A1.	  	  88	  David	  Lauter,	  “Clinton’s	  Decision-­‐Making	  Style	  Keeps	  Capital	  Waiting:	  He	  Invariably	  Delays	  Key	  Moves	  Until	  the	  Last	  Minute.	  Aides	  Say	  Process	  Helps	  Avoid	  Mistakes,”	  The	  Los	  Angeles	  Times,	  February	  9,	  1993.	  	  Accessed	  June	  14,	  2015,	  Online:	  	  http://articles.latimes.com/1993-­‐02-­‐09/news/mn-­‐1282_1_decision-­‐making-­‐style	  	  89	  The	  New	  Atlantic	  Community	  is	  a	  term	  that	  many	  in	  the	  Clinton	  administration	  would	  use	  to	  describe	  the	  post-­‐Cold	  War	  community	  of	  the	  European	  Union	  and	  the	  United	  States.	  	  It	  was	  later	  described	  in	  a	  speech	  by	  Warren	  Christopher	  as	  a	  community	  that	  would	  “transcend	  the	  artificial	  boundaries	  of	  Cold	  War	  Europe,	  and	  “give	  North	  America	  a	  deeper	  partnership	  with	  a	  broader,	  more	  	  integrated	  Europe	  on	  this	  continent	  and	  around	  the	  world.”	  Warren	  Christopher,	  “Speech	  in	  Commemoration	  of	  Secretary	  of	  State	  James	  Byrnes’	  1946	  Speech	  of	  Hope,”	  September	  6,	  1996.	  Federation	  of	  American	  Scientists	  –	  Military	  Analysis	  Network,	  Accessed	  June	  15,	  2015.	  	  http://fas.org/man/nato/offdocs/us_96/dos960906.htm.	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Clinton	  carefully	  selected	  a	  foreign	  policy	  team	  to	  deal	  with	  the	  Balkan	  crisis.	  	  Clinton	  surrounded	  himself	  with	  personnel	  who	  were	  supportive	  of	  a	  larger	  U.	  S.	  foreign	  policy	  role	  in	  the	  Balkans	  –	  some,	  like	  Vice	  President	  Al	  Gore	  and	  U.S.	  Ambassador	  to	  the	  United	  Nations	  Madeleine	  Albright,	  were	  very	  quick	  to	  push	  for	  military	  intervention.	  	  Others,	  like	  Chairman	  of	  the	  Joint	  Chiefs	  of	  Staff	  (CJCS)	  General	  Colin	  Powell,	  were	  more	  wary	  of	  using	  military	  force.	  	  Powell	  was	  the	  lone	  holdover	  from	  the	  Bush	  administration.	  	  He	  had	  offered	  to	  resign	  his	  position,	  but	  Clinton	  preferred	  to	  keep	  Powell	  on	  board	  until	  his	  tenure	  as	  CJCS	  was	  complete.	  	  Powell	  was	  the	  hugely	  popular	  hero	  of	  Operation	  Desert	  Storm,	  and	  the	  president	  knew	  keeping	  Powell	  bolstered	  the	  foreign	  policy	  and	  military	  credibility	  of	  his	  staff.	  	  	  On	  the	  Bosnia	  issue,	  Powell	  remained	  committed	  to	  his	  policy	  of	  not	  risking	  American	  lives	  where	  he	  saw	  no	  U.S.	  interests	  at	  stake.	  	  He	  insisted	  that	  involving	  U.S.	  combat	  forces	  in	  Bosnia	  was	  the	  wrong	  move,	  as	  it	  could	  lead	  to	  a	  quagmire.	  Powell	  remained	  Clinton’s	  only	  resistance	  (from	  within	  his	  inner	  circle)	  in	  this	  respect.90	  	  Countering	  Powell’s	  objections	  were	  the	  influential	  voices	  of	  Albright	  and	  Secretary	  of	  State	  Warren	  Christopher,	  who	  urged	  President	  Clinton	  to	  use	  military	  force	  to	  resolve	  the	  conflict	  as	  early	  as	  February	  1993,	  though	  it	  was	  not	  a	  popular	  course	  of	  action	  at	  that	  time.	  	  Christopher	  recognized,	  long	  before	  his	  contemporaries,	  that	  American	  military	  intervention	  was	  not	  only	  needed,	  but	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  Powell	  and	  Persico,	  My	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would	  involve	  a	  major	  commitment.	  	  He	  argued	  that	  the	  Bosnian	  conflict	  represented	  U.	  S.	  interests	  and	  that	  America	  could	  not	  afford	  to	  ignore	  it.91	  	  	  Albright	  had	  personal	  motivations	  for	  wanting	  to	  halt	  the	  violence	  that	  plagued	  Europe.	  	  She	  immigrated	  to	  the	  United	  States	  from	  Czechoslovakia	  when	  she	  was	  eleven	  years	  old.	  	  Having	  witnessed	  firsthand	  the	  horrors	  of	  Nazi	  occupation	  of	  Eastern	  Europe,	  Albright	  attacked	  the	  Bosnian	  issue	  with	  vehemence.	  	  Her	  personal	  history	  was	  never	  far	  from	  her	  mind	  with	  regards	  to	  Bosnia.92	  	  	  Like	  Christopher,	  Albright	  actively	  sought	  a	  greater	  U.S.	  military	  participation	  in	  the	  Bosnian	  War.	  	  She	  stated	  that	  an	  American	  military	  presence	  in	  Bosnia	  might	  “intimidate	  the	  Bosnian	  Serb	  militia	  and	  their	  patrons	  in	  Belgrade.”93	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  91	  Though	  Christopher	  was	  not	  immediately	  the	  most	  ardent	  public	  supporter	  of	  American	  military	  intervention	  in	  Bosnia,	  he	  was	  among	  the	  most	  committed	  to	  finding	  an	  American	  solution	  to	  the	  European	  problem.	  	  Though	  the	  Clinton’s	  foreign	  policy	  team	  did	  not	  agree	  that	  the	  Vance-­‐Owen	  peace	  plan	  represented	  the	  best	  chance	  for	  success	  in	  Bosnia,	  Christopher	  was	  certainly	  ready	  to	  support	  it,	  with	  U.S.	  military	  force,	  if	  necessary.	  	  In	  February	  1993,	  Christopher	  ied	  peace	  in	  Bosnia	  directly	  with	  U.S.	  interests	  –	  a	  stance	  that	  had	  not	  previously	  been	  taken.	  	  Christopher	  stated,	  “Bosnia	  tests	  our	  ability	  to	  adopt	  new	  approaches	  to	  foreign	  policy	  in	  a	  world	  that	  has	  fundamentally	  changed.	  It	  tests	  our	  democracy…It	  tests	  our	  willingness	  to	  help	  our	  institutions	  of	  collective	  security,	  such	  as	  NATO,	  evolve	  in	  ways	  that	  can	  meet	  the	  demands	  of	  a	  new	  age.	  	  It	  tests	  what	  wisdom	  we	  have	  gathered	  from	  this	  bloody	  century,	  and	  it	  measures	  our	  resolve	  to	  take	  early,	  concerted	  action	  against	  systematic	  ethnic	  persecution…We	  cannot	  afford	  to	  miss	  any	  further	  opportunities	  to	  help	  pursue	  a	  resolution	  to	  this	  conflict.”	  Warren	  Christopher,	  In	  the	  Stream	  of	  History:	  Shaping	  Foreign	  Policy	  for	  a	  New	  Era,	  (Stanford:	  Stanford	  University	  Press	  1998)	  343-­‐345.	  	  92	  Albright	  mentions	  being	  particularly	  horrified	  by	  her	  visits	  to	  mass	  graves	  and	  sites	  of	  atrocities	  in	  Bosnia	  and	  Croatia	  during	  several	  trips	  to	  the	  Balkans.	  	  She	  visited	  mass	  gravesites	  in	  Vukovar,	  Mostar,	  Brcko,	  and	  Bihac	  among	  others.	  	  She	  likens	  what	  she	  saw	  in	  such	  places	  to	  other	  Europeans	  being	  led	  away	  to	  “other	  unfamiliar,	  hard-­‐to-­‐spell	  places	  such	  as	  Auschwitz,	  Treblinka,	  and	  Dachau.”	  	  Albright	  draws	  parallels	  between	  the	  “ethnic	  cleansing”	  in	  Bosnia	  and	  the	  “political	  housecleaning”	  that	  took	  place	  in	  Nazi-­‐occupied	  Poland.	  	  Such	  experiences	  fueled	  Albright’s	  fervor	  to	  solve	  the	  Bosnian	  crisis	  and	  explains	  her	  willingness	  to	  support	  American	  intervention	  in	  the	  Balksins.	  Albright,	  Madame	  Secretary	  (New	  York:	  Hyperion,	  2003)	  179-­‐194.	  	  93	  Memorandum	  for	  the	  National	  Security	  Advisor	  from	  Ambassador	  Madeleine	  K.	  Albright,	  “Options	  for	  Bosnia,”	  April	  14,	  1993.,	  U.S.	  Department	  of	  State	  Case	  Number:	  O-­‐2013-­‐07795,	  Document	  Number:	  C05358137,	  The	  National	  Security	  Archive,	  accessed	  June	  15,	  2015,	  Online:	  	  http://www.foia.cia.gov/sites/default/files/document_conversions/1817859/1993-­‐04-­‐14.pdf	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Further	  support	  from	  the	  inner	  circle	  came	  by	  the	  end	  of	  September	  1993,	  when	  Powell’s	  tenure	  as	  CJCS	  ended.	  Clinton	  selected	  General	  John	  Shalikashvilli	  as	  the	  new	  CJCS.	  Shalikashvilli,	  like	  Albright,	  immigrated	  to	  America	  from	  Eastern	  Europe.	  	  Also	  like	  Albright,	  Shalikashvilli	  was	  supportive	  of	  U.S.	  military	  intervention	  in	  Bosnia.94	  	  Powell,	  had	  remained	  steadfast	  in	  his	  opposition	  to	  using	  military	  force	  in	  Bosnia,	  admitted	  to	  feeling	  like	  a	  “skunk	  at	  the	  picnic.”	  	  Powell	  spurned	  Secretary	  of	  Defense	  Les	  Aspin’s	  viewpoint	  that	  the	  Bosnian	  problem	  could	  be	  solved	  using	  airstrikes	  and	  high-­‐tech	  weapons	  alone;	  he	  knew	  that	  solving	  a	  crisis	  like	  Bosnia	  would	  involve	  ground	  forces.95	  	  Powell’s	  stance	  occasionally	  led	  to	  heated	  arguments	  with	  others,	  especially	  Madeleine	  Albright.96	  	  	  Clinton	  attempted	  to	  emulate	  Franklin	  D.	  Roosevelt’s	  style	  of	  making	  decisions.	  	  He	  regularly	  asked	  his	  advisors	  to	  debate	  a	  particular	  question	  in	  front	  of	  him.	  	  Unlike	  Roosevelt,	  however,	  Clinton	  could	  not	  resist	  jumping	  in.	  	  He	  often	  presented	  his	  own	  opinion	  and	  took	  an	  active	  part	  in	  forming	  policy.97	  	  In	  such	  meetings,	  Clinton	  exhibited	  a	  willingness	  to	  go	  it	  alone	  and	  make	  decisions	  regardless	  of	  the	  advice	  he	  received.	  	  Some	  of	  his	  major	  policy	  decisions	  offer	  evidence	  of	  this	  habit,	  for	  instance	  his	  initiative	  to	  allow	  homosexuals	  to	  serve	  in	  the	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  William	  J.	  Clinton,	  “Ending	  the	  Bosnian	  War,”	  Bosnia,	  Intelligence,	  and	  the	  Clinton	  Presidency,	  8.	  	  95	  Powell	  and.	  Persico,	  My	  American	  Journey,	  562.	  	  96	  Powell	  and	  Persico,	  My	  American	  Journey	  576-­‐577.	  	  97	  David	  Mitchell,,	  Making	  Foreign	  Policy:	  Presidential	  Management	  of	  the	  Decision	  Making	  Process	  (Burlington,	  VT:	  Ashgate	  Publishing	  2005)	  140.	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military,	  and	  later	  his	  decision	  to	  invade	  Haiti.98	  	  In	  the	  administration’s	  early	  days,	  Clinton’s	  unorganized	  and	  decentralized	  decision-­‐making	  process	  yielded	  a	  trial-­‐and-­‐error	  approach	  to	  foreign	  policy,	  which	  soon	  taught	  the	  president	  some	  painful	  lessons	  notably	  in	  Somalia	  and	  Rwanda.	  	  Clinton	  concentrated	  the	  lion’s	  share	  of	  his	  foreign	  policy	  resources	  on	  Bosnia,	  which	  his	  team	  viewed	  as	  the	  most	  crucial	  crisis	  for	  U.S.	  foreign	  policy.	  	  From	  the	  very	  first	  meeting	  of	  the	  Clinton	  staff,	  Bosnia	  was	  their	  primary	  foreign	  policy	  concern.99	  The	  violence	  in	  Bosnia	  represented	  the	  European	  instability	  that	  Clinton	  desired	  to	  abolish	  in	  order	  to	  usher	  in	  his	  new	  vision	  for	  the	  U.S.	  in	  the	  New	  Atlantic	  Community.	  	  Furthermore,	  It	  was	  the	  international	  issue	  about	  which	  candidate	  Clinton	  had	  most	  sharply	  criticized	  Bush,	  and	  now	  as	  president,	  Clinton	  was	  determined	  to	  handle	  the	  situation.100	  	  In	  February	  1993	  -­‐	  less	  than	  a	  month	  after	  taking	  office	  -­‐	  Clinton	  reasserted	  his	  commitment	  to	  U.S.	  involvement	  in	  the	  Balkans.	  	  He	  stated	  that	  the	  U.S.	  needed	  to	  take	  a	  bolder	  stance	  against	  Serbian	  aggression.	  	  Specifically,	  Clinton	  said,	  “We've	  got	  to	  get	  the	  heavy	  weapons	  out	  of	  utilization....we've	  got	  to	  toughen	  the	  embargo	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  98	  Political	  Scientist	  Stanley	  Renshon	  argued	  that	  Clinton’s	  “freewheeling	  staff	  system	  without	  clear	  lines	  of	  authority”	  indicated	  a	  certain	  degree	  of	  control	  that	  Clinton	  exercised	  over	  his	  staff	  –	  Clinton	  ensured	  his	  control	  over	  the	  situation	  by	  establishing	  an	  impromptu	  system	  of	  decision	  making	  with	  no	  clear	  “lines	  of	  authority.”	  	  Stanley	  Renshon,	  High	  Hopes:	  The	  Clinton	  Presidency	  and	  the	  Politics	  of	  Ambition	  (New	  York:	  New	  York	  University	  Press	  1996)	  260.	  	  99	  Tony	  Lake,	  “Frontline	  interview	  with	  Tony	  Lake,”	  September	  2000.	  UNC	  TV/PBS,	  	  accessed	  June	  15,	  2015,	  Online:	  	  http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/clinton/interviews/lake.html	  	  	  100	  Powell	  and	  Persico,	  My	  American	  Journey,	  576.	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against	  the	  Serbs.	  We	  ought	  to	  open	  a	  United	  Nations	  war	  crimes	  inquiry,	  and	  we	  ought	  to	  enforce	  the	  no-­‐fly	  zone	  against	  Serbian	  aircraft,	  strongly.”101	  	  	  Clinton	  asserted,	  perhaps	  rightly,	  that	  the	  U.S.	  would	  have	  to	  take	  the	  lead	  in	  order	  to	  force	  any	  real	  change	  in	  the	  Balkans,	  but	  he	  lacked	  the	  political	  power	  to	  act	  alone.	  	  Anticipating	  the	  pushback	  for	  committing	  U.S.	  resources	  to	  the	  Bosnian	  War,	  Clinton	  argued	  that	  European	  peace	  was	  best	  for	  U.S.	  national	  interest.	  In	  so	  doing,	  Clinton	  sent	  a	  clear	  message	  that	  his	  administration	  would	  take	  a	  much	  bolder	  stand	  on	  the	  Bosnian	  War.	  I	  do	  not	  believe	  that	  the	  military	  of	  the	  United	  States	  should	  get	  involved	  unilaterally	  there	  now.	  We	  have	  to	  work	  with	  these	  other	  countries.	  And	  I	  might	  say	  that	  that's	  the	  position	  that	  General	  Powell	  and	  our	  foreign	  policy	  folks	  have	  taken.	  But	  this	  is	  a	  much	  more	  aggressive	  position	  than	  the	  United	  States	  has	  taken…We're	  not	  going	  to	  make	  peace	   over	   there	   in	   a	  way	   that's	   fair	   to	   the	  minorities	   that	   are	   being	   abused	  unless	  we	  get	   involved.	  And	   if	  we	  don't	  get	   involved	  and	   the	   thing	  spreads	  all	  over	  creation	  over	   there,	   then	  we'll	  be	  pulled	   into	   it	   in	  horrible	  ways	   that	   could	  be	  very	  dangerous	  to	  our	  people.	  So	  we	  ought	  to	  do	  what	  is	  right	  now.	  It's	  also	  what	  is	  safest	  for	  the	  United	  States.102	  	  Just	  two	  weeks	  later,	  on	  February	  25,	  1993,	  President	  Clinton	  took	  the	  first	  step	  toward	  an	  American	  solution	  to	  the	  Balkan	  problem.	  	  In	  an	  effort	  to	  “create	  a	  somewhat	  better	  climate	  for	  negotiations,”	  and	  to	  encourage	  “good-­‐faith	  negotiations”	  among	  the	  warring	  parties	  in	  Bosnia,	  Clinton	  announced	  that	  the	  U.S.	  would	  begin	  a	  campaign	  of	  aerial	  delivery	  of	  humanitarian	  supplies	  to	  the	  people	  of	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  William	  J.	  Clinton,	  “Remarks	  at	  a	  Town	  Meeting	  in	  Detroit,”	  February	  10,	  1993.	  Online	  by	  Gerhard	  Peters	  and	  John	  T.	  Woolley,	  The	  American	  Presidency	  Project.	  Accessed	  June	  14,	  2015.	  http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=46999	  	  102	  William	  J.	  Clinton,	  “Remarks	  at	  a	  Town	  Meeting	  in	  Detroit,”	  February	  10,	  1993.	  Online	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  Gerhard	  Peters	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  John	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  Woolley,	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  American	  Presidency	  Project.,	  accessed	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Bosnia.103	  The	  Clinton	  administration	  made	  it	  clear	  that	  these	  humanitarian	  air	  drops	  were	  in	  response	  to	  an	  emergency	  situation	  in	  Bosnia	  and	  that	  the	  air	  drops	  could	  not	  substitute	  for	  the	  ground-­‐relief	  convoys	  that	  were	  delivering	  supplies	  to	  the	  Bosnians.	  	  At	  the	  time	  Clinton	  was	  considering	  how	  he	  might	  use	  this	  humanitarian	  effort	  to	  increase	  the	  U.S.	  role	  in	  Bosnia.104	  	  	  In	  March	  1993,	  Clinton	  announced	  that	  the	  United	  States	  was	  prepared	  to	  participate	  in	  the	  implementation	  of	  a	  negotiated	  peace	  settlement	  in	  Bosnia.	  	  He	  also	  hinted	  that	  U.S.	  combat	  troops	  could	  be	  used	  to	  enforce	  a	  negotiated	  peace	  in	  the	  region.105	  	  He	  stated	  publicly	  that	  it	  would	  be	  an	  “error	  for	  the United States to 
introduce troops to become embroiled in the conflict,”	  but	  that	  the	  U.S.	  “should be 
prepared to make our contributions” to ensuring peace in the region.106	  	  On	  March	  12,	  1993,	  Clinton	  told	  the	  sailors	  and	  Marines	  aboard	  the	  aircraft	  carrier	  U.S.S.	  Theodore	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  103	  William	  J.	  Clinton,	  “Statement	  Announcing	  Airdrops	  to	  Provide	  Humanitarian	  Aid	  to	  Bosnia-­‐Herzegovina,”	  February	  25,	  1993.	  Online	  by	  Gerhard	  Peters	  and	  John	  T.	  Woolley,	  The	  American	  
Presidency	  Project.	  Accessed	  June	  14,	  2015,	  	  http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=46197	  	  104	  In	  a	  memorandum	  from	  Tony	  Lake	  to	  President	  Clinton,	  Lake	  stated	  that	  Clinton’s	  foreign	  policy	  team	  was	  considering	  how	  the	  U.S.	  would	  “increase	  its	  longer-­‐term	  goal	  in	  the	  humanitarian	  effort.	  In	  fact,”	  Lake	  wrote,	  “we	  should	  try	  to	  use	  this	  action	  as	  leverage	  with	  the	  parties	  on	  the	  ground	  to	  cease	  interference	  with	  relief	  convoys	  and	  relief	  agencies	  (	  and	  their	  UNPROFOR	  escorts)	  to	  be	  more	  assertive	  in	  getting	  the	  convoys	  through.”	  Memorandum	  from	  Anthony	  Lake	  to	  President	  William	  J.	  Clinton,	  “Presidential	  Decision	  on	  Humanitarian	  Air	  Drops	  for	  Bosnia,”	  February	  19,	  1993.	  	  CIA	  Historical	  Collection,	  accessed	  June	  15,	  2015.	  online	  at	  http://www.foia.cia.gov/sites/default/files/document_conversions/1817859/1993-­‐02-­‐19C.pdf	  	  	  105	  William	  J.	  Clinton:	  “Background	  Briefing	  by	  Senior	  Administration	  Official,”	  March	  8,	  1993.	  Online	  by	  Gerhard	  Peters	  and	  John	  T.	  Woolley,	  The	  American	  Presidency	  Project.	  	  Accessed	  June	  14,	  2014.	  http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=59988	  	  106	  William	  J.	  Clinton:	  “The	  President’s	  News	  Conference	  with	  President	  Francois	  Mitterrand	  of	  France,”	  March	  9,	  1993.	  Online	  by	  Gerhard	  Peters	  and	  John	  T.	  Woolley,	  The	  American	  Presidency	  
Project.	  Accessed	  June	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  2014,	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Roosevelt	  that	  “human suffering . . . may not threaten our shores, but still they require 
us to act.”107  	  Later	  that	  month,	  during	  a	  press	  conference	  with	  German	  Chancellor	  Helmut	  Kohl,	  Clinton	  publicly	  supported	  the	  ongoing	  Vance-­‐Owen	  Plan	  -­‐	  though	  most	  in	  the	  administration	  did	  not	  have	  much	  faith	  in	  its	  success.108	  	  	  Clinton’s	  goal	  was	  to	  secure	  an	  agreement	  from	  the	  Serbs	  to	  end	  the	  fighting,	  either	  diplomatically,	  or	  through	  the	  pressure	  of	  increasing	  the	  restrictions	  on	  the	  Serbians.109	  	  Later	  in	  the	  conference,	  the	  president	  reaffirmed	  his	  willingness	  to	  enforce	  any	  peace	  plan	  in	  Bosnia,	  stating	  “the	  United	  States	  would	  be	  prepared	  to	  participate	  in	  a	  multinational	  effort	  to	  help	  keep	  the	  peace.”110 	  	  In	  April	  1993,	  Clinton	  directed	  the	  Central	  Intelligence	  Agency	  (CIA)	  to	  explore	  “whether	  Americans	  should	  intervene	  and	  fight	  in	  the	  Serbian-­‐Bosnian	  war”	  as	  they	  had	  concluded	  “negotiations	  will	  not	  resolve	  this	  issue.”111	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  William	  J.	  Clinton:	  "Remarks	  to	  the	  Crew	  of	  the	  U.S.S.	  Theodore	  Roosevelt,"	  March	  12,	  1993.	  Online	  by	  Gerhard	  Peters	  and	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  Woolley,	  The	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  108	  Of	  the	  four	  ill-­‐fated	  peace	  plans	  aimed	  at	  ending	  the	  violence	  in	  Bosnia,	  the	  Vance-­‐Owen	  Plan	  is	  the	  most	  well	  known.	  	  The	  plan	  called	  for	  Bosnia-­‐Herzegovina	  to	  be	  segmented	  into	  10	  semi-­‐autonomous	  regions.	  	  The	  plan	  was	  initially	  agreed	  upon	  by	  the	  Bosnian	  Croats	  and	  Bosnian	  Muslims,	  but	  the	  Bosnian	  Serbs	  hesitated	  and	  eventually	  refused	  to	  sign.	  	  	  109	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  Clinton:	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  President’s	  News	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  1993.	  	  Online	  by	  Gerhard	  Peters	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  Clinton:	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  1993.	  	  Online	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  Project.	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During	  Clinton’s	  first	  3	  months	  in	  office,	  he	  had	  kept	  his	  promise	  to	  increase	  America’s	  responsibility	  in	  the	  Balkans.	  	  He	  succeeded	  in	  pressuring	  the	  United	  Nations	  to	  enforce	  a	  no-­‐fly	  zone	  on	  Serbian	  aircraft	  (which	  U.S.	  pilots	  would	  help	  NATO	  to	  enforce,)	  he	  and	  to	  tighten	  their	  sanctions	  on	  the	  Serbs.112	  	  More	  importantly,	  he	  had	  established	  the	  U.S.	  as	  a	  player	  in	  the	  Bosnian	  peace	  process.	  	  Clinton	  continued	  to	  push	  his	  Bosnia	  policy	  throughout	  the	  first	  two	  years	  of	  his	  presidency,	  and	  behind	  the	  scenes,	  Clinton	  designated	  the	  Bosnia	  issue	  as	  his	  foreign	  policy	  team’s	  top	  priority.113	  	  Clinton	  exhibited	  his	  determination	  to	  solve	  the	  Bosnian	  problem	  early	  on,	  despite	  the	  previous	  administration’s	  reluctance	  to	  get	  involved.	  	  Bush	  had	  stayed	  out,	  and	  the	  Balkan	  crisis	  had	  become	  a	  catastrophe.	  	  Clinton	  was	  determined	  to	  use	  his	  presidency	  to	  get	  the	  Bosnian	  War	  under	  control.	  	  As	  he	  envisioned	  a	  broader	  role	  for	  the	  U.S.	  on	  the	  world	  stage,	  he	  felt	  that	  history	  had	  proven	  that	  “an	  unstable	  Europe	  eventually	  imperils	  vital	  American	  national	  security	  interests.”114	  Still,	  providing	  an	  American	  solution	  to	  the	  Balkan	  problem	  would	  not	  be	  an	  easy	  task	  for	  the	  new	  president.	  	  Clinton	  would	  encounter	  formidable	  resistance	  on	  several	  fronts	  that	  would	  challenge	  his	  vision	  for	  the	  future	  of	  the	  New	  Atlantic	  Community.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  112	  United	  Nations	  Security	  Council,	  “Resolution	  820	  –	  Bosnia	  and	  Herzegovina,”	  April	  17,	  1993,	  
UNSCR.	  	  Accessed	  June	  14,	  2015.	  Online	  http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/doc/820	  	  113	  Tony	  Lake,	  “Frontline	  interview	  with	  Tony	  Lake,”	  September	  2000.	  UNC	  TV/PBS,	  accessed	  June	  15,	  2015.	  	  http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/clinton/interviews/lake.html	  	  	  114	  Joint	  DOD,	  DOS,	  NSC,	  and	  USIA	  Cable	  	  “European	  Security,”	  	  February	  12,	  1993.	  File:	  European	  	  Affairs	  –	  Feeley,	  Folder:	  France	  and	  NATO,	  2006-­‐0215-­‐F,	  OA/ID	  910,	  CPL	  	  






International	  Challenges:	  The	  Hour	  of	  Europe	  and	  Russian	  Democracy	  The	  European	  Community	  presented	  a	  challenge	  to	  Clinton’s	  vision	  for	  Euro-­‐American	  stability.	  	  Though	  Clinton	  saw	  the	  U.S.	  and	  Europe	  as	  “inextricably	  linked,”	  the	  Europeans	  did	  not	  necessarily	  in	  see	  it	  that	  way.	  	  As	  the	  European	  Community	  evolved	  into	  the	  European	  Union,	  the	  Europeans	  believed	  that	  their	  star	  was	  on	  the	  rise	  and	  preferred	  the	  U.S.	  keep	  out	  of	  European	  affairs.	  Many	  European	  leaders	  envisioned	  a	  cohesive	  and	  active	  Europe	  that	  would	  establish	  a	  sphere	  of	  influence	  –	  proving	  that	  the	  EU	  in	  itself	  could	  be	  an	  international	  actor.	  	  Their	  vision	  of	  the	  post-­‐Cold	  War	  world	  included	  one	  of	  a	  prominent	  European	  state	  that	  could	  compete	  with	  the	  U.S.	  in	  power	  and	  influence.115	  	  The	  Europeans	  were	  committed	  to	  this	  vision.	  	  They	  were	  willing	  to	  risk	  their	  own	  soldiers	  defending	  it,	  as	  long	  as	  they	  would	  deploy	  under	  a	  European	  flag.	  	  The	  Europeans	  felt	  the	  time	  had	  come	  for	  Europe	  to	  handle	  its	  own	  problems	  without	  the	  assistance	  of	  the	  U.S.	  	  The	  Bosnian	  War	  represented	  a	  perfect	  opportunity	  for	  the	  Europeans	  to	  prove	  their	  case.	  	  	  The	  idea	  that	  Yugoslavia	  represented	  a	  uniquely	  “European	  problem,”	  added	  to	  the	  chaos	  surrounding	  the	  Bosnian	  War.116	  During	  the	  first	  year	  of	  the	  war,	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  115	  Josip	  Glaurdic,	  The	  Hour	  of	  Europe:	  Western	  Powers	  and	  the	  Breakup	  of	  Yugoslavia	  (New	  Haven:	  Yale	  University	  Press,	  2011)	  2-­‐9.	  	  116	  Many	  blame	  the	  idea	  of	  the	  “European	  problem.”	  	  This	  idea	  of	  a	  European	  problem	  has	  served	  as	  discussion	  for	  David	  Rieff,	  James	  Gow,	  Richard	  Holbrooke,	  and	  countless	  other	  politicians,	  journalists,	  and	  historians	  who	  have	  covered	  the	  apprehension	  of	  the	  West	  to	  react	  appropriately	  to	  the	  breakup	  of	  Yugoslavia.	  	  Among	  the	  most	  effective	  and	  stinging	  narratives	  remains	  Brendan	  Simms’	  Unfinest	  
Hour:	  Britain	  and	  the	  Destruction	  of	  Bosnia.	  	  In	  this	  work,	  Simms	  admonishes	  Prime	  Minister	  John	  Major	  administration	  and	  illustrates	  how	  Britain	  is	  especially	  guilty,	  not	  only	  for	  its	  own	  inaction,	  but	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European	  leaders	  encouraged	  the	  U.S.	  to	  keep	  out	  of	  Bosnia;	  the	  Bush	  Administration	  happily	  obeyed,	  and	  for	  the	  first	  time	  since	  World	  War	  II,	  the	  U.S.	  would	  allow	  the	  Europeans	  to	  handle	  a	  major	  security	  issue	  entirely	  on	  their	  own.	  With	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  gone	  and	  Germany	  recently	  united,	  the	  Bush	  administration	  viewed	  situation	  in	  Bosnia	  as	  an	  opportunity	  for	  the	  European	  Community	  to	  establish	  themselves	  in	  the	  “new	  world	  order.”	  	  Bush’s	  Secretary	  of	  State,	  James	  A.	  Baker	  III	  claimed	  it	  was	  time	  to	  “make	  the	  Europeans	  step	  up	  to	  the	  plate	  and	  show	  that	  they	  could	  act	  as	  a	  unified	  power.	  	  Yugoslavia	  was	  as	  good	  a	  first	  test	  as	  any.”117	  	  In	  reality	  this	  was	  a	  questionable	  “first	  test,”	  as	  the	  stakes	  for	  international	  security	  were	  high,	  and	  the	  European	  Community	  had	  never	  shown	  that	  they	  could	  act	  as	  a	  “unified	  power”	  without	  U.S.	  leadership.	  	  As	  a	  result,	  hostility	  erupted	  throughout	  the	  region	  as	  Yugoslavia	  central	  government	  crumbled	  and	  the	  country	  spiraled	  into	  war.	  	  Despite	  the	  violence,	  there	  was	  not	  much	  American	  public	  support	  for	  a	  military	  intervention.	  In	  1991,	  describing	  the	  administration’s	  attitude	  toward	  Yugoslavia,	  Baker	  said,	  “We	  got	  no	  dog	  in	  this	  fight”118	  The	  Balkan	  crisis	  elicited	  little	  attention	  from	  the	  White	  House.119	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  for	  preventing	  other	  nations	  from	  getting	  involved	  as	  well.	  	  Simms	  accuses	  the	  Brits	  of	  having	  done	  “more	  than	  any	  other	  major	  Western	  country”	  to	  obstruct	  military	  assistance	  to	  Bosnia.	  Brendan	  Simms,	  Unfinest	  Hour:	  Britain	  and	  the	  Destruction	  of	  Bosnia	  (New	  York:	  Penguin	  Books,	  2001)	  	  117	  James	  A.	  Baker	  III	  and	  Thomas	  DeFrank,	  The	  Politics	  of	  Diplomacy	  (New	  York:	  G.	  P.	  Putnam’s	  Sons,	  1995)	  637.	  	  118	  Quoted	  in	  H.	  W.	  Brands,	  Darren	  Pierson,	  &	  S.	  Kiefer	  Reynolds,	  The	  Use	  of	  Force	  After	  the	  Cold	  War,	  (College	  Station:	  Texas	  A	  &	  M	  Press,	  2000).	  116	  
119	  The	  dynamic	  situation	  brewing	  in	  Yugoslavia	  was	  in	  its	  infancy	  (or	  still	  developing)	  when	  Reagan	  left	  office,	  and	  Bush	  continued	  to	  support	  a	  unified	  Yugoslavian	  government	  until	  its	  breakup	  was	  imminent.	  	  Bush	  insisted	  in	  three	  separate	  phone	  conversations	  with	  Yugoslavian	  leaders,	  that	  the	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The	  Americans	  were	  not	  alone	  in	  this	  respect.	  Most	  European	  leaderss	  did	  not	  favor	  American	  role	  in	  any	  quandary	  on	  European	  soil.	  	  As	  European	  Community	  President	  Jacques	  Delors	  stated	  in	  1991,	  “We	  do	  not	  interfere	  in	  American	  affairs;	  we	  trust	  America	  will	  not	  interfere	  in	  European	  affairs.”120	  	  Jacques	  Poos,	  the	  chairman	  of	  the	  European	  Community’s	  Foreign	  Affairs	  Council	  stated	  this	  case	  more	  pointedly,	  “This	  is	  the	  Hour	  of	  Europe	  –	  not	  the	  hour	  of	  the	  Americans	  .	  .	  .	  If	  one	  problem	  can	  be	  solved	  by	  the	  Europeans,	  it	  is	  the	  Yugoslav	  problem.	  	  This	  is	  a	  European	  country,	  and	  it	  is	  not	  up	  to	  the	  Americans.”121	  Poos’s	  confident	  words	  were	  a	  sign	  of	  Europe’s	  growing	  independence	  from	  the	  U.S.	  	  With	  the	  Cold	  War	  now	  over,	  Europe	  felt	  an	  increasing	  burden	  to	  carry	  its	  share	  of	  the	  security	  load,	  especially	  on	  their	  continent.	  	  The	  Bush	  administration	  had	  made	  it	  clear	  that	  they	  welcomed	  Europe’s	  leadership	  role	  in	  the	  “new	  world	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  United	  States	  and	  Yugoslavia	  shared	  a	  “special	  relationship”	  and	  pledged	  American	  support	  (in	  the	  form	  of	  finances	  and	  equipment)	  even	  as	  the	  legally	  recognized	  Yugoslav	  government	  was	  crumbling.	  	  Memorandum	  of	  Conversation,	  	  Geroge	  H.	  W.	  Bush	  and	  Janez	  Drnovsek	  “Meeting	  with	  President	  Janez	  Drnovsek	  of	  Yugoslavia,”	  Grand	  Foyer	  -­‐	  Metropolitan	  Museum	  of	  Art,	  New	  York,	  September	  25,	  1989,	  8:30	  -­‐	  8:35	  p.m.,	  George	  H.	  W.	  Bush	  Presidential	  Library	  (Hereafter	  BPL).	  	  Accessed	  June	  15,	  2015,	  Online:	  http://bush41library.tamu.edu/files/memcons-­‐telcons/1989-­‐09-­‐25-­‐-­‐Drnovsek.pdf	  Memorandum	  of	  Conversation,”	  George	  H.	  W.	  Bush	  and	  Borisav	  Jovic	  “Meeting	  with	  President	  Borisav	  Jovic	  of	  Yugoslavia,”	  Waldorf	  Astoria	  Hotel,	  New	  York,	  October	  1,	  1990,	  4:03	  -­‐	  4:05	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  Ante	  Markovic,	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  Files),	  BPL	  
120	  Holbrooke,	  To	  End	  a	  War,	  21.	  
121	  Quoted	  in	  Alan	  Riding,	  “Conflict	  in	  Yugoslavia:	  Europeans	  Send	  High-­‐Level	  Team,”	  New	  York	  
Times,	  June	  29,	  1991,	  and	  Jospi	  Glaurdic,	  The	  Hour	  of	  Europe:	  Western	  Powers	  and	  the	  Breakup	  of	  
Yugoslavia	  (New	  Haven:	  Yale	  University	  Press,	  2011)	  1.	  	  
	   53	  
order.”122	  	  As	  far	  as	  Poos	  was	  concerned,	  the	  European	  Community	  was	  accepting	  the	  challenge	  that	  the	  post-­‐Cold	  War	  world	  presented.	  	  In	  fact,	  among	  many	  in	  the	  European	  Community,	  the	  Yugoslav	  crisis	  was	  viewed	  as	  a	  welcome	  challenge	  for	  the	  Europeans.123	  
This	  sentiment	  was	  understandable	  considering	  the	  European	  Community	  was	  growing	  both	  in	  size	  and	  in	  influence.	  	  After	  the	  fall	  of	  the	  Soviet	  Union,	  East	  Germany	  joined	  the	  European	  Community	  as	  part	  of	  a	  reunited	  Germany,	  while	  other	  Eastern	  European	  countries	  clamored	  to	  join	  the	  EC.	  	  In	  November	  1993,	  the	  twelve	  nations	  of	  the	  EC	  signed	  the	  Maastricht	  Treaty	  and	  officially	  established	  the	  European	  Union.	  Three	  more	  nations	  joined	  the	  EU	  within	  three	  years	  of	  the	  signing.	  	  Being	  well	  on	  their	  way	  to	  becoming	  an	  all-­‐encompassing	  supranational	  entity,	  the	  Europeans	  saw	  their	  potential	  as	  endless.	  	  Having	  spent	  the	  previous	  45	  years	  sitting	  at	  “ground	  zero”	  of	  any	  conflict	  between	  the	  U.S.	  and	  the	  Soviet	  Union,	  the	  end	  of	  the	  Cold	  War	  brought	  a	  sense	  of	  liberation	  to	  Europe.	  	  
While	  the	  European	  desire	  to	  handle	  the	  Bosnian	  crisis	  alone	  may	  have	  been	  reasonable,	  they	  made	  no	  progress	  toward	  actual	  peace	  in	  the	  region.	  	  When	  President	  Clinton	  took	  office,	  the	  European	  position	  remained	  firm,	  despite	  the	  energy	  that	  the	  new	  president	  exhibited	  toward	  solving	  the	  Balkan	  problem.	  Early	  research	  into	  the	  Bosnian	  War	  gave	  Clinton	  reason	  to	  doubt	  that	  the	  Europeans	  were	  up	  to	  the	  task	  of	  resolving	  the	  conflict.	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A	  December	  1992	  intelligence	  report,	  ordered	  by	  Clinton’s	  transition	  team,	  indicated	  that	  the	  Europeans	  had	  not	  adequately	  enforced	  the	  U.N.	  sanctions	  against	  Serbia.	  	  The	  report	  detailing	  the	  sanctions	  indicated	  that	  though	  the	  sanctions	  did	  hurt	  the	  Serbian	  economy,	  “loopholes	  and	  violations	  of	  the	  UN	  sanctions	  regime	  have	  allowed	  Serbia	  and	  Montenegro	  continued	  access	  to	  energy	  and	  key	  industrial	  imports.”	  	  The	  report	  highlighted	  the	  numerous	  land	  and	  water	  routes	  that	  connected	  Serbia	  with	  its	  neighbors	  provided	  “numerous	  opportunities	  for	  circumventing	  sanctions”	  and	  suggested	  that	  the	  international	  sanctions	  monitors	  were	  neither	  sufficiently	  manned	  nor	  funded	  to	  stop	  the	  Serbs	  from	  outwitting	  the	  UN	  and	  the	  European	  Community.124	  	  
Clinton’s	  underscoring	  the	  immediacy	  of	  the	  Balkan	  crisis	  showed	  the	  Europeans	  that	  the	  U.S.	  wanted	  play	  a	  greater	  role	  in	  finding	  a	  solution.	  	  Not	  all	  of	  the	  Europeans	  were	  eager	  to	  have	  the	  Americans	  involved.	  	  Despite	  their	  new-­‐found	  independence,	  by	  1993,	  the	  European	  Community	  hadn’t	  been	  able	  to	  contain	  the	  Balkan	  crisis.	  	  The	  European	  nations	  realized	  that	  U.S.	  power,	  money,	  and	  influence	  could	  help	  bring	  about	  a	  lasting	  peace.	  	  Despite	  their	  desire	  to	  go	  it	  alone,	  the	  Europeans	  accepted	  the	  new	  administration’s	  role.	  	  	  
In	  February	  1993,	  Clinton	  announced	  his	  policy	  toward	  the	  former	  Yugoslavia.	  	  The	  UK	  immediately	  welcomed	  the	  new	  American	  initiative.	  	  Prime	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Minister	  John	  Major	  and	  Foreign	  Secretary	  Douglas	  Hurd	  	  “noted	  the	  importance	  of	  NATO	  planning	  and	  U.S.	  involvement	  in	  any	  .	  .	  .	  durable	  settlement	  and	  ceasefire	  in	  Bosnia.”	  	  Major	  also	  stated	  “the	  willingness	  of	  the	  United	  States	  to	  participate	  in	  the	  implementation	  of	  a	  fair	  and	  workable	  agreement	  will	  give	  confidence,	  particularly	  to	  the	  Bosnian	  Muslims,	  that	  a	  lasting	  settlement	  is	  now	  a	  real	  prospect.”125	  
Other	  members	  of	  the	  European	  Community	  were	  cautiously	  optimistic,	  and	  expressed	  relief	  at	  Clinton’s	  “emphasis	  on	  diplomacy.”	  They	  made	  it	  clear	  that	  they	  expected	  “more	  concrete	  assistance	  from	  Washington,	  including	  troops	  and	  money	  to	  support	  the	  peacekeeping	  force.”	  	  While	  smaller	  European	  nations	  like	  Spain	  and	  Belgium	  indicated	  that	  they	  would	  pull	  their	  troops	  from	  the	  UN	  peacekeeping	  force	  if	  U.S.	  involvement	  “increased	  the	  level	  of	  violence	  and	  risk	  to	  their	  troops.”126	  	  
As	  European-­‐initiated	  peace	  plans	  fell	  apart,	  and	  The	  European-­‐led	  U.N.	  peacekeeping	  force	  had	  failed	  to	  keep	  any	  peace	  in	  Bosnia,	  the	  Clinton	  administration	  ascertained	  the	  Europeans	  were	  losing	  control	  of	  the	  situation	  in	  Bosnia.	  	  	  In	  February	  1994,	  the	  Bosnian	  Serbs	  shelled	  a	  Sarajevo	  marketplace,	  killing	  dozens	  of	  innocent	  people.127	  	  Ethnic	  cleansing	  was	  rampant,	  and	  enthusiastically	  carried	  out	  by	  all	  sides,	  though	  the	  Serbs	  were	  the	  worst	  perpetrators	  (responsible	  for	  more	  than	  90	  percent	  of	  identified	  cases	  of	  ethnic	  cleansing.)	  	  By	  April	  1994,	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  Folder:	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  Secretary	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  10	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  of	  U.S.	  Policy	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  the	  Former	  Yugoslavia,”	  February	  19,	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  CPL.	  Accessed	  June	  14,	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Bosnian	  Serb	  forces	  had	  seized	  control	  of	  roughly	  two	  thirds	  of	  Bosnia,	  “cleansing”	  more	  than	  2,000	  towns	  and	  villages.128	  	  	  
Also,	  Bosnian	  Serb	  forces	  regularly	  turned	  back	  UN	  aid	  convoys	  refusing	  to	  let	  the	  peacekeepers	  provide	  assistance	  to	  Croats	  and	  Muslims	  in	  the	  regions	  that	  they	  controlled.129	  	  The	  situation	  was	  becoming	  increasingly	  dire,	  and	  any	  hope	  for	  a	  lasting	  peace	  was	  fading.	  	  It	  was	  evident	  that	  without	  some	  extreme	  motivation	  to	  halt	  their	  aggressions	  -­‐	  which	  the	  Europeans	  were	  not	  able	  to	  provide,	  -­‐	  the	  Bosnian	  Serbs	  would	  continue	  their	  hostilities.	  	  	  
Boris	  Yeltsin	  also	  gave	  Clinton	  pause.	  	  Though	  not	  part	  of	  Clinton’s	  New	  Atlantic	  Community,	  Russia	  represented	  an	  opportunity	  to	  “strengthen	  democratic	  and	  market	  reforms.”130	  	  As	  it	  attempted	  to	  make	  the	  transition	  from	  communism	  to	  democracy,	  Clinton	  wanted	  to	  assist	  Yeltsin	  in	  this	  process	  while	  building	  a	  friendly	  relationship	  between	  the	  U.S.	  and	  Russia.	  	  In	  a	  January	  1993	  memorandum	  from	  Clinton	  to	  Aspin,	  Clinton	  articulated	  the	  importance	  of	  assisting	  the	  Russians	  in	  making	  this	  transition.	  	  He	  stated,	  “the	  political	  and	  economic	  transformation	  of	  the	  former	  Soviet	  Union	  into	  peaceful	  market-­‐oriented	  democracies	  will	  directly	  reduce	  the	  security	  threat	  to	  the	  United	  States	  and	  lead	  to	  substantial	  savings	  in	  the	  cost	  of	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the	  defense	  of	  the	  United	  States.”131	  	  
Clinton	  described	  the	  budding	  relationship	  between	  the	  U.S.	  and	  Russia	  as	  a	  “partnership	  of	  mutual	  respect	  based	  on	  a	  shared	  commitment	  to	  democracy...and	  	  working	  together	  to	  make	  the	  21st	  century	  a	  time	  of	  greater	  peace	  and	  greater	  freedom	  and	  greater	  prosperity	  for	  all	  the	  people	  of	  the	  world.”132	  	  As	  a	  result	  of	  this	  partnership,	  Clinton	  carefully	  considered	  the	  Russians	  when	  making	  foreign	  policy	  decisions	  toward	  the	  Balkans.	  	  	  
The	  Balkan	  situation	  was	  not	  so	  simple	  for	  Yeltsin,	  however.	  	  Russia’s	  historical	  ties	  to	  Serbia	  complicated	  the	  situation.	  	  Yeltsin	  faced	  his	  own	  domestic	  pressure	  to	  show	  strong	  support	  for	  the	  Serbs.	  	  As	  a	  result,	  Yeltsin	  was	  willing	  to	  assist	  Clinton	  in	  working	  for	  peace	  in	  the	  region,	  but	  insisted	  the	  Serbian	  concerns	  received	  adequate	  attention.133	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
131 Memorandum	  for	  the	  Secretary	  of	  Defense,	  from	  William	  J.	  Clinton	  to	  Leslie	  Aspen,	  “Transfer	  of	  Funds	  for	  Assistance	  for	  the	  New	  Independent	  States	  (NIS)	  of	  the	  Former	  Soviet	  Union,”	  January	  8,	  1994,	  U.S.	  Government	  Printing	  Office,	  GPO	  Accessed	  June	  15,	  2015.	  online	  	  http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PPP-­‐1994-­‐book1/pdf/PPP-­‐1994-­‐book1-­‐doc-­‐pg17-­‐2.pdf	  
132	  William	  J.	  Clinton,	  “The	  President’s	  New	  Conference	  with	  President	  Boris	  Yeltsin	  of	  Russia	  in	  Hyde	  Park,	  New	  York,”	  October	  23,	  1995.	  	  Online	  by	  Gerhard	  Peters	  and	  John	  T.	  Woolley,	  The	  
American	  Presidency	  Project.	  Accessed	  June	  14,	  2015.	  	  http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=50688	  	  133	  The	  sentiment	  that	  Russia	  was	  on	  the	  wrong	  path	  during	  the	  immediate	  post-­‐Cold	  War	  years	  was	  popular	  among	  many	  Russians.	  	  They	  felt	  that	  Yeltsin	  did	  not	  represent	  their	  vision	  for	  the	  future	  of	  Russia.	  	  People	  voicing	  these	  concerns	  looked	  for	  reasons	  to	  pounce	  on	  Yeltsin’s	  policies	  and	  embraced	  the	  Serbian	  cause.	  	  There	  were	  some	  in	  favor	  of	  a	  hard-­‐lined	  coup.	  This	  sentiment	  represented	  a	  	  genuine	  threat	  to	  Yeltsin’s	  administration’s	  cooperation	  in	  the	  Bosnian	  peace	  process	  and	  to	  democracy	  in	  Russia.	  Memorandum	  from	  Director	  of	  	  Central	  Intelligence,	  “Moscow’s	  Yugoslav	  Policy	  Reaching	  Critical	  Juncture,”	  January	  23,	  1993,	  Office	  of	  Slavic	  and	  Eurasian	  Analysis,	  CPL.	  Accessed	  June	  15,	  2015	  	  Online	  	  http://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/show/12302	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The	  Clinton	  administration	  was	  legitimately	  concerned	  that	  their	  actions	  could	  push	  the	  Russians	  toward	  providing	  greater	  support	  for	  their	  Serbian	  cousins.	  	  A	  January	  1993	  CIA	  Intelligence	  memorandum	  titled	  “Moscow’s	  Yugoslav	  Policy	  Reaching	  Critical	  Juncture,”	  stated	  that	  “Yeltsin	  would	  be	  under	  increasing	  domestic	  pressure	  to	  break	  with	  the	  West	  on	  Yugoslavia	  if	  the	  international	  community	  decides	  to	  press	  a	  military	  solution	  to	  the	  conflict.”	  	  The	  memorandum	  later	  explained	  “military	  action	  in	  the	  Balkans	  almost	  certainly	  would	  provoke	  Russian	  nationalist	  groups	  to	  seek	  a	  closer	  alliance	  with	  Serbian	  hard	  liners”	  and	  possibly	  “send	  large	  numbers	  of	  volunteers	  to	  the	  region.”	  	  Additionally,	  these	  groups	  would	  also	  “move	  more	  vigorously	  to	  rally	  public	  opinion	  against	  Yeltsin”	  potentially	  damaging	  the	  Russian	  transition	  to	  democracy.134	  
With	  his	  vision	  for	  the	  New	  Atlantic	  Community,	  Clinton	  saw	  Russia	  as	  an	  involved	  partner	  in	  European	  prosperity	  with	  as	  much	  to	  gain	  from	  European	  stability	  as	  the	  U.S.	  	  Clinton	  wanted	  to	  “ensure	  that	  Russia	  remains	  an	  important	  player	  in	  European	  security	  affairs	  and	  does	  not	  become	  marginalized	  or	  isolate	  itself.”135	  	  Clinton	  was	  careful	  to	  involve	  Yeltsin	  in	  many	  key	  decisions	  affecting	  the	  Balkans.	  	  	  After	  the	  Clinton	  administration	  announced	  their	  official	  policy	  on	  Bosnia,	  Yeltsin	  communicated	  that	  “Russia	  was	  flattered	  to	  be	  drawn	  in	  as	  a	  major	  player	  and	  it	  supports	  a	  new	  diplomatic	  effort”	  but	  expressed	  a	  “desire	  to	  avoid	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  134	  Memorandum	  from	  Director	  of	  Central	  Intelligence,	  “Moscow’s	  Yugoslav	  Policy	  Reaching	  Critical	  Juncture,”	  January	  23,	  1993,	  Office	  of	  Slavic	  and	  Eurasian	  Analysis,	  CPL.	  	  Accessed	  June	  15,	  2015,	  Online	  	  http://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/show/12302	  	  135	  Joint	  DOD,	  DOS,	  NSC,	  and	  USIA	  Cable	  	  “European	  Security,”	  	  February	  12,	  1993.	  File:	  European	  	  Affairs	  –	  Feeley,	  Folder:	  France	  and	  NATO,	  2006-­‐0215-­‐F,	  OA/ID	  910,	  CPL.	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exacerbating	  the	  conflict.”	  Because	  of	  domestic	  political	  pressure,	  Yeltsin	  remained	  “opposed	  to	  any	  use	  of	  force.”	  	  Moscow	  also	  wanted	  a	  “balanced	  approach	  that	  does	  not	  single	  out	  the	  Serbs	  for	  criticism	  or	  pressure.”	  	  Furthermore,	  the	  Russians	  called	  for	  “rewarding	  Serbia	  for	  its	  cooperation	  by	  lifting	  some	  of	  the	  sanctions.”	  	  Still,	  whether	  or	  not	  these	  conditions	  were	  met,	  the	  administration	  felt	  that	  “Russia	  would	  probably	  contribute	  to	  an	  expanded	  peacekeeping	  force.”136	  
By	  1993,	  it	  had	  become	  clear	  to	  the	  Europeans	  and	  the	  Russians	  that	  the	  Americans	  would	  play	  a	  significant	  role	  in	  any	  solution	  to	  the	  Bosnian	  crisis,	  European	  problem	  or	  not.	  	  Still,	  the	  Europeans	  maintained	  a	  disdain	  for	  American	  involvement	  that	  manifested	  from	  time	  to	  time.	  	  One	  example	  of	  such	  friction	  involving	  the	  U.S.,	  Europe,	  and	  Russia	  was	  the	  debate	  on	  whether	  to	  lift	  the	  1991	  United	  Nations	  arms	  embargo.	  	  The	  Americans	  believed	  the	  embargo	  only	  prohibited	  the	  Bosnian	  Muslims	  and	  Croats	  from	  defending	  themselves,	  while	  favoring	  the	  Bosnian	  Serbs,	  who	  were	  already	  well	  armed	  with	  the	  stockpiles	  of	  weapons	  formerly	  possessed	  by	  the	  Yugoslavian	  Army.137	  	  The	  Americans	  believed	  lifting	  the	  embargo	  would	  more	  quickly	  bring	  the	  war	  to	  a	  conclusion	  than	  the	  status	  
quo.	  	  The	  Clinton	  administration	  attempted	  to	  convince	  the	  Europeans	  to	  lift	  the	  arms	  embargo.	  The	  Europeans,	  especially	  the	  British,	  vehemently	  resisted	  lifting	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  136	  Memorandum	  from	  DCI	  Interagency	  Balkan	  Task	  Force,	  “Re:	  Secretary	  Christopher’s	  February	  10	  Announcement	  of	  U.S.	  Policy	  Toward	  the	  Former	  Yugoslavia,”	  February	  19,	  2014,	  CPL.Accessed	  June	  14,	  2015	  	  Online:	  http://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/show/12311	  	  	  137	  Bill	  Clinton,	  “Ending	  the	  Bosnian	  War”,	  Bosnia,	  Intelligence,	  and	  the	  Clinton	  Presidency,	  2-­‐8.	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embargo	  (though	  Germany	  supported	  multilaterally	  lifting	  the	  embargo.)	  	  They	  saw	  lifting	  the	  embargo	  as	  an	  effort	  to	  “level	  the	  killing	  field,”	  which	  would	  only	  result	  in	  more	  violence.	  	  They	  also	  believed	  any	  lifting	  of	  the	  arms	  embargo	  would	  encourage	  the	  Croats	  and	  Bosnian	  Muslims	  to	  seek	  a	  military	  solution	  rather	  than	  a	  peaceful	  one.	  	  As	  a	  result,	  the	  European	  Community	  rejected	  American	  efforts	  and	  the	  arms	  embargo	  remained	  in	  place.138	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  DCI	  Interagency	  Balkan	  Task	  Force,	  “Yugoslavia	  Policy	  Options	  Likely	  Responses,”	  February	  1,	  1993.	  	  CPL,	  Accessed	  June	  15,	  2015.	  	  http://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/show/12304	  




Domestic	  Challenges:	  Political	  Adversaries,	  Media,	  and	  the	  American	  Public	  The	  challenges	  posed	  by	  the	  European	  Community	  were	  minor	  compared	  to	  domestic	  ones.	  	  Clinton	  could	  persuade	  or	  pressure	  the	  Europeans	  to	  comply	  (or	  even	  act	  unilaterally,	  if	  necessary)	  with	  his	  actions	  in	  the	  Balkans.	  	  The	  bigger	  impediment	  would	  come	  from	  the	  American	  people	  and	  their	  elected	  representatives.	  	  These	  challenges	  posed	  the	  greatest	  challenge	  to	  Clinton’s	  vision	  of	  the	  U.S.	  in	  the	  post-­‐Cold	  War.	  	  Though	  Bush	  was	  out	  of	  office,	  there	  were	  still	  many	  who	  shared	  his	  narrow,	  Cold-­‐War	  era	  view	  of	  foreign	  policy.	  	  These	  political	  adversaries	  resisted	  American	  intervention	  in	  Bosnia	  as	  there	  was	  no	  threat	  to	  American	  borders	  and	  no	  commercial	  interest	  to	  be	  gained	  by	  involving	  U.S.	  forces.	  	  	  More	  importantly,	  the	  American	  public	  was	  largely	  apathetic	  toward	  the	  Balkans.	  	  The	  conflict	  did	  not	  occupy	  the	  headlines,	  and	  it	  was	  happening	  thousands	  of	  miles	  away.	  	  The	  public	  did	  not	  see	  Bosnia	  as	  an	  American	  problem.	  	  To	  make	  matters	  worse,	  Clinton’s	  political	  adversaries	  continued	  to	  warn	  of	  impending	  doom	  if	  America	  did	  not	  steer	  clear	  of	  the	  Balkan	  problem.	  	  The	  American	  public	  resisted	  intervention	  in	  Bosnia	  for	  several	  reasons:	  the	  fear	  of	  involving	  U.S.	  forces	  in	  a	  European	  quagmire	  (post-­‐Vietnam	  syndrome)	  the	  feeling	  that	  the	  mission	  would	  prove	  futile	  (due	  to	  ancient	  hatreds	  shared	  among	  the	  Bosnian	  people,)	  and	  American	  apathy	  toward	  a	  European	  crisis.	  	  
	   62	  
Clinton’s	  most	  direct	  domestic	  opposition	  came	  from	  his	  political	  rivals	  (mostly	  Republicans	  and	  a	  few	  fellow	  Democrats)	  who	  opposed	  intervention	  early	  on.	  	  Somalia	  had	  shown	  many	  policy	  makers	  the	  risks	  of	  committing	  American	  combat	  forces	  in	  areas	  with	  no	  American	  interests	  at	  stake.	  	  Although	  Clinton	  had	  not	  ordered	  the	  intervention	  in	  Somalia,	  he	  was	  clearly	  in	  charge	  by	  October	  1993,	  when	  18	  soldiers	  were	  killed	  attempting	  to	  apprehend	  tribal	  warlords.	  	  American	  bloodshed	  and	  the	  lack	  of	  tangible	  U.S.	  interest	  in	  Somalia	  encouraged	  Clinton	  to	  withdraw	  American	  forces.	  	  The	  resulting	  media	  nightmare	  had	  cost	  the	  U.S.	  credibility	  and	  led	  to	  the	  withdrawal	  of	  U.S.	  forces	  from	  the	  region.	  	  Moreover	  the	  loss	  of	  American	  lives	  in	  Somalia	  had	  sobering	  effect	  on	  many	  Americans,	  and	  they	  had	  no	  desire	  to	  see	  a	  similar	  episode	  play	  out	  in	  the	  Balkans.139	  Republican	  Senator	  Bob	  Dole,	  Representative	  Newt	  Gingrich,	  and	  presidential	  contender	  Pat	  Buchanan	  were	  among	  Clinton’s	  most	  prominent	  opponents	  warning	  of	  a	  prolonged	  conflict	  in	  Bosnia.	  	  Even	  the	  popular	  General	  Powell	  had	  warned	  against	  a	  potential	  quagmire	  in	  Bosnia.140	  	  Clinton’s	  opponents	  would	  agree	  to	  humanitarian	  assistance,	  lifting	  the	  arms	  embargo,	  or	  even	  backing	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  Michael	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NATO	  airstrikes,	  but	  they	  proposed	  to	  fight	  tooth-­‐and-­‐nail	  to	  oppose	  the	  introduction	  of	  American	  ground	  forces	  in	  Bosnia.141	  	  	  The	  arms	  embargo	  became	  a	  point	  of	  contention	  between	  Dole	  and	  Clinton.	  	  Both	  Clinton	  and	  Dole	  supported	  lifting	  the	  embargo.	  	  Clinton	  however,	  desired	  a	  multilateral	  lift	  in	  cooperation	  with	  Russia	  and	  the	  European	  Community,	  whereas	  Dole	  wanted	  to	  lift	  the	  embargo	  unilaterally.	  	  	  In	  1994,	  when	  the	  Europeans	  resisted	  lifting	  the	  embargo,	  and	  Clinton	  refused	  to	  act	  unilaterally,	  Dole	  proposed	  legislation	  that	  would	  allow	  the	  U.S.	  to	  unilaterally	  export	  arms	  to	  the	  Bosnian	  forces	  on	  the	  battlefield.	  142	  	  
The	  mid-­‐term	  elections	  in	  1994	  resulted	  in	  a	  commanding	  victory	  for	  the	  Republican	  Party,	  as	  they	  seized	  control	  of	  both	  the	  Senate	  and	  the	  House	  of	  Representatives.	  	  In	  full	  control	  of	  congress	  and	  with	  the	  American	  public	  seemingly	  losing	  faith	  in	  the	  president,	  the	  GOP	  had	  reason	  to	  be	  optimistic.143	  Bosnia	  appeared	  to	  be	  an	  issue	  through	  which	  Dole	  could	  oppose	  Clinton	  while	  connecting	  with	  the	  American	  people.	  	  Dole	  had	  consistently	  called	  for	  a	  more	  aggressive	  policy	  toward	  Bosnia	  (especially	  in	  terms	  of	  lifting	  the	  arms	  embargo,)	  but	  he	  resisted	  the	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  Bosnia.”	  Robert	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  Special	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  Kansas,	  accessed	  June	  24,	  2015,	  Online:	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introduction	  of	  ground	  forces	  into	  Bosnia.144	  
By	  1995,	  Dole	  had	  garnered	  considerable	  support	  in	  Washington	  for	  a	  unilateral	  lift.	  	  In	  June	  1995,	  112	  members	  of	  congress	  had	  written	  Clinton	  urging	  him	  to	  unilaterally	  lift	  the	  arms	  embargo.	  	  They	  argued	  that	  Bosnia	  was	  a	  sovereign,	  independent	  country	  whose	  citizens	  possessed	  an	  “inalienable	  right	  to	  defend	  themselves	  against	  Serbian	  aggression.”	  	  The	  embargo,	  they	  insisted,	  denied	  them	  of	  this	  “fundamental	  right.”	  	  They	  asserted	  that	  the	  U.S.,	  as	  the	  “leader	  of	  the	  free	  world,”	  must,	  for	  the	  sake	  of	  their	  “national	  conscience”	  act	  unilaterally	  and	  lift	  the	  arms	  embargo.	  	  The	  representatives	  further	  argued	  that	  our	  European	  allies	  did	  not	  recognize	  that	  the	  embargo	  was	  only	  hurting	  those	  it	  was	  meant	  to	  protect.	  	  “Those	  who	  argue	  that	  [the	  U.S.]	  cannot	  act	  unilaterally	  to	  lift	  the	  arms	  embargo,”	  they	  argued,	  “fail	  to	  see	  the	  basic	  difference	  between	  the	  arms	  embargo	  on	  Bosnia,	  a	  victim	  of	  aggression,	  and	  embargoes	  on	  renegade	  countries	  such	  as	  Iraq	  and	  Libya.”145	  
Clinton	  responded	  to	  the	  representatives	  by	  insisting	  that	  a	  unilateral	  lift	  would	  “make	  a	  difficult	  situation	  even	  worse.”	  	  First,	  he	  insisted	  that	  such	  a	  move	  would	  trigger	  the	  UN	  to	  abandon	  their	  operations	  in	  Bosnia,	  resulting	  in	  a	  significant	  NATO	  commitment	  of	  ground	  forces.	  	  Next,	  Clinton	  stated	  that	  a	  unilateral	  lift	  would	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  Alexander	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prompt	  the	  Bosnian	  Serbs	  to	  go	  on	  the	  offensive	  before	  the	  Bosnian	  government	  could	  acquire	  additional	  arms.	  	  Clinton	  then	  stated	  that	  increased	  fighting	  resulting	  from	  unilateral	  action	  could	  spill	  over	  into	  other	  regions	  of	  the	  former	  Yugoslavia.	  	  Also,	  Clinton	  argued	  that	  such	  action	  could	  encourage	  other	  states	  to	  ignore	  mandatory	  UN	  sanctions.	  	  Most	  importantly	  for	  Clinton	  was	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  U.S.	  would	  bear	  the	  sole	  responsibility	  for	  the	  consequences	  should	  such	  actions	  occur.146	  
Clinton	  steadfastly	  opposed	  Dole’s	  bill	  and	  threatened	  to	  veto	  it	  should	  it	  pass.	  	  Clinton	  agreed	  that	  the	  embargo	  should	  be	  lifted,	  but	  he	  believed	  doing	  so	  unilaterally	  would	  have	  “serious	  implications	  going	  far	  beyond	  the	  conflict	  in	  Bosnia	  itself.”	  	  Clinton	  believed	  a	  unilateral	  lift	  would	  undermine	  the	  UN	  efforts	  in	  Bosnia,	  strain	  his	  relationship	  with	  his	  European	  allies,	  damage	  the	  relationship	  with	  the	  post-­‐Soviet	  Russian	  government,	  and	  most	  importantly,	  a	  unilateral	  lift	  would	  likely	  prove	  a	  tactical	  blunder.147	  	  
Clinton’s	  assessment	  was	  based	  on	  a	  1994	  CIA	  intelligence	  report	  titled	  “Ending	  U.S.	  Compliance	  with	  the	  Bosnian	  Arms	  Embargo,”	  which	  details	  the	  pros,	  cons,	  and	  likely	  reactions	  of	  unilaterally	  lifting	  the	  arms	  embargo.	  	  The	  report	  concluded	  that	  any	  U.S.	  decision	  to	  suspend	  compliance	  with	  the	  embargo	  and	  arm	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  Soderberg,	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   66	  
Bosnian	  government	  forces	  would	  only	  intensify	  the	  fighting	  in	  Bosnia.	  	  It	  would	  “not	  make	  a	  substantial	  difference	  on	  the	  battlefield	  unless	  heavy	  weapons,	  extensive	  training,	  and	  logistic	  support	  were	  included.”148	  	  	  
The	  report	  further	  stated	  “Outside	  ground	  and	  air	  force	  intervention	  would	  be	  needed	  to	  defend	  vulnerable	  Bosnian	  positions	  until	  government	  forces	  were	  prepared	  to	  conduct	  effective	  multi-­‐unit	  offensive	  operations.”149	  	  The	  report	  warned	  of	  additional	  problems	  for	  U.S.-­‐European	  relations	  and	  the	  future	  of	  Russian	  cooperation.	  	  “The	  unilateral	  lifting	  of	  the	  embargo	  would	  “damage	  allied	  confidence	  in	  Washington’s	  leadership	  of	  the	  NATO	  alliance.”	  	  Russia	  would	  condemn	  such	  a	  move	  and	  “break	  its	  pattern	  of	  cooperation	  with	  the	  United	  States	  on	  the	  Yugoslav	  problem,”	  while	  possibly	  providing	  their	  own	  arms	  to	  the	  Serbs.	  	  Moreover,	  these	  “U.S.	  actions	  would	  legitimize	  Iran’s	  role	  in	  the	  region	  as	  an	  arms	  supplier	  to	  the	  Bosnian	  government.”	  	  The	  only	  positive	  to	  come	  out	  of	  the	  U.S.	  unilaterally	  supplying	  arms	  to	  the	  Croats	  and	  Muslims	  was	  that	  the	  move	  “would	  be	  welcomed	  in	  the	  Muslim	  world,	  especially	  by	  Turkey.”150	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  Political	  Implications,”	  August	  1,	  1994,	  Central	  Intelligence	  
Agency,	  Accessed	  June	  15,	  2015.	  Online.	  http://www.foia.cia.gov/document/523c39e5993294098d517648	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Dole’s	  unilateral	  lift	  proposal	  caused	  concern	  among	  European	  leaders,	  most	  notably	  Major	  and	  French	  President	  Jacques	  Chirac,	  who	  felt	  a	  unilateral	  lifting	  of	  the	  arms	  embargo	  by	  the	  Americans	  would	  not	  only	  undermine	  the	  efforts	  of	  the	  UN	  and	  cause	  damage	  within	  NATO,	  but	  also	  provoke	  a	  Serb	  onslaught	  in	  advance	  of	  the	  lift	  before	  the	  Croats	  and	  Bosniaks	  had	  a	  chance	  to	  arm	  themselves.151	  	  	  	  Clinton	  had	  several	  conversations	  with	  European	  leaders	  assuring	  them	  that	  he	  had	  no	  intention	  of	  allowing	  a	  unilateral	  lift	  of	  the	  arms	  embargo	  to	  pass.	  	  Most	  notable	  was	  his	  conversation	  with	  French	  President	  Jacques	  Chirac,	  in	  which	  he	  bluntly	  told	  Chirac	  that	  he	  “vehemently	  opposed	  a	  unilateral	  lift”	  and	  should	  Dole’s	  proposal	  pass	  in	  congress,	  he	  would	  veto	  it.152	  
Dole’s	  legislation	  to	  unilaterally	  lift	  the	  arms	  embargo	  was	  voted	  on	  and	  approved	  by	  Congress;	  both	  houses	  passed	  the	  bill	  by	  a	  two-­‐thirds	  majority.	  	  Keeping	  with	  his	  promise	  to	  his	  European	  counterparts,	  Clinton	  vetoed	  the	  bill	  in	  August	  1995.	  	  Clinton	  said	  of	  his	  decision,	  “I	  know	  that	  members	  of	  Congress	  share	  my	  goals	  of	  reducing	  the	  violence	  in	  Bosnia	  and	  working	  to	  end	  the	  war,	  but	  their	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  151	  Memorandum	  for	  the	  President,	  from	  Anthony	  Lake	  and	  Patrick	  Griffin	  to	  William	  J.	  Clinton,	  “Reassurance	  to	  UK	  of	  U.S.	  opposition	  to	  Unilateral	  Lift	  of	  the	  Arms	  Embargo	  on	  Bosnia,”	  July	  1,	  1995,	  File:	  Vershbow,	  Alexander,	  Folder:	  European	  Bosnia	  –	  July	  1995	  (Early	  July	  [1]),	  	  2006	  –	  0647-­‐F,	  OA/ID	  897,	  CPL.	  	  
152	  Memorandum	  of	  Telephone	  Conversation,	  “Telcon	  with	  French	  President	  Jacques	  Chirac”	  July	  13,	  1995,	  3:22-­‐3:58	  p.m.	  	  	  The	  Oval	  Office,	  Washington,	  D.C.	  	  CPL	  	  Accessed	  June	  15,	  2015.	  Online.	  	  http://www.clintonlibrary.gov/assets/storage/Research-­‐Digital-­‐Library/Declassified/2012-­‐0800-­‐M-­‐Bosnia.pdf	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vote	  to	  unilaterally	  lift	  the	  arms	  embargo	  is	  the	  wrong	  step	  at	  the	  wrong	  time."	  153	  	  The	  arms	  embargo	  remained	  in	  place	  in	  all	  of	  the	  territories	  of	  the	  former	  Yugoslavia	  until	  January	  2006,	  when	  the	  European	  Union	  agreed	  to	  completely	  lift	  the	  embargo.154	  
Despite	  domestic	  problems	  chipping	  away	  at	  his	  approval	  ratings,	  Clinton	  persisted.	  	  Not	  willing	  to	  “kick	  the	  can	  down	  the	  road,”	  Clinton	  constantly	  weighed	  the	  option	  of	  committing	  American	  combat	  forces	  (in	  the	  air	  or	  on	  the	  ground)	  to	  halt	  the	  Bosnian	  atrocities.155	  	  In	  December	  1994,	  Clinton	  pledged	  20,000	  American	  combat	  troops	  as	  part	  of	  a	  NATO	  effort	  to	  evacuate	  the	  U.N.	  peacekeeping	  force	  in	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  153	  Todd	  S.	  Purdum,	  “Clinton	  Vetoes	  Lifting	  Bosnia	  Arms	  Embargo,	  The	  New	  York	  Times,	  August	  12,	  1995	  	  Online:	  	  Accessed	  June	  15,	  2015.	  http://www.nytimes.com/1995/08/12/world/clinton-­‐vetoes-­‐lifting-­‐bosnia-­‐arms-­‐embargo.html	  	  154	  The	  European	  Union	  lifted	  the	  embargo	  on	  arms	  to	  the	  former	  Yugoslavia	  gradually	  in	  three	  different	  measures.	  	  In	  July	  1999	  the	  EU	  agreed	  to	  lift	  the	  embargo	  on	  exports	  of	  small	  arms	  to	  the	  police	  forces	  of	  Bosnia	  and	  Herzegovina	  (EU	  Common	  Position	  1999/481/CFSP.)	  	  In	  October	  2001	  they	  lifted	  the	  arms	  embargo	  on	  the	  Federal	  Republic	  of	  Yugoslavia	  as	  well	  as	  removing	  other	  restrictive	  measures	  (EU	  Common	  Position	  2001/719/CFSP.	  In	  January	  2006	  EU	  the	  EU	  agreed	  on	  Common	  Position	  2006/29/CFSP,	  which	  completely	  lifted	  the	  arms	  embargo.	  	  European	  Union	  Common	  Position	  1999/481/CFSP,	  “Council	  Decision	  of	  19	  July	  1999	  Ammending	  Common	  Position	  96/184/CFSP	  Concerning	  Arms	  Exports	  to	  the	  Former	  Yugoslavia,	  Stockholm	  
International	  Peace	  Research	  Institute.	  	  Accessed	  June	  15,	  2015.	  Online:	  	  http://www.sipri.org/databases/embargoes/eu_arms_embargoes/bosnia/eu-­‐common-­‐position-­‐1999-­‐481-­‐cfsp	  	  European	  Union	  Common	  Position	  2001/719/CFSP,	  “Council	  Decision	  of	  8	  October	  2001	  Ammending	  Common	  Position	  1996/184/CFSP	  Concerning	  Arms	  Exports	  to	  the	  Former	  Yugoslavia	  and	  Common	  Position	  1998/240/CFSP	  on	  Restrictive	  Measures	  against	  the	  Federal	  Republic	  of	  Yugoslavi	  ,	  Stockholm	  International	  Peace	  Research	  Institute.	  	  Accessed	  June	  15,	  2015.	  Online:	  	  http://www.sipri.org/databases/embargoes/eu_arms_embargoes/bosnia/eu-­‐common-­‐position-­‐2001-­‐719-­‐cfsp	  	  European	  Union	  Common	  Position	  2006/29/CFSP,	  “Council	  Decision	  of	  23	  January	  2006	  Repealing	  Common	  Position	  1996/184	  Common	  Position	  1996/184/CFSP	  Concerning	  Arms	  Exports	  to	  the	  Former	  Yugoslavia,	  Stockholm	  International	  Peace	  Research	  Institute.	  	  Accessed	  June	  15,	  2015.	  Online:	  	  http://www.sipri.org/databases/embargoes/eu_arms_embargoes/bosnia/29	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  Hamilton,	  Bill	  Clinton,	  490.	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Bosnia,	  “if	  the	  allies	  decide	  to	  withdraw	  in	  the	  face	  of	  increased	  harassment	  and	  hostage-­‐taking	  by	  nationalist	  Serbian	  forces.”156	  	  This	  was	  in	  response	  to	  international	  concern	  (bolstered	  by	  a	  DCI	  National	  Intelligence	  Council	  estimate)	  that	  the	  U.N.	  might	  withdraw	  its	  forces	  “if	  there	  were	  a	  major	  deterioration	  in	  the	  security	  situation.”	  	  They	  believed	  that	  a	  U.N.	  withdrawal	  would	  “worsen	  the	  bloodshed,	  further	  discredit	  the	  United	  Nations	  and	  regional	  organizations,	  and	  cause	  a	  backlash	  [throughout	  Europe.]”	  	  Many	  feared	  the	  establishment	  of	  an	  Islamic	  peacekeeping	  force	  in	  Bosnia.157	  Clinton’s	  proposed	  commitment	  of	  U.S.	  combat	  forces	  to	  NATO	  would	  not	  be	  limited	  solely	  to	  the	  scenario	  of	  a	  U.N.	  withdrawal;	  they	  would	  be	  used	  to	  enforce	  any	  negotiated	  peace	  settlement	  in	  Bosnia.	  	  Clinton	  was	  making	  good	  on	  his	  1993	  promise	  that	  the	  United	  States	  was	  prepared	  to	  participate	  in	  the	  implementation	  of	  any	  negotiated	  peace	  settlement	  in	  Bosnia.158	  	  	  Clinton	  stated	  in	  a	  December	  1993	  speech	  that	  his	  intention	  was	  to	  “use	  that	  occasion	  to	  reaffirm	  the	  strength	  and	  the	  durability	  of	  the	  transatlantic	  relationship”	  and	  to	  “make	  concrete	  progress	  in	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  Art	  Pine,	  “Clinton	  Offers	  Troops	  for	  Bosnia	  Pullout	  :	  Balkans:	  Up	  to	  20,000	  U.S.	  soldiers	  could	  assist	  if	  peacekeepers	  evacuate.	  President	  pledges	  to	  consult	  Congress	  before	  deploying	  forces	  to	  nation	  for	  first	  time.”	  December	  9,	  1994,	  The	  Los	  Angeles	  Times.	  	  Accessed	  June	  15,	  2015,	  Online	  http://articles.latimes.com/1994-­‐12-­‐09/news/mn-­‐7033_1_u-­‐n-­‐peacekeeping-­‐force	  	  157	  Special	  Intelligence	  Estimate	  	  from	  DCI	  National	  Intelligence	  Council,	  	  “Prospects	  for	  UNPROFOR	  Withdrawal	  from	  Bosnia,”	  December	  1,	  1994,	  CIA	  Historical	  Collections.	  CPL,	  Accessed	  June	  15,	  2015.	  Online.	  	  http://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/show/12385	  	  158	  William	  J.	  Clinton:	  “Background	  Briefing	  by	  Senior	  Administration	  Official,”	  March	  8,	  1993.	  Online	  by	  Gerhard	  Peters	  and	  John	  T.	  Woolley,	  The	  American	  Presidency	  Project.	  	  Accessed	  June	  15,	  2015.	  http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=59988	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adapting	  NATO,	  one	  of	  the	  most	  successful	  military	  alliances	  in	  all	  history,	  to	  the	  new	  realities	  and	  opportunities	  it	  faces.”159	  With	  Congress	  and	  the	  American	  public	  opposed	  to	  military	  action	  in	  Bosnia,	  and	  with	  the	  situation	  posing	  no	  immediate	  security	  threat	  to	  the	  United	  States,	  the	  President	  would	  not	  unilaterally	  order	  military	  action.160	  	  Clinton	  did	  not	  give	  up,	  but	  continued	  to	  face	  stiff	  resistance	  from	  his	  political	  rivals.	  	  In	  June	  1995,	  Clinton	  engaged	  in	  discussions	  with	  European	  leaders	  about	  involving	  American	  ground	  forces	  in	  Bosnia	  as	  part	  of	  a	  multi-­‐national,	  UN	  Rapid	  Reaction	  Force	  (RRF)	  of	  12,500	  personnel.	  	  While	  technically	  part	  of	  the	  UN	  Protective	  Forces,	  the	  RRF	  was	  not	  meant	  to	  fill	  a	  sustained	  combat	  role,	  but	  only	  to	  be	  deployed	  in	  the	  event	  that	  a	  situation	  on	  the	  ground	  proved	  too	  much	  for	  the	  UNPROFOR	  to	  handle.	  	  If	  the	  RRF	  were	  to	  deploy,	  they	  were	  only	  to	  remain	  on	  the	  battlefield	  until	  the	  UNPROFOR	  could	  effectively	  take	  control	  again.161	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  159	  William	  J.	  Clinton:	  "Letter	  to	  Congressional	  Leaders	  Reporting	  on	  Sanctions	  Against	  the	  Federal	  Republic	  of	  Yugoslavia	  (Serbia	  and	  Montenegro),"	  December	  6,	  1993.	  Online	  by	  Gerhard	  Peters	  and	  John	  T.	  Woolley,	  The	  American	  Presidency	  Project.	  Accessed	  June	  15,	  2015.	  	  http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=46211	  	  160	  Clinton	  was	  somewhat	  restricted	  as	  far	  as	  ordering	  American	  troops	  into	  combat	  by	  the	  War	  Powers	  Respolution,	  which	  reads	  in	  part	  “The	  constitutional	  powers	  of	  the	  President	  as	  Commander-­‐in-­‐Chief	  to	  introduce	  United	  States	  Armed	  Forces	  into	  hostilities,	  or	  into	  situations	  where	  imminent	  involvement	  in	  hostilities	  is	  clearly	  indicated	  by	  the	  circumstances,	  are	  exercised	  only	  pursuant	  to	  (1)	  a	  declaration	  of	  war,	  (2)	  specific	  statutory	  authorization,	  or	  (3)	  a	  national	  emergency	  created	  by	  attack	  upon	  the	  United	  States,	  its	  territories	  or	  possessions,	  or	  its	  armed	  forces.”	  	  	  The	  93rd	  United	  States	  Congress,	  “Joint	  Resolution	  Concerning	  the	  War	  Powers	  of	  Congress	  and	  the	  President,”	  November	  7,	  1973,	  Lillian	  Goldman	  Law	  Library,	  Yale	  Law	  School,	  The	  Avalon	  Project:	  
Documents	  in	  Law,	  History,	  and	  Diplomacy.	  	  Accessed	  June	  15,	  2015.	  Online	  at	  http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/warpower.asp	  	  161	  United	  Nations	  Security	  Council	  “Resolution	  998	  (1995),"	  United	  Nations	  Security	  Council.	  June	  16,	  1995.	  United	  Nations	  Security	  Council,	  Online:	  http://www.un.org/docs/scres/1993/scres93.htm	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Despite	  some	  European	  support	  from	  French	  President	  Jacques	  Chirac,	  Senator	  Dole	  and	  Speaker	  Gingrich	  steadfastly	  refused	  to	  fund	  American	  participation	  in	  any	  proposed	  reaction	  force.	  	  Clinton	  attempted	  to	  use	  international	  pressure	  to	  convince	  his	  rivals,	  calling	  on	  French	  President	  Jacque	  Chirac	  to	  “break	  the	  stonewall.”	  	  Neither	  Dole	  nor	  Gingrich	  was	  willing	  to	  budge	  (Dole	  was	  eyeing	  a	  potential	  presidential	  run,	  and	  Gingrich	  was	  concentrating	  on	  a	  budget	  fight.)162	  	  	  The	  RRF	  issue	  would	  resurface	  again	  at	  the	  end	  of	  June	  1995,	  when	  having	  exhausted	  efforts	  to	  efforts	  to	  overcome	  Republican	  opposition,	  Clinton	  notified	  lawmakers	  that	  he	  would	  “draw	  down”	  $15	  million	  from	  the	  emergency	  fund	  (previously	  appropriated	  for	  the	  Bosnia	  Mission)	  to	  provide	  airlift	  capability	  and	  equipment	  for	  the	  RRF.163	  	  The	  RRF	  eventually	  deployed	  with	  French,	  British,	  and	  Dutch	  troops	  on	  the	  front	  lines,	  while	  the	  Americans	  played	  a	  support	  role	  donating	  money,	  equipment,	  and	  supplies.164	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  162	  Hamilton,	  Bill	  Clinton,	  490-­‐491.	  	  163	  Art Pine and John M. Broder, "Clinton to Unilaterally Fund Bosnia Force: President Backs Rapid-
reaction Plan with $95 Million from Emergency Account." Los Angeles Times. June 30, 1995. Accessed 
June 14, 2015. http://articles.latimes.com/1995-06-30/news/mn-18904_1_rapid-reaction-force 	  164	  A	  collection	  of	  letters	  between	  Clinton,	  Dole,	  and	  Gingrich	  illustrates	  heated	  exchange.	  	  Dole	  and	  Gingrich	  admonished	  the	  president	  for	  providing	  U.S.	  resources	  for	  a	  “bloated	  and	  failed	  operation”	  while	  subjecting	  U.S.	  air	  crews	  to	  “greater	  risks	  than	  are	  necessary	  because	  of	  political	  sensitivities.”	  	  	  Later	  the	  congressmen	  referred	  to	  the	  entire	  Bosnia	  operation	  as	  a	  “costly	  failure.”	  	  Clinton	  stood	  by	  his	  decision	  claiming	  it	  was	  in	  the	  national	  interest	  to	  make	  a	  “voluntary	  contribution”	  to	  our	  NATO	  allies	  who	  would	  “deploy	  the	  forces,	  bear	  most	  of	  the	  burden,	  and	  take	  most	  of	  the	  risks.”	  	  He	  accused	  the	  two	  statesmen	  of	  harboring	  hopes	  that	  the	  UN	  mission	  would	  collapse;	  Clinton	  asked	  them	  to	  consider	  if	  Bosnia	  would	  then	  be	  better	  off.	  	  Letter,	  Bob	  Dole	  and	  Newt	  Gingrich	  to	  William	  J.	  Clinton,	  June	  15,	  1995,	  File:	  Vershbow,	  Alexander	  European,	  Folder:	  Bosnia	  –	  July	  1995	  (Early	  July	  [2]),	  2006	  –	  0647-­‐F,	  OA/ID	  897,	  Clinton	  Presidential	  Records,	  CPL.	  	  Letter,	  William	  J.	  Clinton	  to	  Bob	  Dole,	  July	  1,	  1995,	  File:	  Vershbow,	  Alexander	  –	  European,	  Folder:	  Bosnia	  –	  July	  1995	  (Early	  July	  [2]),	  2006	  –	  0647-­‐F,	  OA/ID	  897,	  Clinton	  Presidential	  Records,	  CPL.	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Of	  course,	  Clinton’s	  opponents	  did	  not	  applaud	  his	  commitment	  of	  U.S.	  ground	  forces	  to	  the	  NATO	  effort.	  	  Dole,	  Powell,	  Buchanan,	  Gingrich	  and	  other	  critics	  of	  intervention	  warned	  the	  American	  public	  that	  U.S.	  ground	  forces	  in	  Bosnia	  would	  likely	  end	  up	  in	  a	  quagmire	  –	  more	  closely	  resembling	  Vietnam	  than	  Desert	  Storm.	  	  Aside	  from	  the	  fear	  of	  involving	  U.S.	  forces	  in	  a	  long	  conflict,	  the	  idea	  of	  ancient	  hatreds	  did	  much	  to	  discourage	  Americans	  from	  supporting	  a	  greater	  U.S.	  role	  in	  halting	  the	  Bosnian	  War.	  	  Clinton’s	  political	  foes	  played	  heavily	  on	  this	  concern.	  	  Their	  conviction	  that	  the	  hatred	  shared	  among	  the	  Balkan	  combatants	  was	  so	  intense	  and	  interwoven	  into	  the	  history	  of	  the	  region	  that	  the	  U.S.	  (or	  anyone)	  could	  do	  nothing	  to	  prevent	  the	  fighting,	  led	  many	  to	  oppose	  U.S.	  involvement	  in	  the	  Balkan	  crisis.165	  	  This	  idea	  was	  particularly	  popular	  with	  many	  politicians	  who	  did	  not	  want	  to	  entangle	  American	  forces	  in	  the	  Balkan	  conflict,	  especially	  when	  they	  could	  not	  prevent	  the	  Balkan	  people	  from	  killing	  each	  other.	  	  Ancient	  hatreds	  gave	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Letter,	  William	  J.	  Clinton	  to	  Newt	  Gingrich,	  July	  1,	  1995,	  File:	  Vershbow,	  Alexander	  –	  European,	  Folder:	  Bosnia	  –	  July	  1995	  (Early	  July	  [2]),	  2006	  –	  0647-­‐F,	  OA/ID	  897,	  Clinton	  Presidential	  Records,	  
CPL.	  	  165	  “Ancient	  Hatreds,”	  (the	  idea	  that	  the	  different	  cultural	  groups	  in	  the	  Balkans	  have	  hated	  each	  other	  so	  intensely	  and	  for	  so	  long	  that	  nothing	  will	  stop	  them	  from	  fighting)	  has	  played	  an	  interesting	  role	  both	  in	  the	  Clinton	  administration’s	  decision	  to	  intervene	  and	  in	  the	  historiography	  of	  the	  Bosnian	  War.	  	  Richard	  Holbrooke	  calls	  this	  phenomenon	  the	  “Rebecca	  West	  Factor,”	  because	  he	  blames	  the	  influence	  of	  Rebecca	  West’s	  seminal	  work	  Black	  Lamb	  and	  Grey	  Falcon:	  A	  Journey	  Through	  
Yugoslavia	  on	  the	  history	  of	  the	  region.	  	  Holbrooke	  asserts	  West’s	  reliance	  on	  ancient	  hatreds	  as	  an	  explanation	  for	  violence	  in	  the	  Balkans	  as	  influenced	  other	  authors	  –	  most	  notably	  Robert	  Kaplan,	  who	  wrote	  the	  popular	  Balkan	  Ghosts:	  A	  Journey	  Through	  History,	  which	  shaped	  many	  policy	  makers’	  opinions	  of	  the	  Bosnian	  issue.	  	  Holbrooke	  considers	  Noel	  Malcolm’s	  Bosnia:	  A	  Short	  History,	  to	  be	  a	  superior	  work	  as	  it	  debunks	  the	  idea	  of	  ancient	  hatreds	  by	  highlighting	  long	  periods	  of	  Bosnian	  history	  where	  Serbs,	  Croats,	  and	  Muslims	  coexisted	  peacefully.	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them	  a	  seemingly	  historical	  argument	  that	  seemed	  to	  resonate	  with	  the	  American	  public.166	  	  Powell	  remained	  one	  of	  staunchest	  critics	  of	  Clinton’s	  Bosnia	  policy.	  	  Aside	  from	  his	  warning	  against	  a	  European	  quagmire,	  Powell	  cited	  ancient	  hatreds	  as	  another	  reason	  for	  his	  apprehension.	  	  Even	  after	  his	  retirement	  from	  the	  Clinton	  foreign	  policy	  team,	  Powell	  persisted	  that	  his	  stance	  against	  American	  intervention	  was	  the	  correct	  one.	  	  For	  Powell,	  both	  experience	  and	  history	  influenced	  his	  perspective.	  	  What	   I	   saw	   from	  my	   perch	   in	   the	   Pentagon	   was	   America	   sticking	   its	   hand	   into	   a	  thousand-­‐year-­‐old	  hornet’s	  nest	  with	  the	  expectation	  that	  our	  mere	  presence	  might	  pacify	  the	  hornets.	   	  When	  ancient	  ethnic	  hatreds	  ignited	  in	  the	  former	  Yugoslavia	  in	  1991	  and	  well-­‐meaning	  Americans	  thought	  we	  should	  “do	  something”	  in	  Bosnia,	  the	  shattered	   bodies	   of	  Marines	   at	   the	   Beirut	   airport	  were	   never	   far	   from	  my	  mind	   in	  arguing	   for	  caution.	   	  There	  are	   times	  when	  American	   lives	  must	  be	  risked	  and	   lost.	  	  Foreign	  policy	  cannot	  be	  paralyzed	  by	  the	  prospect	  of	  casualties.	  	  But	  lives	  must	  not	  be	  risked	  until	  we	  can	  face	  a	  parent	  or	  a	  spouse	  or	  a	  child	  with	  a	  clear	  answer	  to	  the	  question	   of	   why	   a	  member	   of	   that	   family	   had	   to	   die.	   	   To	   provide	   a	   “symbol”	   or	   a	  “presence”	  is	  not	  good	  enough.167	  	  	   	  The	  American	  public	  agreed.	  	  They	  felt	  the	  ethnic	  groups	  in	  the	  Balkans	  had	  constantly	  been	  at	  war	  for	  thousands	  of	  years,	  and	  they	  would	  likely	  be	  fighting	  for	  thousands	  more,	  so	  there	  was	  no	  sense	  in	  spilling	  American	  blood	  trying	  to	  stop	  the	  inevitable.	  	  An	  honest	  look	  into	  Balkan	  history	  would	  have	  contradicted	  the	  myth	  of	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  166	  Richard	  Sobel,	  “Trends:	  United	  States	  Intervention	  in	  Bosnia,”	  The	  Public	  Opinion	  Quarterly	  Vol	  62,	  No.2	  (Oxford:	  Oxford	  University	  Press	  for	  the	  American	  Association	  for	  Public	  Opinion	  Research,	  Summer,	  1998)	  	  167	  Powell	  and	  Persico,	  My	  American	  Journey,	  291-­‐292	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ancient	  hatreds,	  but	  in	  the	  mid	  1990s,	  few	  among	  the	  American	  public	  concerned	  themselves	  with	  such	  details.168	  	  The	  fear	  of	  ancient	  hatreds	  did	  not	  grip	  everyone,	  however.	  	  There	  were	  several	  within	  the	  administration,	  who	  saw	  ancient	  hatreds	  as	  a	  misunderstanding	  of	  Balkan	  history.	  	  Madeleine	  Albright,	  Warren	  Christopher,	  and	  Richard	  Holbrooke	  are	  examples.	  	  In	  his	  book,	  To	  End	  a	  War,	  written	  about	  his	  experience	  in	  the	  Balkans,	  Holbrooke	  blames	  the	  widespread	  belief	  and	  fear	  of	  ancient	  hatreds	  on	  authors	  who	  have	  written	  about	  the	  Balkans.	  	  He	  bemoans	  their	  influence	  on	  many	  Americans,	  including	  some	  in	  the	  Clinton	  administration.	  	  Holbrooke	  regrets	  works	  like	  Noel	  Malcolm’s	  Bosnia:	  A	  Short	  History	  didn’t	  have	  more	  influence	  on	  policymakers.”169	  Balkan	  Historian	  and	  current	  chairman	  of	  the	  Bosnian	  Institute	  in	  London,	  Noel	  Malcolm	  has	  written	  extensively	  on	  ancient	  hatreds,	  which	  he	  calls	  “misinformation.”	  	  He	  explains	  that	  to	  claim	  everything	  that	  occurred	  in	  Bosnia	  between	  1992	  and	  1995	  as	  an	  expression	  of	  ancient	  ethnic	  hatreds	  is	  absurd	  and	  short-­‐sighted.	  	  He	  acknowledges	  that	  tensions	  certainly	  have	  existed	  in	  Bosnian	  history,	  but	  they	  were	  neither	  absolute	  not	  unchanging.	  	  Nor	  were	  they	  the	  inevitable	  consequences	  of	  the	  mixing	  together	  of	  different	  communities.170	  	  The	  main	  basis	  of	  the	  hostility,	  Malcolm	  claims,	  was	  not	  religious	  or	  ethnic,	  but	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Article	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  Richard	  Sobel,	  “Trends:	  United	  States	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  in	  Bosnia,”	  The	  Public	  Opinion	  
Quarterly	  Vol	  62,	  No.2	  (Oxford:	  Oxford	  University	  Press	  for	  the	  American	  Association	  for	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  Opinion	  Research,	  Summer,	  1998)	  	  169	  Holbrooke,	  To	  End	  a	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  22-­‐24	  170	  Noel	  Malcolm,	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  A	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economic;	  it	  varied	  as	  the	  economic	  conditions	  in	  Bosnia	  changed.	  	  Ancient	  hatreds	  were	  not	  built	  into	  the	  psyches	  of	  the	  Bosnian	  people;	  they	  were	  product	  of	  history	  and	  changed	  as	  history	  developed.171	  Most	  importantly,	  Clinton	  himself	  did	  not	  buy	  into	  the	  myth	  of	  ancient	  hatreds.	  In	  July	  1995,	  he	  wrote	  a	  letter	  to	  Edward	  Damich,	  the	  president	  of	  the	  National	  Federation	  of	  Croatian	  Americans.	  	  In	  his	  correspondence,	  Clinton	  acknowledged	  that	  the	  “fighting	  between	  the	  Croats	  and	  Serbs	  only	  surfaced	  during	  World	  War	  II.”	  	  He	  mentioned	  that	  tensions	  between	  Serbia	  and	  Croatia	  was	  a	  recent	  development,	  and	  noted	  their	  history	  of	  cooperation	  in	  forming	  the	  Yugoslav	  Republic.172	  	  	  Despite	  historical	  examples	  debunking	  the	  myth,	  ancient	  hatreds	  remained	  a	  persuasive	  rhetorical	  tool	  in	  keeping	  the	  U.S.	  out	  of	  the	  Balkans.	  	  The	  Clinton	  administration	  could	  not	  convince	  their	  political	  adversaries	  of	  the	  feasibility	  of	  a	  U.S.	  intervention	  in	  the	  face	  of	  centuries	  of	  hostility,	  so	  Clinton	  made	  his	  case	  directly	  to	  the	  American	  people.	  	  If	  Clinton	  could	  convince	  the	  American	  people	  that	  intervention	  was	  in	  their	  best	  interest,	  their	  elected	  officials	  would	  have	  no	  choice	  but	  to	  side	  with	  their	  constituents.	  	  Public	  opinion	  polling	  revealed	  that	  the	  majority	  of	  Americans	  were	  not	  paying	  much	  attention	  to	  the	  state	  of	  affairs	  in	  Bosnia;	  even	  those	  who	  were	  following	  the	  situation	  indicated	  that	  the	  “post-­‐Vietnam	  syndrome”	  was	  still	  prevalent	  among	  the	  American	  public.	  	  Though	  the	  memories	  of	  the	  recent	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  171	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victory	  over	  Iraq	  remained	  present	  in	  their	  minds,	  so	  did	  the	  loss	  of	  18	  soldiers	  in	  Somalia.	  	  They	  preferred	  that	  Clinton	  stay	  out	  of	  foreign	  entanglements	  abroad.	  	  After	  all,	  they	  did	  elect	  him	  to	  concentrate	  on	  domestic	  affairs,	  and	  Bosnia	  was	  a	  European	  problem	  for	  the	  Europeans	  to	  sort	  out.173	  	  At	  the	  end	  of	  1994,	  Serb	  aggression	  persisted	  in	  the	  Balkans,	  as	  did	  Clinton’s	  desire	  to	  find	  a	  solution.	  	  Clinton	  himself	  later	  admitted	  that	  his	  options	  were	  constrained	  by	  public	  opinion.	  	  In	  spite	  of	  everything,	  he	  was	  elected	  to	  serve	  the	  people.	  	  Clinton	  was	  also	  aware	  of	  his	  own	  sinking	  poll	  numbers.	  	  Still,	  he	  knew	  that	  if	  he	  could	  somehow	  turn	  public	  opinion	  in	  favor	  of	  a	  Bosnian	  intervention,	  he	  could	  gain	  much	  in	  the	  way	  of	  public	  favor.174	  	  	  	   The	  American	  media	  gave	  Bosnia	  very	  limited	  attention	  other	  than	  to	  say	  that	  it	  was	  happening.	  	  This	  coverage	  did	  not	  facilitate	  a	  real	  connection	  between	  the	  American	  people	  and	  a	  conflict	  that	  was	  happening	  thousands	  of	  miles	  away.	  	  As	  a	  result,	  the	  American	  public	  largely	  did	  not	  pay	  much	  attention	  to	  happenings	  in	  the	  Balkans.	  	  Those	  who	  did	  follow	  the	  Bosnian	  War	  did	  not	  like	  what	  had	  occurred,	  but	  they	  did	  not	  see	  it	  as	  their	  problem	  to	  solve,	  so	  their	  elected	  officials	  had	  little	  incentive	  to	  potentially	  risk	  American	  lives	  (and	  their	  jobs)	  sorting	  out	  a	  European	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Article	  IV. 173	  Public	  opinion	  polling	  showed	  that	  Americans	  were	  not	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  opposed	  to	  any	  action	  in	  the	  Balkans	  –	  they	  favored	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  drops	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  humanitarian	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  U.N.	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  to	  American	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  American	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  Bosnia,”	  The	  Public	  Opinion	  Quarterly	  Vol	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issue.	  	  This	  made	  for	  a	  domestic	  political	  scene	  that	  resisted	  Clinton’s	  efforts	  in	  Bosnia.	  	  It	  seemed	  that	  nothing	  the	  administration	  tried	  could	  resonate	  with	  the	  American	  people	  on	  the	  Bosnia	  issue.175	  Adding	  to	  Clinton’s	  domestic	  woes,	  his	  approval	  ratings	  approached	  their	  all-­‐time	  low	  (about	  44%)	  during	  the	  summer	  of	  1995.176	  	  This	  would	  concern	  any	  elected	  official,	  but	  for	  a	  first-­‐term	  president	  facing	  re-­‐election,	  especially	  so.	  	  Furthermore,	  Clinton’s	  efforts	  in	  taking	  on	  a	  greater	  American	  role	  in	  Bosnia	  had	  thus	  far	  done	  little	  to	  actually	  halt	  the	  violence;	  the	  president’s	  Balkan	  policy	  appeared	  politically	  vulnerable.177	  	  	  By	  mid-­‐1995,	  the	  opposition	  to	  Clinton’s	  vision	  for	  American	  prosperity	  through	  European	  stability	  seemed	  to	  be	  succeeding.	  	  International	  friction	  combined	  with	  domestic	  apathy	  and	  fear	  (of	  a	  quagmire	  or	  of	  futility	  of	  Balkan	  intervention)	  had	  posed	  formidable	  barriers	  to	  Clinton’s	  vision	  of	  post-­‐Cold	  War	  U.S.	  foreign	  policy.	  	  Failure	  in	  Bosnia	  may	  well	  have	  doomed	  Clinton’s	  foreign	  policy	  overall.	  	  Clinton	  needed	  to	  turn	  things	  around,	  and	  a	  foreign	  policy	  victory	  in	  Bosnia	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  175	  I	  touch	  on	  this	  in	  a	  later	  section,	  but	  American	  media	  had	  not	  yet	  established	  any	  real	  connection	  between	  the	  Bosnian	  War	  and	  the	  American	  people.	  	  This	  did	  not	  occur	  until	  after	  the	  U.S.	  became	  more	  involved	  in	  Bosnia.	  	  Media	  coverage	  of	  the	  shoot-­‐down	  and	  rescue	  of	  Scott	  O’Grady	  and	  of	  the	  Srebrenica	  Massacre	  increased	  American	  attention	  significantly.	  	  For	  example,	  in	  1992,	  there	  were	  just	  over	  100	  articles	  about	  the	  Balkan	  crisis	  published	  in	  major	  American	  periodicals.	  	  In	  1995,	  there	  were	  more	  than	  1,000.	  	  The	  Washington	  Post	  published	  77	  articles	  covering	  the	  Bosnian	  War	  in	  July	  1995,	  but	  only	  nine	  of	  those	  were	  published	  before	  Srebrenica.	  For	  a	  more	  detailed	  breakdown	  of	  these	  numbers,	  see	  Appendix	  3.	  James	  J.	  Sadkovich,	  The	  U.S.	  Media	  and	  Yugoslavia,	  1991-­‐1995	  (Santa	  Barbara:	  Praeger,	  1998)	  117-­‐118.	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  “Clinton’s	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  Policy	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  Somalia,	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  Haiti,	  and	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  Korea,”	  Essays	  
in	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  Policy,	  	  (Stanford:	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Balkan	  Calamity:	  The	  Massacre	  at	  Srebrenica	  and	  the	  European	  Problem	  The	  Srebrenica	  massacre	  forced	  the	  world	  to	  pay	  attention	  to	  what	  it	  had	  been	  ignoring.	  	  Srebrenica	  displayed	  to	  the	  world	  that	  the	  Bosnian	  war	  had	  become	  the	  worst	  European	  atrocity	  since	  World	  War	  II.	  	  Furthermore,	  it	  proved	  that	  the	  Europeans	  were	  not	  capable	  of	  handling	  the	  situation.	  	  Until	  July	  1995,	  the	  Europeans	  had	  been	  handling	  the	  Balkan	  crisis	  under	  the	  authority	  of	  the	  United	  Nations.	  The	  Massacre	  displayed	  to	  the	  world	  that	  the	  U.N.	  was	  not	  up	  to	  the	  task	  of	  implementing	  any	  lasting	  peace	  in	  Bosnia.	  When	  the	  Serbs	  murdered	  more	  than	  7,000	  civilians,	  the	  world	  lost	  faith	  in	  the	  U.N.	  	  It	  was	  then	  apparent	  that	  in	  order	  for	  the	  Serbs	  to	  halt	  their	  atrocities,	  they	  would	  need	  to	  be	  forced	  to	  stop	  and	  brought	  to	  their	  knees	  if	  necessary.	  	  
Upon	  the	  establishment	  of	  the	  U.N.	  safe	  haven	  in	  Srebrenica	  in	  April	  1993,	  General	  Philippe	  Morillon,	  commander	  of	  United	  Nations	  forces	  in	  Bosnia,	  hoisted	  a	  United	  Nations	  flag	  above	  a	  makeshift	  headquarters	  and	  vowed	  not	  to	  leave	  until	  the	  inhabitants	  were	  safe.	  	  The	  U.N.	  provided	  a	  protection	  force	  of	  7,600	  troops	  charged	  with	  ensuring	  the	  safety	  of	  the	  safe	  areas.178	  	  Still,	  the	  U.N.	  Protection	  Force	  (UNPROFOR)	  lacked	  adequate	  firepower	  to	  ensure	  the	  safety	  of	  the	  refugees,	  who	  were	  now	  pouring	  into	  the	  small	  Bosnian	  towns.	  	  Srebrenica,	  for	  example	  was	  a	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town	  of	  about	  8,000	  inhabitants	  before	  the	  war,	  but	  by	  the	  summer	  of	  1995,	  there	  were	  more	  than	  40,000	  refugees,	  most	  of	  them	  crammed	  into	  prefabricated	  concrete	  apartments	  and	  makeshift	  shelters	  without	  water	  or	  electricity.179	  
The	  idea	  of	  a	  U.N.	  protected	  safe	  area	  was	  appealing,	  especially	  for	  Muslim	  refugees	  fleeing	  from	  Serbian	  cruelties	  (mass	  displacements,	  rapes,	  and	  murders.)	  	  In	  reality,	  however,	  the	  safe	  areas	  were	  always	  a	  myth.	  	  The	  first	  NATO	  airstrikes,	  officially	  part	  of	  “Operation	  Deny	  Flight,”	  in	  April	  1994	  were	  in	  response	  to	  Bosnian	  Serbs	  shelling	  the	  town	  of	  Gorazde.	  	  Later	  that	  year,	  the	  Serbs	  initiated	  new	  fighting	  in	  Bihac,	  also	  a	  U.N.	  safe	  area.	  	  NATO	  again	  responded	  with	  airstrikes	  and	  expanded	  its	  range	  into	  Serb-­‐controlled	  Croatia.180	  	  	  
“Operation	  Deny	  Flight”	  was	  originally	  intended	  to	  enforce	  the	  U.N.	  no-­‐fly	  zone	  over	  Bosnia,	  denying	  Bosnian	  Serb	  aircraft	  the	  ability	  to	  attack	  their	  weaker	  enemies	  from	  the	  skies.	  	  After	  continued	  Bosnian	  Serb	  aggression,	  Deny	  Flight	  was	  expanded	  to	  allow	  NATO	  aircraft	  to	  fly	  air-­‐support	  sorties	  and	  coercive	  airstrikes	  as	  well.	  	  The	  operation	  began	  in	  April	  1993	  and	  marked	  the	  first	  entry	  of	  U.S.	  combat	  personnel	  (as	  part	  of	  a	  multi-­‐national	  NATO	  force)	  in	  the	  Balkan	  theater.	  	  Operation	  Deny	  Flight	  consisted	  of	  109,000	  sorties,	  only	  63	  of	  these	  flights	  actually	  dropped	  ordnance	  in	  response	  to	  10	  incidents.	  	  During	  the	  42	  months	  of	  the	  operation,	  NATO	  lost	  only	  three	  aircraft;	  among	  them	  Air	  Force	  Captain	  Scott	  O’Grady’s	  F-­‐16,	  which	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was	  shot	  down	  by	  a	  Serb	  surface-­‐to-­‐air	  missile	  on	  June	  2,	  1995,	  south	  of	  the	  Bosnian	  city	  of	  Banja	  Luka.	  O’Grady	  evaded	  capture	  by	  Bosnian	  Serb	  forces	  for	  six	  days	  before	  his	  rescue	  by	  a	  Marine	  Corps	  search	  and	  rescue	  team	  with	  multinational	  support	  six	  days	  later.181	  	  
As	  fighting	  in	  Bosnia	  raged	  on,	  there	  seemed	  to	  be	  no	  end	  in	  sight.	  	  Despite	  previous	  failed	  attempts	  at	  peace	  in	  Bosnia,	  mid-­‐December	  1994	  offered	  an	  unexpected	  and	  hopeful	  turn	  of	  events.	  	  Bosnian	  Serb	  leader	  Radovan	  Karadzic	  extended	  an	  invitation	  to	  former	  President	  Carter	  to	  visit	  Bosnia	  in	  the	  hopes	  that	  the	  two	  could	  broker	  some	  sort	  of	  peace	  agreement.	  	  President	  Carter	  insisted	  he	  had	  no	  intentions	  of	  being	  becoming	  a	  permanent	  negotiator,	  but	  he	  hoped	  his	  trip	  might	  provide	  an	  opening	  to	  move	  toward	  a	  cessation	  of	  hostilities.182	  	  	  
While	  in	  the	  Balkans,	  Carter	  spoke	  with	  the	  president	  of	  Croatia,	  the	  U.N.	  special	  representative	  for	  the	  former	  Yugoslavia,	  the	  current	  and	  former	  U.S.	  representatives,	  U.N.	  commanders,	  representatives	  of	  relief	  agencies	  and	  human	  rights	  groups,	  and	  leaders	  of	  the	  government	  of	  Bosnia-­‐Herzegovina	  and	  of	  the	  Bosnia	  Serbs.	  After	  two	  days	  of	  talks,	  the	  leaders	  of	  Bosnia's	  Muslim-­‐led	  government	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and	  the	  Bosnian	  Serbs	  reached	  mutual	  agreements.	  	  Before	  he	  departed	  Bosnia,	  President	  Carter	  secured	  a	  pledge	  from	  Karadzic	  to	  reopen	  the	  Sarajevo	  airport,	  institute	  a	  temporary	  cease-­‐fire	  in	  and	  around	  Sarajevo,	  the	  release	  of	  some	  Muslim	  prisoners,	  and	  to	  allow	  unrestricted	  movement	  of	  all	  U.N.	  convoys,	  as	  well	  as	  a	  promise	  from	  the	  Bosnian	  Serb	  leader	  to	  honor	  basic	  human	  rights.183	  	  	  	  
Within	  72	  hours	  of	  President	  Carter’s	  departure	  from	  Bosnia,	  a	  nationwide	  cease-­‐fire	  was	  implemented	  and	  negotiations	  began	  on	  an	  agreement	  for	  a	  total	  cessation	  of	  hostilities.	  On	  Dec.	  31,	  1994,	  a	  cease-­‐fire	  was	  finalized.	  	  For	  the	  first	  time	  since	  the	  outbreak	  of	  the	  ethnic	  hostilities,	  there	  was	  a	  sincere	  hope	  for	  sustained	  peace	  in	  the	  former	  Yugoslavia.184	  	  The	  cease-­‐fire	  seemed	  promising,	  but	  began	  to	  unravel	  about	  four	  months	  later.	  	  By	  the	  next	  summer,	  the	  Bosnian	  Serbs,	  Croats,	  and	  Muslims	  were	  once	  again	  engaged	  in	  full-­‐scale	  combat.	  What	  followed	  was	  a	  nightmare.	  	  	  
Once	  the	  truce	  that	  Carter	  had	  brokered	  fell	  apart,	  Bosnian	  Serbs	  continued	  to	  assault	  the	  U.N	  safe	  areas	  without	  regard	  for	  potential	  NATO	  retaliation.	  	  In	  Srebrenica,	  they	  shelled	  the	  town	  and	  barred	  food	  convoys	  while	  the	  refugees	  survived	  on	  roots,	  berries	  and	  vegetables	  they	  were	  able	  to	  farm	  from	  hillside	  plots.	  The	  Bosnian	  28th	  Division	  (a	  force	  of	  about	  2,000	  government	  soldiers	  armed	  with	  machine	  guns,	  anti-­‐tank	  weapons,	  and	  wooden	  clubs)	  dug	  in	  to	  defend	  Srebrenica.	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A	  lightly	  armed	  U.N.	  force	  of	  several	  hundred	  Dutch	  peacekeepers	  supported	  the	  28th	  Division.185  Though	  sworn	  to	  protect	  the	  safe	  areas,	  the	  U.N.	  forces	  imposed	  the	  safe	  areas	  on	  Bosnian	  government’s	  military	  commanders	  on	  the	  ground	  without	  consulting	  them.	  	  As	  a	  result,	  they	  never	  demilitarized,	  and	  the	  Bosnian	  army	  continued	  to	  conduct	  offensive	  military	  actions	  out	  of	  the	  safe	  areas.	  	  A	  move	  that	  was	  certain	  to	  incite	  Serbian	  ire.186	  	  	  
On	  July	  9,	  1995,	  elements	  of	  the	  Bosnian	  Serb	  Army	  surrounded	  the	  U.N.	  outpost	  at	  Srebrenica,	  and	  detained	  seven	  Dutch	  peacekeepers.187	  	  Within	  two	  days,	  the	  Serb	  forces	  had	  broken	  through	  the	  Dutch-­‐U.N.	  and	  Bosnian	  Army	  defenses.	  	  Once	  in	  control	  of	  the	  town,	  the	  Bosnian	  Serb	  forces	  took	  their	  reign	  of	  terror	  to	  a	  new	  level.	  	  They	  rounded	  up	  more	  than	  7,000	  Bosnian	  Muslim	  civilians	  (mostly	  men	  and	  boys)	  at	  gunpoint.	  	  They	  leveled	  their	  automatic	  rifles	  and	  butchered	  their	  helpless	  prisoners.	  188	  	  	  	  Without	  allowing	  the	  families	  to	  mourn	  their	  losses,	  the	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  Online:	  http://www.foia.cia.gov/sites/default/files/document_conversions/1817859/1995-­‐07-­‐18A.pdf	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Bosnian	  Serb	  invaders	  dumped	  the	  lifeless	  bodies	  into	  mass	  gravesites.	  	  They	  then	  proceeded	  to	  rape	  and	  terrorize	  the	  women	  and	  girls	  of	  the	  Bosnian	  town.189	  	  	  These	  atrocities	  occurred	  in	  plain	  sight	  of	  the	  Dutch-­‐U.N.	  peacekeepers,	  who	  were	  powerless	  to	  do	  anything.	  	  After	  Srebrenica,	  the	  Bosnian	  Serbs	  continued	  their	  violent	  takeover	  of	  the	  Bosnian	  towns	  of	  Zepa,	  Bihac,	  and	  Gorazde	  -­‐	  all	  of	  which	  had	  previously	  been	  declared	  U.	  N.	  safe	  havens.190	  	  Because	  of	  the	  difficulty	  in	  locating	  some	  of	  the	  mass	  gravesites,	  Bosnian	  citizens	  are	  still	  discovering	  and	  burying	  victims’	  remains	  Almost	  20	  years	  after	  the	  massacres.191	  	  	  What	  made	  Srebrenica	  particularly	  horrific	  was	  not	  simply	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  Serbs	  massacred	  more	  than	  7,000	  people	  in	  a	  small	  Bosnian	  town,	  but	  the	  manner	  in	  which	  they	  carried	  out	  their	  atrocities.	  	  They	  stormed	  a	  U.N.	  safe	  zone	  with	  complete	  disregard	  for	  U.N.	  authority.	  	  They	  captured	  several	  peacekeepers	  and	  butchered	  the	  refugees	  in	  the	  safe	  areas.	  	  	  They	  had	  the	  audacity	  to	  use	  their	  superior	  military	  capabilities	  to	  force	  the	  Dutch	  peacekeepers	  to	  back	  down.	  	  With	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  189	  Honig	  and	  Both,	  Srebrenica,	  48-­‐66.	  	  190	  Honig	  and	  Both,	  Srebrenica,	  48-­‐66.	  	  191	  Intelligence	  reports	  confirm	  the	  discovery	  of	  the	  first	  bodies	  of	  the	  Srebrenica	  massacres.	  	  One	  report	  states	  that	  because	  mass	  graves	  are	  difficult	  to	  locate	  –	  most	  are	  situated	  in	  obscure	  areas,	  densely	  wooded	  forests,	  or	  abandoned	  mine	  shafts	  making	  any	  kind	  of	  aerial	  search	  methods	  difficult	  –remains	  will	  likely	  turn	  up	  for	  months	  or	  even	  years.	  	  The	  most	  efficient	  way	  to	  locate	  these	  grave	  sites	  are	  physical	  searches.	  	  A	  2013	  Fox	  News	  article	  confirms	  that	  remains	  are	  still	  being	  located	  almost	  20	  years	  after	  the	  massacres.	  DCI	  Interagency	  Balkan	  Task	  Force,	  Intelligence	  Report,	  “Mass	  Graves	  in	  the	  Former	  Yugoslavia,”	  6	  October	  1995,	  The	  CIA	  Historical	  Collection.	  	  Accessed	  June	  14,	  2015.	  Online:	  http://www.foia.cia.gov/sites/default/files/document_conversions/1817859/1995-­‐10-­‐06C.pdf	  	  Smajilhodzic,	  Rusmir	  ,	  “Bosnia	  to	  bury	  hundreds	  at	  Srebrenica	  massacre	  site,“	  Fox	  News	  website:	  July	  11,	  2013,	  World	  Section.	  Accessed	  June	  14,	  2015	  	  http://www.foxnews.com/world/2013/07/11/bosnia-­‐to-­‐bury-­‐hundreds-­‐at-­‐srebrenica-­‐massacre-­‐site/#ixzz2cv1SItBV	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this	  action,	  and	  those	  in	  the	  days	  that	  followed,	  the	  Bosnian	  Serbs	  proved	  that	  they	  would	  take	  any	  measure	  within	  their	  means	  to	  carry	  out	  their	  policy	  of	  ethnic	  cleansing.	  	  Srebrenica	  proved	  that	  only	  a	  force	  that	  was	  militarily	  superior	  to	  the	  Serbs	  could	  force	  them	  to	  comply	  with	  any	  negotiated	  peace	  settlement.	  	  The	  European-­‐led	  U.N.	  force	  could	  not	  accomplish	  this.	  	  Srebrenica	  made	  it	  clear	  that	  a	  NATO	  force	  led	  by	  American	  military	  might	  was	  necessary.	  	  
A	  Dutch	  official	  report	  on	  the	  actions	  of	  Dutch	  peacekeepers	  during	  and	  after	  the	  fall	  of	  Srebrenica,	  which	  pointed	  out	  misconduct	  on	  the	  part	  of	  peacekeepers,	  only	  further	  damaged	  the	  perception	  that	  the	  Europeans’	  ability	  to	  handle	  the	  European	  problem.	  	  The	  controversial	  “Official	  Report	  on	  Dutch	  Actions	  During	  and	  After	  the	  Fall	  of	  Srebrenica”	  described	  the	  military	  limitations	  under	  which	  the	  Dutch	  peacekeepers	  operated.	  	  The	  report	  also	  highlighted	  transgressions	  committed	  by	  Dutch	  peacekeeping	  troops	  to	  include	  the	  selling	  of	  weapons,	  extreme	  right-­‐wing	  sympathies,	  and	  the	  repeated	  mistreatment	  of	  women	  –	  both	  civilians	  and	  fellow	  peacekeepers.192	  	  Other	  reports	  indicated	  that	  the	  Dutch	  even	  covered	  up	  evidence	  of	  human	  rights	  atrocities	  committed	  by	  Serbs	  against	  the	  Muslim	  refugees	  under	  U.N.	  protection.193	  	  
One	  account	  of	  the	  fall	  of	  Srebrenica	  was	  particularly	  damning.	  	  A	  report	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  192	  U.S.	  Department	  of	  State	  Cable	  from	  U.S.	  Embassy,	  The	  Hague	  to	  Secretary	  of	  State,	  “Dutch	  Report	  on	  Srebrenica	  to	  Offer	  Grist	  for	  Defenders	  and	  Detractors	  of	  Blue	  Helmet	  Actions,”	  October	  13,	  1995,	  	  U.S.	  Dept	  of	  State	  Case	  Number	  O-­‐2013-­‐04186,	  Document	  Number	  C05323076,	  CPL	  Accessed	  June	  15,	  2015.	  Online:	  	  http://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/show/12561	  	  193	  Human	  Rights	  Watch/Helsinki,	  “Report	  -­‐	  The	  Fall	  of	  Srebrenica	  and	  the	  Failure	  of	  U.N.	  Peacekeeping,”	  October	  15,	  1995,	  Human	  Rights	  Watch.	  	  Accessed	  June	  15,	  2015.	  Online.	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from	  Human	  Rights	  Watch/Helsinki,	  detailed	  the	  events	  of	  the	  Srebrenica	  massacre,	  from	  the	  Serb	  atrocities	  to	  the	  embarrassing	  conduct	  of	  the	  Dutch	  peacekeepers.	  	  The	  report	  was	  based	  on	  an	  investigation	  by	  Human	  Rights	  Watch	  representatives	  conducted	  immediately	  after	  the	  massacre	  (July	  31	  -­‐	  August	  23,	  1995.)	  	  They	  recorded	  the	  events	  leading	  up	  to,	  during	  and	  immediately	  after	  the	  fall	  of	  the	  Srebrenica	  safe	  area,	  “including	  gross	  violations	  of	  humanitarian	  law,	  as	  has	  been	  typical	  of	  Bosnian	  Serb	  military	  conduct	  to	  date.	  Abuses	  attending	  the	  occupation	  of	  the	  “safe	  area”	  included	  the	  terrorization	  of	  women,	  children	  and	  the	  elderly	  and	  the	  premeditated	  mass	  executions	  of	  men	  and	  boys.”	  	  Their	  report	  displayed	  to	  the	  world,	  the	  ineptitude	  of	  the	  U.N.	  and	  the	  European	  Community.194	  	  
The	   fall	  of	   the	   town	  of	  Srebrenica	  and	   its	  environs	   to	  Bosnian	  Serb	   forces	   in	  early	  July	  1995	  made	  a	  mockery	  of	  the	  international	  community’s	  professed	  commitment	  to	  safeguard	  regions	  it	  declared	  to	  be	  "safe	  areas"	  and	  placed	  under	  United	  Nations	  protection	   in	  1993.	   	  United	  Nations	  peacekeeping	  officials	  were	  unwilling	   to	  heed	  requests	   for	   support	   from	   their	   own	   forces	   stationed	   within	   the	   enclave,	   thus	  allowing	  Bosnian	  Serb	  forces	  to	  easily	  overrun	  it	  and	  —	  without	  interference	  from	  U.N.	   soldiers	   —	   to	   carry	   out	   systematic,	   mass	   executions	   of	   hundreds,	   possibly	  thousands,	   of	   civilian	  men	   and	   boys	   and	   to	   terrorize,	   rape,	   beat,	   execute,	   rob	   and	  otherwise	  abuse	  civilians	  being	  deported	  from	  the	  area.195	  The	  Srebrenica	  Massacre	  was	  significant	  for	  several	  reasons.	  	  First,	  it	  demonstrated	  that	  the	  Serbs	  did	  not	  respect	  the	  authority	  of	  the	  U.N.	  	  They	  would	  have	  to	  be	  forced	  to	  halt	  their	  aggressions,	  and	  a	  militarily	  superior	  force	  would	  be	  needed	  to	  do	  so.	  	  Second,	  Srebrenica	  highlighted	  the	  inefficiency	  of	  the	  U.N.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  194	  Human	  Rights	  Watch/Helsinki,	  “Report	  -­‐	  The	  Fall	  of	  Srebrenica	  and	  the	  Failure	  of	  U.N.	  Peacekeeping,”	  October	  15,	  1995,	  Human	  Rights	  Watch.	  Accessed	  June	  15,	  2015.	  Online.	  http://www.hrw.org/reports/1995/10/15/fall-­‐srebrenica-­‐and-­‐failure-­‐un-­‐peacekeeping	  	  195	  Human	  Rights	  Watch/Helsinki,	  “Report	  -­‐	  The	  Fall	  of	  Srebrenica	  and	  the	  Failure	  of	  U.N.	  Peacekeeping,”	  October	  15,	  1995,	  Human	  Rights	  Watch.	  	  Accessed	  June	  15,	  2015.	  Online.	  http://www.hrw.org/reports/1995/10/15/fall-­‐srebrenica-­‐and-­‐failure-­‐un-­‐peacekeeping	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peacekeepers	  in	  Bosnia.	  	  The	  UNPROFOR	  was	  overmatched	  by	  the	  Serb	  aggressors,	  and	  the	  Dutch	  U.N.	  peacekeepers	  backed	  down	  at	  the	  first	  sight	  of	  any	  real	  challenge	  to	  their	  authority.	  	  Srebrenica	  proved	  that	  the	  European	  Union	  was	  not	  up	  to	  the	  task	  of	  handling	  their	  European	  problem.	  	  	  
The	  fact	  that	  the	  massacres	  occurred	  during	  the	  “hour	  of	  Europe”	  and	  well	  within	  European-­‐controlled,	  U.N.	  safe	  havens	  underscored	  this	  fact.	  	  Without	  the	  military	  might	  of	  the	  Americans,	  the	  Europeans	  were	  helpless	  to	  stop	  the	  violence	  in	  the	  Balkans.	  	  The	  breakup	  of	  Yugoslavia,	  though	  a	  European	  problem,	  was	  too	  big	  for	  Europe	  to	  handle	  alone,	  and	  the	  “Hour	  of	  Europe,”	  for	  the	  purposes	  of	  solving	  the	  Balkan	  problem	  only	  highlighted	  their	  inability	  to	  do	  so.	  
Finally,	  the	  Srebrenica	  massacre	  provided	  Clinton	  with	  an	  opportunity	  to	  take	  the	  lead	  on	  the	  Bosnia	  issue.	  	  Furthermore,	  it	  provided	  him	  with	  the	  leverage	  (both	  foreign	  and	  domestic)	  to	  do	  so.	  	  After	  Srebrenica,	  redoubled	  his	  efforts	  in	  Bosnia.196	  	  The	  massacre	  -­‐	  horrible	  an	  event	  as	  it	  was	  -­‐	  allowed	  Clinton	  to	  fully	  employ	  his	  Bosnia	  policy	  and	  thereby	  attain	  his	  vision	  for	  post-­‐Cold	  War	  U.S.	  foreign	  policy.	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  Bill	  Clinton,	  My	  Life,	  (New	  York:	  Vintage	  Books,	  2005)	  669.	  	  




Winning	  the	  American	  Public	  and	  the	  Dayton	  Peace	  Accords	  The	  importance	  of	  the	  massacre	  at	  Srebrenica	  for	  Clinton’s	  vision	  for	  the	  post-­‐Cold	  War	  world	  cannot	  be	  overstated.	  	  The	  massacre	  provided	  Clinton	  with	  the	  ability	  to	  simultaneously	  destroy	  the	  barriers	  to	  his	  vision	  of	  a	  new	  post-­‐Cold	  War	  human	  rights	  regime	  and	  of	  Euro-­‐American	  guaranteed	  stability.	  	  Srebrenica	  proved	  that	  the	  European	  Union	  was	  incapable	  of	  handling	  the	  Bosnian	  War	  without	  the	  military	  might	  and	  international	  influence	  of	  the	  United	  States.	  	  It	  demonstrated	  to	  the	  world,	  the	  need	  for	  the	  U.S.	  to	  take	  the	  lead	  and	  offered	  the	  Clinton	  administration	  valuable	  leverage	  with	  their	  European	  allies.	  	  Even	  Yeltsin	  could	  not	  defend	  the	  Bosnian	  Serb	  actions	  after	  Srebrenica.	  Also,	  it	  put	  Clinton’s	  domestic	  political	  opposition	  back	  on	  their	  heels.	  	  Though	  they	  might	  not	  support	  an	  American	  intervention,	  further	  resistance	  to	  it	  would	  make	  them	  appear	  callous	  to	  oppose	  peace	  in	  the	  face	  of	  such	  a	  massacre.	  	  Most	  importantly,	  Srebrenica	  made	  the	  American	  public	  pay	  attention.	  They	  began	  to	  view	  the	  Bosnian	  War	  as	  an	  American	  problem;	  they	  lost	  faith	  in	  the	  UN	  and	  European	  Union’s	  ability	  to	  end	  the	  war,	  and	  U.S.	  intervention	  became	  a	  genuine	  option.	  
Clinton	  recognized	  the	  tragedy	  of	  the	  event,	  but	  also	  its	  utility.	  	  More	  importantly,	  he	  took	  advantage.	  	  Armed	  with	  this	  leverage	  over	  the	  Europeans,	  Clinton	  took	  the	  lead	  in	  Bosnia.	  	  Regardless	  of	  the	  control	  the	  Europeans	  were	  willing	  to	  grant	  him,	  Clinton	  convinced	  the	  Europeans	  of	  his	  sincerity	  and	  of	  the	  utility	  of	  American	  power	  and	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influence.	  	  Persuading	  the	  American	  public	  would	  prove	  more	  difficult.	  He	  went	  to	  work	  immediately	  convincing	  the	  American	  public	  of	  the	  need	  for	  American	  leadership	  in	  the	  Balkans.197	  	  While	  Clinton	  realized	  the	  potential	  political	  capital	  that	  Srebrenica	  offered,	  he	  could	  not	  sit	  idly	  by	  waiting	  for	  the	  American	  people	  to	  buy	  into	  his	  plan.	  	  While	  working	  to	  sell	  his	  public	  on	  his	  plan,	  Clinton	  pressed	  forward.	  	  In	  late	  July,	  Clinton	  decided	  that	  the	  changes	  on	  the	  ground	  and	  NATO’s	  new	  resolve	  provided	  the	  basis	  for	  an	  all-­‐out	  diplomatic	  effort	  to	  end	  the	  conflict.	  In	  early	  August,	  he	  sent	  his	  National	  Security	  Adviser,	  Anthony	  Lake,	  to	  present	  a	  U.S.	  peace	  initiative	  to	  the	  NATO	  Allies	  and	  the	  Russians.198	  
The	  Massacre	  at	  Srebrenica	  gave	  Clinton	  the	  political	  influence	  that	  he	  needed	  to	  implement	  his	  Bosnia	  policy.	  	  Clinton	  seized	  the	  opportunity	  to	  assert	  his	  leadership	  on	  the	  Bosnia	  issue.	  He	  took	  action	  almost	  immediately.	  	  Responding	  to	  the	  fall	  of	  the	  safe	  areas	  of	  Srebrenica	  and	  Zepa,	  Clinton	  demanded	  that	  NATO	  and	  the	  UN	  honor	  their	  commitment	  to	  protect	  the	  remaining	  safe	  areas.	  The	  European	  Community	  agreed	  to	  U.S.	  insistence	  that	  NATO	  take	  decisive	  action.	  Clinton	  warned	  of	  broad-­‐based	  airstrikes	  if	  any	  safe	  areas	  were	  attacked	  again.	  199	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  197	  Bill	  Clinton,	  “Ending	  the	  Bosnian	  War:	  The	  Personal	  Story	  of	  the	  President	  of	  the	  United	  States”,	  
Bosnia,	  Intelligence,	  and	  the	  Clinton	  Presidency:	  The	  Role	  of	  Intelligence	  and	  Political	  Leadership	  in	  
Ending	  the	  Bosnian	  War	  (Little	  Rock:	  William	  J.	  Clinton	  Presidential	  Library	  2013)	  7-­‐9.	  	  198	  U.S.	  Department	  of	  State,	  “Bosnia	  Factsheet:	  Chronology	  of	  the	  Balkan	  Conflict,”	  December	  6,	  1995.	  Bureau	  of	  Public	  Affairs.	  	  Accessed	  June	  15,	  2015.	  online.	  	  http://www.state.gov/1997-­‐2001-­‐NOPDFS//regions/eur/bosnia/balkan_conflict_chron.html	  	  See	  Appendix	  2.	  	  199	  Clinton,	  My	  Life,	  668-­‐669.	  	  
	   90	  
	  In	  August	  1995,	  Clinton	  intensified	  his	  efforts	  when	  Bosnian	  Serbs	  tested	  this	  ultimatum.	  	  NATO	  began	  a	  month-­‐long	  bombing	  campaign	  officially	  called	  “Operation	  Deliberate	  Force.”200	  	  The	  airstrikes	  took	  place	  over	  from	  August	  29	  through	  September	  14,	  1995.	  In	  all,	  NATO	  forces	  flew	  3515	  sorties,	  2470	  of	  which	  were	  penetrating	  sorties,	  which	  included	  attacks	  on	  48	  target	  complexes	  (consisting	  of	  338	  individual	  targets	  within	  target	  complexes).	  	  Clinton	  pushed	  for	  NATO	  airstrikes	  in	  order	  to	  forward	  several	  objectives:	  to	  punish	  the	  Bosnian	  Serbs	  for	  their	  atrocities,	  to	  strike	  targets	  in	  an	  effort	  to	  weaken	  their	  ability	  to	  make	  war,	  to	  help	  defend	  the	  remaining	  Bosnian	  Muslim	  enclaves,	  to	  demonstrate	  the	  will	  and	  commitment	  of	  the	  U.S.	  in	  preventing	  further	  ethnic	  cleansing,	  and	  most	  importantly	  to	  force	  the	  Serbs	  to	  negotiating	  a	  lasting	  peace	  agreement.201	  	  The	  airstrikes	  led	  to	  battlefield	  withdrawals	  of	  Bosnian	  Serb	  forces	  and	  forced	  them	  to	  turn	  over	  their	  remaining	  heavy	  weapons	  in	  and	  around	  Sarajevo.202	  	  	  Clinton’s	  initial	  reactions	  to	  Srebrenica	  did	  not	  yet	  reflect	  the	  will	  of	  his	  public,	  but	  he	  was	  willing	  to	  take	  unpopular	  actions	  to	  halt	  the	  violence.	  	  In	  2013,	  at	  a	  forum	  entitled	  “Bosnia,	  Intelligence,	  and	  the	  Clinton	  Presidency,”	  Clinton	  reflected	  on	  his	  actions	  in	  those	  early	  days	  following	  Srebrenica.	  	  “Often	  times	  when	  a	  proposed	  course	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  201	  In	  a	  memorandum	  for	  the	  National	  Security	  Advisor,	  Ambassador	  Albright,	  arguing	  for	  a	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  U.S.	  military	  presence	  in	  Bosnia,	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  seven	  strategic	  objectives	  of	  U.S.-­‐led	  NATO	  airstrikes.	  	  Memorandum	  for	  the	  National	  Security	  Advisor	  from	  Ambassador	  Madeleine	  K.	  Albright,	  “Options	  for	  Bosnia,”	  April	  14,	  1993,	  CPL.	  Accessed	  June	  15,	  2015.	  	  Online:	  	  http://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/show/12326	  	  	  202	  Intelligence	  Report	  from	  DCI	  Interagency	  Balkan	  Task	  Force,	  “Impact	  of	  the	  NATO	  Air	  Campaign	  in	  Bosnia,”	  19	  September	  1995,	  CPL.	  	  Accessed	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  15,	  2015.	  Online.	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of	  action	  is	  unpopular,	  it’s	  not	  exactly	  like	  the	  voters	  are	  telling	  you	  not	  to	  do	  it.”	  	  Realizing	  the	  gamble	  he	  was	  taking,	  (facing	  a	  reelection	  campaign	  against	  a	  popular	  GOP	  rival	  in	  Senator	  Dole)	  he	  considered	  the	  will	  of	  the	  public	  a	  warning,	  but	  not	  a	  barrier.	  	  “It’s	  basically	  like	  a	  giant,	  blinking	  yellow	  light,”	  he	  stated.203	  	  	  As	  Clinton	  proceeded	  with	  caution,	  his	  Interagency	  Balkan	  Task	  Force	  contemplated	  and	  planned	  for	  an	  American-­‐led	  military	  intervention,	  despite	  their	  near	  certainty	  that	  any	  intervention	  force	  would	  sustain	  “significant	  casualties	  and	  would	  need	  to	  remain	  in	  the	  region	  for	  years.”	  	  They	  considered	  military	  intervention	  a	  viable	  option	  as	  early	  as	  July	  13,	  1995	  –	  just	  three	  days	  after	  Srebrenica.204	  	  	  Aside	  from	  highlighting	  the	  absurdity	  that	  Bosnia	  was	  “just”	  a	  European	  problem,	  more	  importantly,	  and	  perhaps	  surprisingly	  for	  Clinton,	  the	  war	  in	  Bosnia	  caught	  the	  attention	  of	  the	  American	  public.	  	  Carter’s	  failed	  peace	  attempt,	  the	  shooting	  down	  of	  U.S.	  Captain	  O’Grady,	  and	  now	  Srebrenica	  thrust	  the	  Bosnian	  War	  onto	  the	  headlines	  of	  American	  media	  outlets,	  and	  the	  American	  public	  was	  paying	  attention.	  	  Media	  coverage	  of	  the	  Bosnian	  War	  increased	  significantly	  as	  the	  U.S.	  became	  more	  involved,	  creating	  a	  connection	  between	  the	  American	  people	  and	  what	  was	  formerly	  a	  European	  problem.	  	  For	  example,	  in	  1992,	  there	  were	  just	  over	  100	  articles	  about	  the	  Balkan	  crisis	  published	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  203	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  “Clinton	  Recalls	  U.S.	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  in	  Stopping	  Bosnia	  War:	  As former President Bill 
Clinton released hundreds of classified intelligence documents about the war, he said Washington had to 
take action in Bosnia whatever the US public thought about it.,” October	  2,	  2013,	  Balkan	  Transitional	  
Justice.	  	  Accessed	  June	  15,	  2015.	  Online.	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  204	  Intelligence	  Report	  from	  DCI	  Interagency	  Balkan	  Task	  Force,	  “The	  Bosnian	  Army	  in	  Srebrenica:	  What	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  18	  July	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  CPL.	  Accessed	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  2015.	  Online:	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in	  major	  American	  periodicals.	  	  In	  1995,	  there	  were	  more	  than	  1,000.205	  	  The	  Washington	  
Post	  published	  77	  articles	  covering	  the	  Bosnian	  War	  in	  July	  1995,	  but	  only	  nine	  of	  those	  were	  published	  before	  Srebrenica.206	  	  The	  increased	  U.S.	  media	  coverage	  of	  Bosnia	  after	  Srebrenica	  allowed	  Clinton	  to	  make	  a	  case	  for	  U.S.	  intervention	  to	  the	  American	  public.	  	  	  The	  public	  responded.	  	  Polling	  indicated	  that	  when	  the	  administration	  took	  a	  clear	  position	  against	  Serbian	  aggression,	  (most	  notably	  in	  August	  1995	  –	  one	  month	  after	  Srebrenica)	  the	  poll	  numbers	  reflected	  a	  greater	  degree	  of	  American	  support	  for	  military	  action	  in	  Bosnia.207	  	  	  Srebrenica,	  and	  the	  subsequent	  media	  coverage	  of	  Bosnia,	  encouraged	  the	  American	  public	  to	  become	  more	  compassionate	  toward	  Bosnia;	  it	  thrust	  the	  Bosnian	  War	  onto	  the	  headlines	  of	  American	  media	  outlets	  and	  to	  the	  forefront	  of	  public	  opinion.	  	  With	  actual	  military	  involvement,	  the	  issue	  would	  remain	  among	  the	  nation’s	  top	  news	  stories	  –	  keeping	  the	  Bosnia	  issue	  in	  the	  minds	  of	  the	  U.S.	  public,	  further	  convincing	  the	  American	  people	  that	  peace	  in	  Bosnia	  was	  in	  America’s	  best	  interest,	  and	  sending	  American	  combat	  troops	  to	  enforce	  peace	  was	  worth	  the	  risks.208	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  205	  Some	  of	  these	  articles	  were	  duplicates,	  but	  this	  does	  not	  dispute	  the	  fact	  that	  American	  media	  coverage	  of	  the	  Bosnian	  War	  increased	  significantly	  after	  the	  Srebrenica	  massacre.	  	  James	  J.	  Sadkovich,	  The	  U.S.	  Media	  and	  Yugoslavia,	  1991-­‐1995	  (Santa	  Barbara:	  Praeger,	  1998)	  	  110-­‐121.	  	  206	  James	  J.	  Sadkovich,	  The	  U.S.	  Media	  and	  Yugoslavia,	  1991-­‐1995	  (Santa	  Barbara:	  Praeger,	  1998)	  117-­‐118.	  See	  Appendix	  3	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Greater	  media	  coverage	  of	  Bosnia	  also	  affected	  those	  who	  opposed	  American	  involvement.	  	  Clinton	  recognized	  that	  the	  media	  surge	  following	  Srebrenica	  would	  make	  his	  political	  opponents	  appear	  callous	  if	  they	  continued	  to	  argue	  against	  stopping	  human	  rights	  violations	  occurring	  in	  Bosnia.	  	  As	  American	  public	  opinion	  shifted,	  so	  did	  that	  of	  many	  politicians.	  	  Suddenly,	  policy	  makers	  who	  had	  opposed	  Bosnian	  intervention	  found	  themselves	  backpedaling	  and	  publicly	  stating	  that	  the	  president	  should	  be	  allowed	  to	  make	  his	  case	  before	  judging.	  	  Even	  Dole	  softened	  his	  stance	  on	  intervention.	  	  He	  agreed	  that	  Clinton	  should	  be	  able	  to	  make	  his	  case	  to	  the	  American	  people.	  	  He	  stated	  that	  he	  would	  like	  to	  support	  the	  president	  on	  his	  decision	  to	  intervene.209	  	  	  
Not	  all	  of	  Clinton’s	  rivals	  remained	  silent,	  however.	  Powell	  still	  opposed	  deploying	  U.S.	  ground	  forces,	  and	  Buchanan,	  ever	  the	  isolationist,	  held	  true	  to	  his	  non-­‐interventionist	  stance.	  	  Many	  Republicans	  adopted	  an	  attitude	  of	  “support	  the	  troops,	  but	  not	  the	  plan”	  and	  vowed	  to	  make	  any	  intervention	  involving	  ground	  troops	  a	  difficult	  road	  for	  the	  president.210	  	  In	  October	  1995,	  the	  Republican-­‐controlled	  House	  of	  Representatives	  passed	  a	  resolution	  stating	  that	  the	  United	  States	  should	  not	  send,	  or	  even	  pledge,	  American	  peacekeepers	  without	  permission	  from	  Congress.	  	  The	  resolution	  had	  no	  legal	  effect,	  but	  expressed	  a	  strong	  congressional	  opposition	  to	  the	  president’s	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plan	  to	  involve	  American	  combat	  forces	  in	  the	  Balkans.211	  
Getting	  his	  message	  across	  to	  the	  American	  public	  became	  central	  to	  Clinton's	  strategy	  for	  winning	  congressional	  support	  for	  sending	  U.S.	  combat	  troops	  to	  Bosnia.	  	  In	  November	  1995,	  Clinton	  addressed	  the	  nation.	  	  He	  told	  Americans	  that	  only	  the	  U.S.	  could	  prevent	  the	  resurgence	  of	  a	  grisly	  four-­‐year	  war	  that	  had	  produced	  more	  than	  100,000	  casualties	  and	  2,000,000	  refugees.	  	  Clinton	  also	  linked	  US	  national	  interest	  to	  stability	  in	  Europe,	  the	  loss	  of	  which	  had	  drawn	  the	  US	  into	  two	  world	  wars	  in	  the	  20th	  century.	  	  Clinton	  stated	  that	  the	  risks	  were	  acceptable	  because	  the	  mission	  had	  clear	  goals	  and	  limited	  duration	  and	  because	  US	  troops	  were	  being	  deployed	  to	  guarantee	  a	  peace	  treaty,	  not	  to	  end	  a	  civil	  war.	  	  ''America's	  role	  will	  not	  be	  about	  fighting	  a	  war,''	  Clinton	  said.	  ''It	  will	  be	  about	  helping	  the	  people	  of	  Bosnia	  secure	  their	  own	  peace.''212	  
Clinton’s	  assurance	  that	  US	  troops	  would	  be	  part	  of	  a	  60,000-­‐member	  NATO	  contingent,	  which	  would	  be	  deployed	  immediately	  after	  the	  finalization	  of	  a	  peace	  agreement,	  assuaged	  public	  apprehensions	  of	  unilateral	  U.S.	  action.	  	  His	  assurance	  of	  clear	  goals	  and	  limited	  duration	  further	  eased	  American	  trepidation.	  	  Finally,	  Clinton’s	  linking	  U.S.	  national	  interests	  to	  European	  peace	  and	  stability	  allowed	  the	  president	  to	  successfully	  make	  his	  case	  to	  the	  American	  public.213	  	  Clinton	  showed	  that	  Bosnia	  had	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  William	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  Clinton,	  “Transcript	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  Speech	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  Bosnia,”	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  27,	  1995.	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become	  an	  American	  problem.	  	  Though	  there	  were	  no	  tangible	  American	  interests	  at	  stake	  in	  Bosnia,	  ending	  the	  human	  rights	  abuses	  became	  its	  own	  American	  interest.	  	  In	  light	  of	  the	  massacres,	  the	  American	  people	  became	  willing	  to	  risk	  the	  lives	  of	  their	  sons	  and	  daughters	  to	  secure	  peace	  for	  the	  Bosnian	  people.	  
The	  U.S.	  Defense	  Department	  believed	  “Operation	  Deliberate	  Force”	  demonstrated	  the	  decisive	  role	  of	  air	  power	  when	  serving	  clear,	  achievable	  policy	  objectives.	  Furthermore,	  they	  felt	  the	  bombing	  campaign	  saved	  lives	  and	  helped	  pave	  the	  way	  for	  a	  negotiated	  peace	  settlement	  in	  Bosnia.	  	  Operation	  Deliberate	  Force	  was	  the	  crucial	  step	  in	  bringing	  the	  warring	  parties	  to	  the	  negotiating	  table	  at	  Dayton,	  leading	  to	  the	  peace	  agreement.214	  	  The Bosnian Serbs capitulated after the 
bombing campaign – they were astonished and terrified by the ability of the missiles to 
navigate the local street grid and pick out specific targets.215	  
Clinton	  deployed	  his	  Bosnia	  Contact	  Team	  led	  by	  Ambassador	  Holbrooke	  and	  General	  Wes	  Clark	  in	  hopes	  of	  negotiating	  a	  lasting	  peace.	  On	  August	  19,	  1995,	  this	  group,	  traveling	  in	  two	  French	  armored	  combat	  vehicles	  met	  with	  disaster	  as	  the	  inadequate	  Bosnian	  road	  gave	  way	  sending	  one	  of	  the	  vehicles	  tumbling	  down	  a	  mountainside.	  	  Three	  members	  of	  the	  contact	  team,	  Bob	  Frasure,	  Joe	  Kruzel,	  and	  Air	  Force	  Colonel	  Nelson	  Drew,	  perished	  in	  the	  accident.	  	  President	  Clinton	  later	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described	  the	  deceased	  as	  “patriotic	  public	  servants	  and	  good	  family	  men	  who	  died	  too	  young	  trying	  to	  save	  the	  lives	  of	  innocent	  people	  a	  long	  way	  from	  home.”216	  	  The	  deaths	  of	  the	  three	  diplomats	  served	  to	  further	  inspire	  the	  efforts	  of	  the	  negotiators	  and	  harden	  the	  stance	  of	  the	  Clinton	  administration.	  	  At	  this	  point,	  the	  Bosnia	  Contact	  Team,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  Clinton	  Administration,	  was	  more	  determined	  than	  ever	  to	  ensure	  a	  lasting	  peace	  in	  Bosnia.217	  After	  months	  of	  intense	  negotiations,	  President	  Clinton’s	  team	  and	  the	  leaders	  of	  the	  Bosnian	  belligerents	  reached	  a	  tentative	  agreement	  on	  peace	  in	  Bosnia.	  	  By	  the	  end	  of	  October	  1995,	  all	  sides	  agreed	  to	  meet	  in	  Dayton,	  Ohio	  to	  discuss	  an	  end	  to	  the	  fighting.	  	  Clinton’s	  Bosnia	  team	  informed	  the	  president,	  “This	  is	  the	  best	  chance	  we’ve	  had	  for	  peace	  since	  the	  war	  began.”218	  President	  Clinton	  briefed	  the	  press	  on	  October	  31,	  1995	  and	  said,	  “It	  may	  be	  the	  last	  chance	  we	  have	  for	  a	  very	  long	  time.”219	  	  Twenty	  one	  days	  of	  emotional	  negotiations	  in	  Dayton	  left	  the	  Bosnian	  Serbs,	  Croats,	  and	  Muslims	  reaching	  an	  acceptable	  peace	  agreement.	  	  	  On	  December	  7,	  1995,	  Clinton	  made	  phone	  calls	  to	  several	  world	  leaders	  and	  influential	  Americans	  in	  an	  effort	  to	  garner	  support	  for	  the	  Dayton	  agreement	  and	  a	  follow	  on	  NATO	  Implementation	  Force	  (IFOR.)	  	  Among	  those	  contacted	  were	  former	  Prime	  Minister	  Margaret	  Thatcher,	  Colin	  Powell,	  and	  former	  Presidents	  Gerald	  Ford,	  Jimmy	  Carter,	  and	  George	  H.W.	  Bush.	  	  Clinton	  stated	  that	  America’s	  participation	  in	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  216	  Clinton,	  My	  Life,	  668.-­‐669.	  	  217	  Derek	  Chollet,	  The	  Road	  to	  the	  Dayton	  Accords:	  A	  Study	  of	  American	  Statecraft,	  (New	  York:	  Palgrave	  MacMillan,	  2005)	  132.	  	  218	  Chollet,	  The	  Road	  to	  the	  Dayton	  Accords,	  132	  	  219	  Chollet,	  The	  Road	  to	  the	  Dayton	  Accords,	  180-­‐181.	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the	  mission	  was	  “vital	  to	  the	  future	  of	  NATO	  and	  America’s	  leadership	  role	  in	  the	  alliance.”	  	  That	  leadership	  role,	  Clinton	  asserted	  remained	  essential	  to	  securing	  peace	  and	  ending	  the	  Bosnian	  War.	  	  Clinton	  also	  mentioned	  that	  it	  was	  “critical	  for	  members	  of	  congress,	  from	  both	  sides	  of	  the	  aisle,	  keep	  an	  open	  mind”	  as	  they	  learned	  of	  the	  terms	  of	  the	  Dayton	  agreement.	  	  He	  asked	  for	  their	  assistance	  in	  making	  a	  case	  for	  IFOR.	  	  Powell	  told	  Clinton	  that	  his	  stance	  had	  not	  changed,	  and	  expressed	  concerns	  about	  the	  mission	  and	  America’s	  legacy,	  but	  that	  he	  would	  support	  the	  president’s	  decision.220	  Three	  weeks	  later	  20,000	  Americans	  formed	  part	  of	  a	  60,000	  strong	  NATO	  Implementation	  Force	  (IFOR)	  that	  arrived	  in	  Bosnia	  to	  ensure	  that	  the	  Dayton	  Peace	  Accords	  were	  enforced	  by	  all	  sides.	  	  U.S.	  military	  participation	  in	  IFOR	  proved	  vital.	  	  Had	  the	  American’s	  left	  the	  implementation	  up	  to	  the	  Europeans,	  the	  Dayton	  agreement	  could	  have	  ended	  in	  renewed	  violence,	  similar	  to	  the	  previous	  peace	  plans	  employed	  by	  the	  U.N.	  and	  the	  European	  Community.	  	  Instead,	  the	  region	  continues	  to	  enjoy	  peace	  a	  decade	  after	  the	  last	  American	  combat	  forces	  left	  Bosnia.221	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  220	  Talking	  Points	  with	  notes,	  “Securing	  Peace	  in	  Bosnia:	  Talking	  Points	  for	  Calls	  to	  Former	  Presidents	  Bush,	  Ford,	  and	  Carter;	  Margaret	  Thatcher;	  Colin	  Powell;	  and	  Elie	  Weisel,”	  File:	  FG001-­‐08,	  Folder:	  14346955,	  OA/ID:	  21807	  	  Clinton	  Presidential	  Records,	  WHORM,	  CPL.	  	  221	  U.S.	  combat	  forces	  officially	  left	  Bosnia	  in	  late	  November	  2004.	  	  More	  than	  100,000	  U.S.	  personnel	  served	  in	  Operation	  Joint	  Endeavor	  since	  U.S.	  troops	  crossed	  the	  Sava	  River	  into	  Bosnia	  at	  the	  end	  of	  December	  1995.	  Thousands	  more	  supported	  the	  service	  members	  from	  bases	  in	  Croatia,	  Italy,	  Germany	  and	  Hungary.	  (a) Jim	  Garamone	  -­‐	  United	  States	  Press	  Service,	  “U.S.	  Peacekeepers	  Finish	  Bosnia	  Mission,	  Case	  Colors,”	  DoD	  News,	  U.S.	  Department	  of	  Defense	  website.	  	  Accessed	  June	  15,	  2015.	  Online.	  	  http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=24700	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Conclusion	  –	  Victorious	  Vision	  	  Intervention	  in	  the	  Bosnian	  War	  would	  ultimately	  prove	  to	  be	  one	  of	  the	  Clinton	  administration’s	  boldest	  and	  most	  successful	  accomplishments.	  	  After	  combat	  forces	  were	  deployed	  to	  enforce	  the	  implementation	  of	  the	  Dayton	  Peace	  Accords,	  public	  opinion	  for	  the	  mission	  soared.	  	  In	  1998,	  just	  over	  two	  years	  after	  the	  deployment	  of	  U.S.	  soldiers	  to	  Bosnia,	  the	  Washington	  Post	  reported	  that	  American	  public	  support	  for	  the	  NATO	  mission	  in	  Bosnia	  had	  “never	  been	  higher.”222	  	  Clinton	  would	  eventually	  admit	  that	  he	  felt	  it	  was	  a	  miracle	  that	  war	  had	  not	  resumed	  in	  Bosnia.223	  	  Reflecting	  years	  later	  on	  America’s	  role	  in	  stopping	  the	  Bosnian	  War,	  Clinton	  stated	  “Bosnia	  in	  some	  ways	  became	  a	  metaphor	  for	  the	  struggles	  of	  the	  21st	  century,”	  as	  it	  shaped	  both	  his	  presidency,	  and	  his	  foreign	  policy	  going	  forward.224	  	  	  Today,	  an	  exhibit	  displaying	  Clinton’s	  efforts	  in	  the	  Balkans	  stands	  among	  the	  most	  extravagant	  in	  the	  William	  Jefferson	  Clinton	  Presidential	  Library.	  	  When	  he	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  222	  Richard	  Morin,	  “Missing	  the	  Story	  on	  Bosnia,”	  The	  Washington	  Post,	  Monday,	  April	  27,	  1998.	  Accessed	  June	  15,	  2015.	  Online.	  	  	  http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-­‐srv/politics/polls/wat/archive/wat042798.htm	  	  223	  Debate	  Transcripts,	  “The	  First	  Clinton	  	  -­‐	  Dole	  Presidential	  Debate:	  Debate	  Transcript,”	  October	  6,	  1995,	  The	  Commission	  on	  Presidential	  Debates.	  	  Accessed	  June	  15,	  2015.	  Online.	  	  http://www.debates.org/index.php?page=october-­‐6-­‐1996-­‐debate-­‐transcript	  	  224	  Valerie	  Hopkins,	  “Clinton	  Recalls	  U.S.	  Role	  in	  Stopping	  Bosnia	  War:	  As former President Bill 
Clinton released hundreds of classified intelligence documents about the war, he said Washington had to 
take action in Bosnia whatever the US public thought about it.,” October	  2,	  2013,	  Balkan	  Transitional	  
Justice.	  	  Accessed	  June	  15,	  2015.	  Online.	  http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/clinton-­‐recalls-­‐us-­‐role-­‐in-­‐stopping-­‐bosnia-­‐war	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entered	  office,	  the	  American	  people,	  for	  the	  most	  part,	  were	  optimistic	  about	  the	  future	  and	  direction	  of	  the	  country.	  	  After	  three	  years,	  however,	  economic	  issues	  and	  domestic	  problems	  caused	  trouble	  at	  home,	  and	  Clinton’s	  foreign	  policy	  team	  had	  blundered	  affairs	  in	  Somalia	  and	  Rwanda.	  	  With	  his	  approval	  ratings	  nearing	  their	  all-­‐time	  low	  and	  facing	  a	  re-­‐election	  bid	  in	  1996,	  the	  value	  of	  a	  foreign	  policy	  victory	  in	  the	  Balkans	  was	  not	  lost	  on	  the	  president.225	  	  Reading	  the	  memoirs	  of	  Clinton,	  Albright,	  or	  Christopher	  would	  lead	  one	  to	  believe	  that	  that	  the	  administration’s	  chief	  incentive	  for	  their	  Bosnia	  policy	  was	  a	  moral	  one;	  they	  wanted	  to	  stop	  the	  violence	  because	  it	  was	  their	  only	  ethical	  option.	  	  While	  this	  may	  or	  may	  not	  be	  true,	  it	  is	  not	  enough.	  	  It	  may	  be	  nearly	  impossible	  to	  prove	  exactly	  what	  motivated	  Clinton	  to	  push	  for	  an	  America	  intervention	  in	  Bosnia,	  but	  his	  motivations	  were	  certainly	  multi-­‐faceted.	  	  It	  is	  true	  that	  Bosnia	  represented	  a	  weakness	  in	  Bush’s	  foreign	  policy,	  and	  Clinton	  campaigned	  heavily	  on	  it.	  	  This	  does	  not	  mean	  that	  his	  motivations	  were	  entirely	  politically	  motivated.	  	  It	  is	  true	  that	  Clinton’s	  poll	  numbers	  were	  lower	  before	  the	  Dayton	  Peace	  Accords	  than	  after	  their	  implementation,	  but	  this	  does	  not	  mean	  Clinton	  was	  only	  trying	  to	  turn	  around	  his	  public	  image.	  	  While	  Clinton’s	  role	  in	  halting	  Europe’s	  worst	  atrocities	  since	  World	  War	  II	  will	  certainly	  be	  fondly	  remembered,	  this	  is	  not	  proof	  that	  Clinton	  was	  motivated	  by	  his	  legacy.	  	  What	  is	  certain	  is	  Clinton	  entered	  office	  with	  a	  very	  different	  idea	  of	  America’s	  role	  in	  the	  post-­‐Cold	  War	  world	  than	  that	  of	  his	  predecessor.	  	  Clinton’s	  view	  was	  more	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  225	  Gallup	  Poll,	  “Bill	  Clinton’s	  Presidential	  Job	  Approval,”	  Presidential	  Approval	  Ratings	  -­‐-­‐	  Bill	  Clinton,	  
Gallup.	  	  Accessed	  June	  14,	  2015.	  Online:	  	  http://www.gallup.com/poll/116584/presidential-­‐approval-­‐ratings-­‐bill-­‐clinton.aspx	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encompassing	  view	  of	  American	  foreign	  policy	  that	  placed	  a	  higher	  premium	  on	  Euro-­‐American	  cooperation	  in	  the	  New	  Atlantic	  Community	  and	  regarded	  instability	  in	  Europe	  as	  an	  American	  issue.	  	  The	  post-­‐Cold	  War	  world	  was	  one	  of	  quickly	  developing	  challenges	  for	  the	  world’s	  lone	  superpower.	  	  It	  was	  also	  a	  period	  of	  clashing	  ideals	  as	  the	  old,	  narrow	  vision	  for	  the	  U.S.	  was	  forced	  to	  make	  way	  for	  a	  more	  incorporating	  idea	  for	  U.S.	  foreign	  policy;	  in	  this	  world,	  where	  the	  world	  was	  becoming	  increasingly	  more	  connected,	  a	  more	  encompassing	  foreign	  policy	  was	  necessary	  for	  the	  world’s	  preeminent	  military	  power.	  	  Bosnia	  -­‐	  more	  specifically	  Srebrenica	  -­‐	  proved	  this	  to	  be	  the	  case.	  	  Bosnia	  presented	  the	  first	  Euro-­‐American	  foreign	  policy	  challenge,	  and	  Clinton’s	  new	  vision	  for	  the	  U.S.	  in	  the	  post-­‐Cold	  War	  world	  proved	  superior	  to	  all	  of	  that	  of	  his	  opponents.	  	  With	  his	  intervention	  into	  the	  Bosnian	  War,	  Clinton	  charted	  a	  new	  course	  for	  American	  foreign	  policy.	  In	  an	  age	  of	  increased	  American	  power,	  authority,	  and	  responsibility,	  the	  Clinton	  administration	  made	  a	  clear	  statement	  that	  catastrophes	  such	  as	  the	  Bosnian	  war	  were	  most	  effectively	  met	  with	  cooperation,	  and	  a	  foreign	  policy	  that	  considered	  the	  problems	  of	  one’s	  partners	  as	  important	  as	  their	  own.	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Appendix	  1:	  Bosnian	  War	  Death	  Toll	  –	  Casualty	  figures	  
according	  to	  the	  Demographic	  Unit	  at	  the	  ICTY	  (Reported	  February	  1,	  2010)	  
Total	  104,733	   Bosniaks	   c.	  68,101	  Serbs	   c.	  22,779	  
Croats	   c.	  8,858	  
Others	   c.	  4,995	  
Total	  civilians	  36,703	   Bosniaks	   25,609	  Serbs	   7,481	  
Croats	   1,676	  
Others	   1,937	  
Total	  soldiers	  68,030	   Bosniaks	   42,492	  Serbs	   15,298	  
Croats	   7,182	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Appendix	  2:	  Operation	  Deliberate	  Force	  Summary	  DATA	  
• Total	  sorties	  flown:	  3515	  
o Penetrating	  sorties	  (CAS,	  BAI,	  SEAD,	  RECCE,	  SAR/CSAR):	  2470	  
o Support	  sorties	  (NAEW,	  ABCCC,	  ELINT/ESM,	  AAR,):	  1045	  
• Total	  bombs	  dropped:	  1026	  
o Precision	  munitions:	  708	  
o Non-­‐precision	  munitions:	  318	  
• Airstrikes	  were	  conducted	  on	  eleven	  days	  during	  the	  period	  8/29–9/14	  1995	  	  
o 48	  target	  complexes	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Appendix	  3:	  Media	  Coverage	  of	  the	  Bosnian	  War	  	  
New	  York	  Times	  Stories	  Covering	  Bosnia	   1994	   1995	   1996	  January	   121	   74	   143	  February	   201	   68	   111	  March	   106	   79	   106	  April	   156	   93	   95	  May	   96	   101	   78	  June	   71	   177	   97	  July	   79	   168	   93	  August	   81	   130	   84	  September	   93	   153	   90	  October	   78	   161	   82	  November	   108	   141	   87	  December	   161	   234	   85	  	   	   	   	  	   	   	   	  Washington	  Post	   1994	   1995	   1996	  January	   144	   110	   201	  February	   235	   80	   144	  March	   167	   60	   151	  April	   197	   88	   191	  May	   156	   78	   116	  June	   133	   229	   121	  July	   113	   180	   129	  August	   78	   183	   135	  September	   88	   150	   154	  October	   55	   187	   122	  November	   107	   232	   130	  December	   161	   371	   124	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News	  &	  Observer	   1994	   1995	   1996	  January	   3	   3	   5	  February	   5	   1	   5	  March	   3	   3	   2	  April	   2	   0	   7	  May	   7	   2	   1	  June	   0	   5	   3	  July	   0	   5	   3	  August	   0	   4	   4	  September	   1	   1	   3	  October	   1	   3	   5	  
November	   1	   6	   2	  
December	   3	   20	   0	  
	   	   	   	  
	   	   	   	  Significant	  Events	  Affecting	  U.S.	  Media	  Coverage	  
December	  1994	  -­‐	  Carter's	  peace	  agreement	  in	  Bosnia	  
	   	   	  January	  1995	  -­‐	  Dole	  introduces	  embargo	  legislation	  
	   	   	  June	  1995	  -­‐	  USAF	  Capt.	  Scott	  O'Grady	  aircraft	  shot	  down	  
	   	   	  July	  1995	  –	  Srebrenica	  
	   	   	  December	  1995	  -­‐	  Dayton	  Peace	  Accords	  signed	  
	   	   	  Late	  December	  1995/January	  1996	  -­‐	  U.S.	  troops	  deployed	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